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This thesis consists of two chapters in political economy of finance and one chapter in FinTech. 
My central interest is to study the interaction between socioeconomic stability and financial 
activities of corporations and financial institutions. The first chapter focuses on whether economic 
shocks trigger labour unrest and fuel political extremism. The second chapter provides an analysis 
as to how state-owned firms use internal funds to address sudden social unrest events. The final 
chapter investigates if new peer-to-peer (P2P) lending technology undermines macroprudential 
regulation and adds risk to financial stability. 
In Chapter 1, we aim to answer a long existing question involving economics, political 
science, and history: do economic shocks trigger social unrest? The literature lacks a clear answer 
to this question, primarily because causality runs both ways: social unrest can both disturb labour 
relations and worsen investment opportunities, thus leading to reductions in economic output. To 
address this empirical challenge, we go back to the 1930s in China, where the 1933 U.S. Silver 
Purchase Program acts as a shock to bank lending. Using hand-collected loan-level data, as well 
as detailed labour unrest and communist penetration information, we document how the silver 
purchase shock results in a severe credit contraction, and that firms borrowing from banks with a 
larger exposure to the shock experience increased labour unrest and Communist Party penetration 
among their workers. This study contributes to the understanding of social consequences caused 
by credit contraction. 
In Chapter 2, I study how social instability affects firm behaviour. Particularly, I show that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be used as a political mechanism for the government to 
maintain social stability. Upon major social unrest events, SOEs strategically allocate internal 
funds within their business groups to offset local instability by altering labour payments, hiring, 
and investment levels. To pursue the political goal of maintaining stability, SOEs lose market 
value, but their allocation strategy helps recover local sentiment after unrest occurs. Additionally, 
I find that recovering social stability is associated with improved long-term firm performance. This 
study contributes to the literature by showing how the intra-group allocation of resources 
incorporates political objectives and yields socioeconomic impact. 
In the final chapter, we study to what extent P2P lending poses a threat to loan-to-value 
(LTV)- based regulation on the traditional credit market. With the growing popularity of P2P 
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lending, concerns arise as unregulated P2P lending could potentially help borrowers circumvent 
LTV caps, which aim to prevent excessive household leverage. We use a policy shock that 
tightened mortgage LTV caps in a number of Chinese cities in 2013 to study whether borrowers 
borrow more from P2P platforms in treated cities to elude credit restrictions. Relying on 
transaction data from Renrendai, a major Chinese P2P platform, we show that P2P loans increase 
in treated cities. However, lenders do not adjust screening strategies around the shock, despite the 
fact that the increased loans default more ex-post. This finding indicates that without proper 
regulation, P2P lending can allow risker borrowers to circumvent traditional LTV-based credit 
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Do economic shocks trigger social unrest? To answer this question, we turn to a natural experiment 
in 1930s China, where the 1933 U.S. Silver Purchase program acts as a shock to bank lending. 
This setting eliminates potential confounding effects of policy, focuses the set of relevant social 
actors (factory workers and the Communist Party), and provides an exogenous shock to credit, 
limiting the scope for reverse causality. We assemble a novel, hand-collected dataset of loan 
contracts between banks and individual firms, labor unrest episodes, and underground Communist 
Party penetration. We show that the Silver Purchase shock results in a severe credit contraction, 
and that firms borrowing from banks with a larger exposure to the shock experience increased 
labor unrest and Communist Party penetration among their workers. These findings contribute to 
understanding the socio-political consequences of credit (and more in general, economic) shocks. 
 
JEL: G01, G21, N15, N25. 








Do economic shocks trigger social unrest? Versions of this question often feature in the academic 
debate in economics, political science, and history, among policy makers, as well as in the general 
public. Examples include whether tight money and credit led to the development of populist 
movements in 19th century United States (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 116-117; Rodrik 
(2017)); whether the Great Depression drove the Nazis to power in 1930s Germany (Feinstein, 
Temin, and Toniolo (1997), pp. 120-124); and more recently, whether the Eurozone crisis of 2010-
11 fueled mass protests and the rise of populist movements in southern Europe.1 The intensification 
of social unrest in a number of countries in recent years has also led to renewed interest in its 
causes and drivers by international organizations such as the OECD (Renn, Jovanovic, and 
Schroter (2011)), the World Bank (Word Bank (2016)), and the International Labor Organization 
(ILO (2013)).  
Despite its relevance, however, the question does not yet have a clear answer in the 
literature. That is because a test of the relationship between the economy and the emergence of 
social unrest poses at least three challenges.2 First, causality can run both ways (Alesina and Perotti 
(1994)): social unrest itself can exacerbate labor relations (Kennan (1986)) or worsen investment 
prospects (Blattman and Miguel (2010)), thus reducing employment and output. As a result, it is 
difficult to determine whether social unrest precedes or follows aggregate movements in the 
economy, as well as to design policy responses (Renn, Jovanovic, and Schroter (2011)). Second, 
inference is typically confounded by the presence of fiscal and monetary authorities, whose 
policies may pursue social objectives.3 Third, present-day social unrest has been associated with 
movements outside the political mainstream, whose ideological base is often vaguely delineated. 
                                                   
1 See, for instance, “Populism: What Happens Next?” Financial Times, 9 January 2015. 
2 We define social unrest as a state of generalized dissatisfaction that gives rise to public disturbances, such as riots, 
strikes, and public rallies, as well as increasing support for movements outside mainstream political ideologies. The 
expression “social unrest” is consistent with usage by policy institutions and international organizations. Our 
definition embodies the focus by such institutions on labor market conditions, standards of living, and trust in the 
government (see Renn, Jovanovic, and Schroter (2011) and ILO (2013)). 
3 For instance, the Federal Reserve is charged with conducting monetary policy “so as to promote effectively the goals 
of maximum employment” together with “stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” See the Federal 
Reserve Reform Act of 1977 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Passarelli and Tabellini 
(2017) provide a general theory of how political unrest may affect government policies.  
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It is thus hard to trace a fringe movement’s support to a specific social class exposed to economic 
hardship.4  
Our study addresses these challenges, studying the effects of a credit market shock in 1930s 
China. First, we isolate the direction of causality via a natural experiment, triggered by the U.S. 
1933 Silver Purchase program. Undertaken for purely U.S. domestic reasons, and independent of 
Chinese economic conditions, the Silver Purchase raised the price of silver worldwide and drained 
the Chinese silver stock. Because China was on the silver standard, the credit capacity of its banks 
was tied to their silver reserves; we thus use the Silver Purchase shock to identify changes in credit 
supply. Second, in our setting the link between policy and the economy is much looser than today: 
the fledgling Republic of China lacked a central bank regulating money supply and credit, and 
private ones issued money and loans.5 Third, the main radical movement in 1930s China, the 
Communist Party, had a well-defined social target in the urban areas: the working class, and in 
particular factory workers.6  
We provide micro-econometric evidence of the shock’s impact on social unrest, based on 
novel, hand-collected archival information on credit, labor relations, and fringe political activity 
in 1930s China. Our data reconstruct a Chinese “credit registry” for the period 1931-1935, and 
document firm-level labor unrest episodes in three major Chinese cities (Nanjing, Shanghai, and 
Tianjin), as well as Communist Party penetration among workers at firms located in Shanghai.   
We exploit cross-sectional variation in the exposure of lenders and borrowers – banks and 
firms – to the Silver Purchase shock to identify the direct effect of credit rationing on social unrest, 
measured by labor unrest intensity and Communist Party penetration. Our empirical strategy is 
articulated in two steps. First, we test if there is a lending contraction, and banks with a larger 
exposure to the Silver Purchase shock (lower pre-1933 silver reserves) curb credit after 1933. 
Second, we study whether labor unrest episodes and the spread of Communism in Chinese firms 
                                                   
4 For instance, delimiting the social support for right-wing parties in Europe is notoriously challenging (Arzheimer 
(2009)), and the voter base of modern fringe movements transcends traditional boundaries between the political right 
and left (Cramer Walsh (2012), Jacoby (2014)). More recent work shows how the support to populist movements is 
associated with a number of voter characteristics (Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2016), Guiso et al. (2017)).  
5 Government budgets at the time were limited, and fiscal policy was not generally considered a tool to mitigate 
economic shocks, especially in an emerging economy such as the Republic of China. 
6 In a speech given on June 30, 1949, to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman 
Mao Zedong declared: “The people’s democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class. (…) The 
entire history of revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class revolution fails and that with the 
leadership of the working class revolution triumphs.” 
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relate to their banks’ silver reserves. If banks exposed to the Silver Purchase shock cut lending, 
firms borrowing from them face tighter financial constraints, which limit investment and lead to 
pay cuts and layoffs, increasing the likelihood of labor unrest and Communist support. Our 
evidence supports these arguments.  
While throughout the analysis we pay great attention to identification and what we can and 
cannot conclude in causal terms, our main results are immediately visible in the data displayed in 
Figures 1 and 2. Chinese credit sharply contracts over 1933-35: credit-to-GDP drops by about 15% 
(Fig. 1.A), and credit-to-deposits by 10% (Fig. 1.B). As we show in Figure 2, this is driven by 
banks with lower pre-1933 silver reserves (panel A). Firms borrowing from these banks, in turn, 
experience increased labor unrest intensity and Communist party penetration. By 1935, labor 
unrest episodes (panel B) and Communist penetration (panel C) are about twice more likely than 
at firms borrowing from banks with larger reserves. 
Our tests exploit the wealth of micro-level information in our data to interpret these facts 
in a causal sense. First, we show that banks with lower pre-1933 silver reserves reduce lending 
volumes after 1933. Because we are able to observe bank-firm lending relationships, we can absorb 
credit demand with borrowing-firm fixed effects: the same firm, borrowing from multiple banks, 
experiences restricted lending from those banks that are more exposed to the Silver Purchase. 
Therefore, the shock appears to ration credit. 
Second, we look at social unrest. As a first gauge, we document that firms that are more 
exposed to the Silver Purchase shock experience a disproportionate increase in labor unrest after 
1933. We measure a firm’s exposure by its access to silver reserves pools, either from banks with 
which it has an ongoing lending relationship, or associated with banks with branches near the 
firm’s location. Smaller reserves pools are related to a larger increase in labor unrest intensity. Our 
estimates imply that borrowers with access to the smallest reserves pools experience a 30% larger 
increase in the number of labor unrest episodes, and a 15% longer average episode duration, in 
comparison to firms borrowing from banks with the largest reserve pools. 
As a second measure of social unrest, we study fringe political activity, proxied by 
Communist Party penetration. Our regressions show that firms with access to the smallest reserves 
pools experience a 3 to 6.5% larger increase in communist penetration, relative to firms with access 
to the largest reserve pools. Limited access to credit resulting from the Silver Purchase, thus, has 
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important socio-political consequences, exacerbating labor relations and, to a more modest extent, 
affecting the reach of the Communist Party.  
Additional tests rule out alternative interpretations of our findings. First, the effects we 
uncover are unlikely driven by omitted factors affecting East Asian economies in the 1930s. 
Comparing industries exposed to versus isolated from international trade, to assess the impact of 
a mechanical currency appreciation driven by the Silver Purchase, we find statistically 
indistinguishable effects across the two groups. This indicates that an exchange rate channel is 
unlikely behind our results, and alleviates concerns about a worldwide trend towards greater 
instability associated with the 1930s Great Depression: international trade exposure does not 
appear to mediate our effects. In addition, there is no evidence of similar effects in Hong Kong, 
the closest economy to 1930s China. Finally, our results are robust to excluding firms related to 
Japanese interests, suggesting that they are not driven by Japanese political interference. 
Second, we address the potential endogenous selection of banks into high and low pre-
1933 silver reserves groups. We exploit a unique feature of 1930s China’s monetary system: the 
parallel circulation of a traditional currency backed by copper, whose availability is exogenously 
determined by the geographical distribution of copper mines. Copper coins circulated locally and 
were typically used to clear small transactions, as a partial substitute to Chinese silver dollars, in 
regions with a relative abundance of copper. We use copper availability at local mines as an 
instrument for the demand for silver-backed currency, and thus pre-1933 reserves. Instrumental 
variables estimation confirms our results, indicating that they are not driven by selection.  
Third, for a sample of textile mills for which the information is available, we find that firms 
with access to a smaller silver reserves pool are more likely to reduce employment, electricity 
consumption, and output after 1933. This result indicates that labor unrest episodes (and, 
potentially, Communist penetration) are indeed related to worsening economic conditions driven 
by the Silver Purchase shock. It is also consistent with labor unrest statistics, showing that a large 
majority of unrest episodes are due to salary cuts and employees layoffs. 
Our results speak to a growing literature relating economic shocks to social and political 
outcomes (de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke (2013); Dube and Vargas (2013); Bai and 
Jia (2016); Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016)). The literature has not yet reached a consensus 
on whether economic shocks have a socio-political effect. Some studies argue, for instance, that 
austerity does not have an impact on political stability (Alesina et al. (1998); Alesina, Carloni, and 
14 
 
Lecce (2011)), others find that it leads to a rise in social and political unrest (Ponticelli and Voth 
(2017)). Focusing on the Silver Purchase episode, and using micro data, helps us identify a causal 
channel running from a negative economic shock – the 1930s Chinese credit crunch – to social 
unrest. While we study a credit shock, our findings can be generalized to any shock affecting firms’ 
investment prospects. We also contribute to the literature on the economic determinants of labor 
unrest (Kennan (1986); Naidu and Yuchtman (2015)). In this literature too, a general challenge is 
that the likelihood of labor unrest and firm behavior are jointly determined. Our empirical 
framework allows us to examine how an exogenous shock to the firm’s access to credit affects 
labor unrest propensity. 
Our work also provides new evidence on the effects of the Silver Purchase Program on the 
Chinese economy. This is considered a key moment in Chinese economic history, and throughout 
the years it has received the attention of many prominent scholars (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), 
Brandt and Sargent (1989), Rawski (1989, 1993), Friedman (1992), Burdekin (2008)). We 
contribute to the study of this historical episode by bringing to the table new micro-level data that 
allow us to focus on a specific channel, through which the Program may have affected social unrest 
and the real economy: credit.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the real effects of bank liquidity shocks. This 
literature has focused on the identification of credit supply effects, e.g. via natural experiments 
(Khwaja and Mian (2008); Schnabl (2012); Chodorow-Reich (2014); Cingano, Manaresi, and 
Sette (2016)). Our setting combines a plausibly exogenous shock – the U.S. Silver Purchase – with 
micro-level data on labor unrest and political extremism, providing evidence on so far unexplored 
real effects of credit shocks, and suggesting that restrictions to finance and credit can be a powerful 
trigger of social unrest.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the historical 
background. Section III presents the data. Section IV presents our tests. Section V discusses the 
interpretation of our results. Section VI concludes. 
1.2. Historical background 
A. Credit and silver in 1930s China 
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In the early 1930s, Chinese banks are divided into two categories, “modern” and “native.” The 
Chinese Banker’s Yearbook (全国银行年鉴) reports 176 “modern” domestic banks in China, with 
over 1,300 branches (see also Liu (2007)). These banks can issue currency (e.g. to make loans), 
subject to a reserve requirement: the bank must hold silver reserves corresponding to at least 60% 
of the nominal amount of banknotes it issues (the remaining 40% consisting of government bonds). 
In order to make a new loan, thus, the bank can draw on its reserves in excess of the 60% threshold, 
or purchase silver on the market to back the lending amount exceeding its reserves. Silver reserve 
ratios range from 60% to 100% and are around 66% on average, so that different banks have a 
different exposure to the Silver Purchase shock (also see next section).  
Silver reserves are reported on the assets side of bank balance sheets, at the official parity 
established by the Treasury. This implies that an increase in the market price of silver does not 
directly increase the asset value of the bank. A bank can only capitalize the increase in silver prices 
by redeeming banknotes, obtaining silver and recording in the balance sheet the corresponding 
amount at market prices, effectively, reducing money supply. 
The four largest modern banks – Central Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of 
Communications, and Farmers Bank of China – have a closer relationship with political power, 
and perform duties such as placing Treasury bonds on the market (Tamagna (1942, p. 121)). There 
is, however, no central bank in the modern sense, entrusted to set interest rates or to regulate the 
money supply.  
The “native” banks are smaller, operate locally, and often lack limited liability (Tamagna 
(1942, p. 57-59)). They mainly circulate banknotes issued by the modern banks. In addition, they 
may issue in their own name banknotes backed by copper, for local circulation (Tamagna (1942, 
p. 68)). Although our data do not include native banks (to the best of our knowledge, no records 
of their balance sheets and loans survive), we exploit their issuance of copper-based currency in a 
robustness check in Section V.  
B. The Silver Purchase program 
The Silver Purchase program is initiated in May 1933, establishing that the U.S. government can 
monetize silver (in addition to gold) to back a money supply expansion. The Roosevelt 
administration orders U.S. mints to buy all newly produced U.S. silver at 64.64 cents per ounce, 
at a time when the market price is 44 cents (Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 483)). The world 
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price of silver nearly doubles in the space of two years, reaching about 70 cents per ounce in New 
York in 1935 (Figure 3.A).7  
The Roosevelt administration undertakes the Silver Purchase program to accommodate 
lobbying in the senate by the so-called “silver bloc.”8 Between 1928 and 1932, the price of silver 
has dropped by 30%, and silver producers increasingly demand Federal intervention to reverse this 
trend. Out of 14 silver-bloc Senators, 12 are Democrats like Roosevelt, and strongly advocate 
policies to raise silver prices. Their interests are also backed by states with large agricultural 
sectors, which aim to increase inflation and raise agricultural prices. In 1934, the Silver Purchase 
Act further empowers the Federal Government to purchase silver at home and abroad. 
Rising silver prices have a visible impact on the quantity of silver available in China, as 
large amounts are exported to take advantage of the high market price. The Chinese silver stock 
growth rate takes a sharp downward turn after 1933, reducing the stock by about 15% by 1935 
(Figure 3.B).9 Foreign banks operating in China, such as HSBC and the National City Bank of 
New York, appear to be the main drivers of the silver export, along with wealthy individuals 
opening accounts abroad in foreign currencies (Tamagna (1942, p. 104), Cheng (1956, pp. 260-
261), Shiroyama (2008, p. 157)).10 These trends have the potential to impair Chinese banks’ lending 
capacity. China does not have silver mines and does not produce silver; therefore, in order to issue 
currency to make loans, domestic banks typically purchase silver from foreign ones. This becomes 
more expensive, as silver prices rise.   
Figures 1.A and 1.B show the time series of credit in China between 1931 and 1935. Figure 
1.A plots aggregate credit over GDP. While the ratio increases by about 3% between 1931 and 
1933, it sharply declines by about 15% between 1933 and 1935. Figure 3.B illustrates loans-to-
assets and loans-to-deposit ratios, which also sharply decline after 1933.   
                                                   
7 The London price of silver registers a similar rise as on the New York Market over this period. 
8 The “silver bloc” states are: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah (Kreps (1934, p. 246), 
cited by Friedman (1992)). 
9 After 1933, the silver holdings of foreign banks based in Shanghai drop by about one half, corresponding to over 
20% of the total silver holdings of banks based in Shanghai (Appendix Figure A.2). 
10 To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence that Chinese banks actively exported silver to realize capital 
gains. In fact, it appears that they were concerned with the situation, and tried to reach an agreement with foreign 
banks to stop the silver outflow (Tamagna (1942, p. 103)). For example, the 1934 annual report of the Bank of China 
declares that “the silver problem concerns both domestic and foreign business. We eventually share the consequences 
together. […] Chinese banks feel the responsibility to maintain economic stability, and request foreign banks to work 
together […]. Otherwise, industries will suffer from credit reduction.”  
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Unable to stem the effects of the Silver Purchase shock, the Chinese government finally 
abandons the silver standard in late 1935. An official announcement is made in November, 
declaring all silver to be government property. All silver exchange is forbidden, and paper 
banknotes are issued one-to-one against the silver Chinese dollars in circulation.11  
Our analysis explores credit as a channel through which the silver outflow may have an 
impact on social unrest. While the economic historiography debates whether the silver purchase 
program materially reduced the Chinese money supply (see Rawski (1989, 1993) and Brandt and 
Sargent (1989), as well as Appendix A.1), our mechanism relies exclusively on the increase in 
silver prices and decline of silver stock documented in Figures 3.A and 3.B. We present a model 
describing it in greater detail in Appendix A.2. 
C. Limited impact of confounding events in 1931-1935 
In 1931-1935 China enjoys a relatively stable government and internal politics (Cheng (2003, p. 
67)). Moreover, we find that the only major external event, the 1931 Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, does not appear to have a tangible impact on credit provision in the main urban areas 
covered by our sample data, which are located far from it.  
In 1928 the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek reunifies the country after a 
decade of civil war, bringing along a period of relative stability that allows the economy and the 
banking sector to grow (Cheng (2003, pp. 67-70)). There are still skirmishes in rural areas with 
various guerrilla groups, but the Nationalists effectively control most of the country, especially the 
urban areas where economic activity concentrates. In particular, the data in our sample focus on 
cities under Nationalist control, free of guerrilla episodes in 1931-35.  
Ho and Li (2013) document that the only major political event in this period is the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria, which begins on 18 September 1931.12 The invasion raises concerns about 
the solvency of the Chinese government, leading to a partial restructuring of Treasuries in February 
1932.  
                                                   
11 Before 1935, the Chinese government imposes high export duties on silver, with the aim of curbing profits on silver 
exports. Official Chinese customs data show that the silver outflow is close to zero during 1935. However, smuggling 
makes this regulation ineffective: estimated silver smuggling amounts between 1934 and 1936 are roughly 250 million 
Chinese silver dollars. Towards the end of 1935, at the end of our sample period, the Chinese government becomes 
the controlling shareholder of two “modern” banks, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communication, in an attempt 
to boost the credit capacity of the two institutions (Cheng (2003, p. 99)). 
12 The only other two major events in the 1921-42 period identified by Ho and Li (2013) are the 1927 Northern 
Expedition and the 1937 Sino-Japanese war; both take place well outside our sample period. 
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This event alone appears unlikely to have a major impact on our tests, for four reasons. 
First, it happens at the beginning of our sample period, with little detectable impact on credit 
provision. In fact, the aggregate credit-to-GDP ratio slightly increases between 1931 and 1933 
(Cheng (2003) and Liu (1946), as well as Figure 1). Second, the restructuring involves a reduction 
of coupon rates and an extension of maturities, while face values remain unchanged (Cheng (2003, 
p. 124)). Treasuries can form up to 40% of bank reserves, on the basis of their face value (see 
Appendix A.2). Thus, the restructuring requires no adjustment to the outstanding amount of 
currency. Third, the time series of Chinese sovereign debt yields does not exhibit a strong reaction 
to the event. In fact, the spread relative to British Gilts slightly drops towards the end of 1931 
(Goetzmann, Ukhov, and Zhu (2007); Ho and Li (2013)). Fourth, Manchuria itself has very limited 
relevance for the Chinese banking industry in the early 1930s: no modern banks are headquartered 
there, no loans in our sample are made to firms operating in Manchuria, and although several banks 
have branches in Manchuria, those branches account for only about 2% of the total number of bank 
branches in the country.13 
One last potential challenge is that banks may cut loans collateralized with Treasury bonds. 
Our data, however, reveal that less than 2% of outstanding loans have Treasury bonds as collateral 
in the first place. We also find a very low correlation (0.05) between banks’ silver reserves and 
loan collateralization with Treasuries. 
In sum, other events taking place over 1931-1935 have only a modest effect on credit 
provision. The Silver Purchase shock is the major event with the potential to affect credit during 
our sample period. 
1.3. Data 
We build our analysis on four main sources providing information on: (1) Loan contracts; (2) Bank 
balance sheets; (3) Labor unrest episodes; and (4) Underground Communist Party activities at our 
sample firms. All of our data refer to the years starting in 1931 and ending in November 1935, 
when the Republic of China abandons the silver standard. 
A. Loan contracts 
                                                   
13 Data on bank and bank branches’ location are retrieved from the Chinese Banker’s Yearbook (全国银行年鉴).  
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Individual loan information is collected from provincial and city archives in seven major Chinese 
provinces/cities: Beijing, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shandong, Shanghai, and Tianjin. 
These areas are chosen because of their economic importance in inter-war China: Beijing is the 
former imperial capital, with considerable industrial activities; Chongqing and Guangzhou are 
among the oldest and largest trading harbors; Nanjing is the capital city; Shandong is a major 
industrial and farming province in North China with a large population; Shanghai and Tianjin are 
the main financial centers. Individual loan contracts report the issuing bank’s name, the identity of 
the borrowing firm, the loan amount, issue date, and for a subset of the contracts also additional 
terms such as interest rate, duration, collateral, or the purpose of the loan. The loan amount is the 
most widely populated data item, so we focus on it for our tests. 
In total, the sample covers 579 industrial loans, made by 32 financial institutions to 151 
individual plants, associated with 139 firms. The mean (median) loan in our sample amounts to 
273,000 (44,000) Chinese dollars.14 The lenders in this set appear to be representative of the 
domestic banking sector in 1930s China, and comprise three large banks (Bank of China, Central 
Bank of China, and Bank of Communications), 27 other modern banks, and two other financial 
institutions (Shanghai Trust Co., Ltd.; and Joint Savings Society of Yienyieh, Kincheng, 
Continental and China & South Sea Bank).15 
Based on the available information from the loan contracts, our sample borrowers are also 
representative of the 1930s Chinese economy. They span 17 different industries, out of a total of 
27 industries based on the International Labor Organization 1923 classification in use in 1930s 
China.16 The most important industries in our sample are transportation, services, and textiles 
(25%, 22%, and 12% of the aggregate loan volume, respectively), consistent with the massive 
                                                   
14 As a benchmark, Zhang (2011) reports an average hourly wage for a male worker in Shanghai in 1931-33 of about 
Ch$0.10, and a 70-hour working week, implying a yearly wage of Ch$364.  
15 We are able to recover 792 individual loan contracts, out of which 579 can be matched to banks covered by our 
data. Among these loans, we exclude 52: 47 loans to non-profit institutions (universities, colleges, and high schools), 
four loans received by the Hunan Flood Committee (湖南水灾善后委员会, a charity), and one loan contract with 
unreadable identifying information. All the results are robust to including these 52 loan contracts. The distribution of 
lenders in this sample reflects the overall Chinese banking industry (based on the data described below, in section 
III.B). The rank correlation between the banks’ shares of loans in this sample and their overall credit market share is 
73% (p-value < 0.01), and a Pearson chi-square test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the loan sample and overall 
credit market share distributions are identical. 
16 We add a residual category “Other” for one contract, in which the borrowing firm operates across multiple industries 
(Power and utilities, Services, and Construction). In addition, there are 103 contracts with no available industry 
classification, which we still use in our analysis. 
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railway construction underway during the period (Ma and Zhang (2007)), as well as the historical 
role of textiles in Chinese industrial development (Young (1971, p. 306)).  
B. Bank balance sheet data 
Bank balance sheet data are retrieved from the Chinese Banker’s Yearbook (全国银行年鉴), 
published by the Bank of China, and the Bankers’ Weekly (银行周报), a review published by the 
Shanghai Banking Association on a weekly basis from May 1917 through to March 1950. Each 
issue contains the annual reports of both national and regional banks, as well as the leading trusts.17  
We complement these data with information from two additional sources: the Financial 
and Commercial Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of China (FCMB, 中外商业金融汇报) issued by the 
Bank of China from 1934 to 1939, and Liu (2007). The FCMB is a widely adopted, reliable source 
providing data on the Chinese banking sector during the first half of the 20th century. It reports 
data on banks’ banknote issuance and the related silver stock.18 Liu (2007) reports complementary 
information on bank location and capital.  
From these sources, we retrieve data on bank total assets, equity, cash holdings, outstanding 
loans, deposits, net income, retained earnings, banknotes issuance, and silver reserves. The key 
variables of interest in our analysis are 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 , the (log-)stock of silver held by the bank, 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟, defined as the natural logarithm of the difference between the bank’s silver stock 
and the 60% silver reserve requirement, and 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁), an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the bank’s silver stock is (strictly) greater than the 60% requirement. We obtain information 
for 138 institutions (126 banks and 12 other financial institutions). Out of these 138, we have 
complete balance sheet information for 80 banks, which account for about 95% of Chinese modern 
banks’ assets over our sample period (Cheng (2003, Appendix II)).  
We present descriptive statistics in Table 1. Prior to the implementation of the Silver 
Purchase program, there is significant cross-sectional dispersion in the level of silver reserves for 
our sample banks. The average bank has silver reserves of 1.9 million Chinese dollars in 1931. 
The minimum silver reserve we observe is exactly zero dollars, for the 51 banks in our sample that 
                                                   
17 In 1930s China, trusts engage in financial intermediation activities, including collecting deposits, extending loans, 
and selling insurance. They do not materially differ from banks in terms of savings and lending practices, so we 
include them in our data (all the findings are robust to excluding them). 
18 The Financial and Commercial Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of China (中外商业金融汇报) is issued by the 
research department of the Bank of China (中国银行总管理处经济研究室). 
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do not issue any banknotes, while the maximum value is 64.4 million dollars.19 Around 62% of 
those banks that issue banknotes hold exactly the 60% minimum silver reserve; the remaining 
banks hold excess reserves, ranging between 60-100%, with an average level of 66% and a 
standard deviation of about 9% of the total currency issued. 
C. Labor unrest 
Information on labor unrest episodes in major Chinese cities around the Silver Purchase program 
is retrieved from surveys on labor relations set up by the Republic of China’s central government 
and local authorities. These records provide information about labor unrest episodes revolving 
around disagreements between employers and employees, which in a number of cases involve acts 
of violence.  
These data are available for three major cities: Nanjing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. We retrieve 
the Nanjing data from the surveys Industrial Disputes in Nanjing 1932-1934 (南京市之劳资纠纷
统计) and Industrial Disputes in Nanjing 1935 (民国二十四年南京市劳资纠纷统计), which 
record cases that are reported and processed by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the city of Nanjing. 
Information about Shanghai is retrieved from the survey Industrial Disputes in Shanghai since 
1928 (近五年来上海之劳资纠纷), conducted by government of greater Shanghai between 1931 
and 1935.20 We complement these data with information from the surveys Strikes and Lockouts in 
Shanghai since 1918 (近十五年来上海之罢工停业) for the period 1931-1932, and Strikes and 
Lockouts in Shanghai in the Past Four Years (近四年来上海的罢工停业) for 1933-1935. 
Regarding Tianjin, we use information available in the International Labor Bulletin (国际劳工通
讯; 1934-1941). These data are complemented with additional information retrieved from two 
newspapers, the Yishi Bao (益世报 ; a Tianjin daily) and the Shen Bao (申报 ; a Shanghai 
newspaper covering stories from other parts of China).  
We identify in total 1,209 episodes of labor unrest between 1931 and 1935 (Table 2.A). 
For episodes taking place in Shanghai, the data report information on the underlying reason. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the majority are related to worsening economic conditions: the top causes 
are layoffs (56%) and salary disputes (21%).  
                                                   
19 We retain in the sample banks that do not issue banknotes, as they constitute a useful control group. Results remain 
unaltered if exclude them from the sample.  
20 For the years between 1933 and 1935, we retrieve the survey data from the International Labor Bulletin (国际劳工
通讯; 1934-1941, No. 5 Issue 6, June 1937), compiled by the Chinese Branch of the International Labor Organization. 
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D. Communist activities 
The final piece of data is about underground Communist Party activities at Shanghai factory plants 
during our sample period. We obtain these data from the Shanghai Municipal Police Files, 1894-
1949 (henceforth, SMP files). The SMP files contain the records of the British-run municipal 
police force in Shanghai, which investigates and reports on subversive activities in the city, 
including communist ones.   
The SMP files do not have a standardized format, as they are mostly internal reports 
documenting the work of this special police force. We focus on two types of documents: arrests of 
communist supporters and intelligence reports. The arrests provide information about individuals 
who are taken into custody by the Shanghai Municipal Police, and indicate the name of the firm 
where the arrested individual works. The intelligence reports describe the activities of undercover 
agents who infiltrate communist cells in Shanghai. They provide detailed accounts of the cells’ 
meetings, including lists of firms or factories that a given cell targets for recruitment into the party, 
as well as information about the workplace of participants to the meeting. They also investigate a 
number of strikes and labor unrest episodes, for a connection to communist activities. 
This archival work results in a list of Shanghai firms penetrated or targeted by communists 
during our sample period. From these records, we find that about 96 plants, belonging to 65 firms 
(corresponding to 159 plant-year observations) have communist sympathizers among their 
workers, or have been targeted by the communists for recruitment. 
1.4. Empirical analysis and results 
We use our data to test the impact of the credit shock on social unrest. Our empirical strategy is 
articulated in two parts. First, we test if the U.S. Silver Purchase program leads to a contraction of 
lending in China. Second, we test if there are social consequences to the credit shock, in terms of 
labor unrest and Communist Party penetration. 
A. Impact of the Silver Purchase program on lending 
In order to make a loan, a bank needs to draw on its silver reserves in excess of the 60% 
requirement, or acquire additional silver on the market. A higher market price of silver, thus, 
increases the cost of lending for the bank, particularly for banks with ex ante lower silver reserves. 
23 
 
As a result, banks that are more exposed to the Silver Purchase shock, i.e. with lower pre-1933 
silver reserves, will drive the post-1933 credit contraction. 
We use three alternative measures of silver reserves: the bank’s 1931 (log-)silver holdings 
(𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟), the difference between the bank’s silver holdings and 60% of their outstanding banknotes 
in 1931 (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟), and an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s silver stock is  greater 
than the 60% requirement in 1931 (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁)).21 These measures are consistent 
with the predictions of a simple model we present in Appendix A.2, which rationalizes bank 
lending in 1930s China. The model predicts that the amount of loans issued by a bank depends on 
the bank’s silver holdings and on whether they exceed the 60% silver reserve requirement. 
We first regress the (log-)loan volume from the banks’ balance sheets on these variables, 
estimating: 22  
 𝐿𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇′𝑥𝑏𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡  (1) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of loans made by bank 𝑏 in 
year 𝑡. We regress this variable on an indicator 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, equal to 1 in the years subsequent to the U.S. 
Silver Purchase program (1933 onwards), the bank’s 1931 silver reserves 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟  (or 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟), and an interaction term, as well as a vector 𝑥 of control variables. A positive 𝛾 
coefficient in equation (1) indicates that banks with larger silver reserves before the shock extend 
larger loans after 1933. We estimate (1) by collapsing the data down to bank averages before and 
after 1933, to be immune to the Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) critique, and first 
differencing, i.e. we run: 23 
 Δ𝐿𝑏 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏 + 𝑏  (1’) 
where Δ denotes first differences, so that Δ𝐿𝑏 is the change in average log-loans from before to 
after 1933 for bank 𝑏. 
The estimates, reported in Table 3, are consistent with the evidence from Figure 2, and 
with the notion that the Silver Purchase Program leads to a credit contraction: banks with lower 
reserves reduce their lending volumes after 1933. The result holds across all three proxies for a 
                                                   
21 Whenever the 1931 silver reserves value is not available, we use in its stead the 1932 value. We use the earliest 
available silver reserves to guarantee that they are pre-determined relative to the Silver Purchase shock of 1933; 
analogous results obtain if we use the 1931-1933 average reserves instead (available upon request). 
22 In these tests, we exclude the amount of loans extended to the government from each bank’s total loan volume. Our 
results hold, quantitatively and statistically, if we do not exclude loans to the government. 
23 Equivalently, we may not collapse the data and estimate a panel regression with fixed effects, clustering the standard 
errors. This approach delivers similar results, reported in Appendix C. 
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given bank’s exposure to the shock (𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟, 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟, and 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁)), but 
the economic magnitudes are best assessed by looking at 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁) . The 
coefficient estimate of 0.13 (specifications (6)-(7)) implies that, in comparison to banks that are 
less exposed to the shock (i.e., having 1931 silver reserves in excess of the 60% threshold), banks 
that are immediately exposed to it reduce their loans by 13% more per year on average during the 
period 1934-1935. 
These results suggest a severe impact of the shock on credit provision. The estimates are 
based on a sample representing over 95% of the total assets of modern banks active throughout the 
sample period, and are thus largely free from selection or survivorship bias. They could, however, 
be confounded by credit demand effects associated with individual firms. For instance, banks with 
larger silver reserves might tend to lend to more efficient firms, or less risky firms with a lower 
exposure to the international economic crisis of the 1930s. This would also predict higher lending 
growth for banks with larger silver reserves – but due to credit demand, not supply. 
To address this identification challenge, we turn to our data on matched bank-firm 
individual loan contracts. Following the literature on bank liquidity shocks (Khwaja and Mian 
(2008); Schnabl (2012)), we absorb the impact of credit demand by controlling for firm fixed 
effects, interacted with time, in the following specification: 
 𝐿𝑓𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼𝑓0 + 𝛼𝑓 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝜇′𝑥𝑓𝑏𝑡 + 𝑓𝑏𝑡  (2) 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the dollar amount lent to firm 𝑓 by bank 
𝑏 in year 𝑡. Again, a positive 𝛾 coefficient indicates that banks with larger silver reserves before 
the shock make larger loans after 1933; as before, we estimate (2) by collapsing the data down to 
firm-bank pair averages before and after 1933. 
Identification in equation (2) mostly originates from the cross-sectional differences in our 
sample banks’ 1931 silver reserves.24 Banks with a larger amount of pre-shock silver reserves are 
better able to absorb the liquidity shock, and are thus less likely to ration credit after 1933. As 
Khwaja and Mian (2008), we then restrict the sample to the set of firms that borrow from at least 
two banks, allowing us to control for firm fixed effects. 
                                                   
24 In results omitted for brevity, we find that the industry distribution is statistically very close for “treated” and 
“control” firms in this sample (i.e. firms whose lenders have silver reserves above/below the median). The rank 
correlation of industry shares across the two groups is 61% (p-value < 0.01), and a Pearson chi-square test cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the distributions of industry shares in the two groups are identical. 
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We report the estimates of (2) in Table 4. They are consistent with our earlier results: banks 
with a larger exposure to the Silver Purchase program (lower pre-1933 silver reserves) are quicker 
to cut down lending. The point estimates are remarkably stable across specifications with and 
without firm fixed effects. Focusing again on the coefficient on 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁), they 
imply that banks immediately exposed to the Silver Purchase shock curb lending by about 30% 
more than banks with excess silver reserves. Moreover, our empirical strategy alleviates the 
potential confounding effect of loan demand by individual firms. The presence of borrowing firm 
fixed effects in the regression equation implies that the same firm, borrowing from two different 
banks, will experience a larger drop in lending from the bank with lower silver reserves, i.e. greater 
exposure to the shock. 
Taken together, these findings provide the first block of evidence for our analysis. 
Importantly, we obtain very similar results from bank-level and loan-level regressions. The former 
does not suffer from selection bias, but the estimates may be contaminated by an effect of credit 
demand. The latter look at a selection of loan contracts, but the detail of the data allows us to make 
stronger statements in terms of causality. The scarcity of silver in China, and its high market price, 
driven by the U.S. Silver Purchase program, leads to a reduction in credit, the more severe the 
lower pre-1933 silver reserves. As we will also show in section V, the credit contraction is unlikely 
to be explained by demand conditions, supporting a causal interpretation for our evidence.  
B. Impact on social unrest  
Next, we look at the consequences of the Silver Purchase program shock on social unrest, focusing 
on labor unrest episodes and Communist Party penetration.  
In the first place, we find that labor unrest is closely related to firm-level economic 
conditions. This supports the argument that the credit contraction can be expected to have an 
impact on labor unrest, as opposed to alternatives such as a fight for civil rights or political 
freedom. As illustrated in Figure 4, the majority of labor unrest episodes in our data are due to 
layoffs or salary disputes. Only rarely we find labor unrest motivated by other causes. In line with 
these arguments, for a subsample of cotton mills where more detailed information is available, we 
find that worsening economic conditions are related to the Silver Purchase shock. In particular, 
firms borrowing from low-silver reserves banks are more likely to lay off workers, as discussed in 
section V.D.  
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It also appears that the loans in our sample are evenly distributed between financing 
investments projects and working capital and/or wage payments (Figure 5). In both cases, a credit 
supply cut may have an impact on the labor force either because planned investment projects need 
to be scrapped or because the firm lacks the resources to maintain production.  
In our main social unrest tests, we rely on the fact that 1930s Chinese firms borrow 
primarily from banks headquartered near them, or with branches in their proximity, as argued by 
the literature on relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan (2002); Degryse and Ongena (2005)) and 
verified in our data (see below). Building on this fact, we develop an index of local silver reserves 
availability around each firm 𝑓 in our sample, as an inverse distance-weighted average of bank 
silver reserves: 
 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 = ∑
𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏/𝑑(𝑓,𝑏)
∑ 1/𝑑(𝑓,𝑏)𝑏
𝑏  (3) 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏 denotes the log-1931 silver reserves of bank 𝑏, and 𝑑(𝑓, 𝑏) is the distance between 
firm 𝑓 and bank 𝑏 (or its branches), measured in km. 
𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is larger if banks in the vicinity of firm 𝑓 have larger silver reserves. Similarly, 
we define 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 , a weighted average 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 , and 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/
𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, a weighted average 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁). Importantly, these measures capture the 
capacity of the pool of potential lenders of firm 𝑓 to absorb the Silver Purchase shock (similar 
results obtain if we focus on its actual lenders, as we discuss below).   
We then relate the index to the measures of social unrest intensity. We estimate: 
 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑡 (4) 
where, depending on the specification, 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 indicates the (log-)number of labor unrest episodes 
at firm f in year t, the duration of these episodes, or (log-)number of times firm f is mentioned in 
the SMP files as experiencing communist activities in year t. As before, we collapse the sample to 
plant averages before and after 1933 following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and 
estimate (4) on changes. The control variables 𝑥 include city-district, industry, and firm nationality 
fixed effects.25 
                                                   
25 Firms with access to large/small (above/below the median) silver reserve pools are ex ante similar. In particular, in 
results omitted for brevity we find that the rank correlation of industry shares in the two groups of firms is 90% (p-




We examine labor unrest episodes in Table 5. Specifications (1)-(3) of panel A focus on 
the (log-)number of labor unrest episodes in a given year, and specifications (4)-(6) on their 
duration. Across all specifications, 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, and 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/
𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 are negatively associated with the number of labor unrest episodes and their duration. 
This is consistent with the notion that firms that have access to a smaller pool of silver reserves 
are more exposed to the credit shock, and experience intensified labor unrest. The effect is also 
important in economic terms: firms with the lowest 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 experience a 
30% higher increase in the number of labor unrest episodes after 1933 than firms with the highest 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙; the corresponding difference in terms of unrest episode duration 
is 15%.26 Importantly, these results control for city district fixed effects; that helps us to rule out 
the possibility that local economic conditions (for instance, real estate prices) may drive our 
results.27  
Panel B of Table 5 reports two sets of tests. First, in column (1) we validate the conjecture 
that firms tend to borrow from the banks that are geographically closer to them. We rely on 
information on existing lending relationships from our loan contracts data, and regress an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a given firm borrows from a given bank on the natural logarithm of the 
distance between the firm and the bank (in km), and indicators for the firm’s location (city). 28 
Corroborating our approach in panel A, we find a strong negative relation between distance and 
the likelihood of a lending relationship: a 10% closer bank is 0.18% more likely to have a lending 
relationship. In our data, a firm has a lending relationship, on average, with 4% of the banks with 
a branch located in its city, implying that the estimated effect of distance is material. 
Second, we validate our tests of panel A by looking at actual lending relationships. In this 
case, the sample size shrinks, because we are restricted to working with firms and banks where 
information is available from our loans data. Despite the sample shrinkage, in columns (2)-(4) we 
                                                   
26 These effects are estimated as follows. The minimum value of 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 (𝑌/𝑁)  𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙  is 0.38, and the 
maximum 0.82 (Table 2.A). Based on the coefficient estimate of –0.675 from Table 5.A (specification (3)), this implies 
a −0.675 × (0.38 − 0.82) = 30% higher increase in the number of labor unrest episodes for firms at the lowest level 
of 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 (𝑌/𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, relative to firms at the highest level. The effect on the duration of unrest episodes is 
estimated similarly. 
27 Because we run the test on collapsed data, effectively we are controlling for district fixed effects interacted with the 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 indicator. 
28 The unit of observation in column (1) is a bank branch-firm pair. For each bank, we include in the sample the branch 
that is closest to the firm. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a given branch belongs to a bank that has a 
lending relationship with the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
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are able to detect a significant relation between silver reserves and lending outcomes, in line with 
the results described in panel A. Across all silver holdings measures, we find a negative 
relationship between silver reserves and the post-1933 number of labor unrest episodes.29 Firms 
borrowing from banks without excess reserves experience an 18% higher increase in the number 
of labor unrest episodes after 1933 than firms with access to excess reserves, economically close 
to the effects implied by the estimates of panel A.  
We then turn to communist penetration as a measure of social unrest. Table 6 relates silver 
reserves to the probability that a firm experience underground Communist Party activities. 
Although positive as could be expected, at 13.5% the correlation between the frequency of labor 
unrest episodes and communist activities is not high, suggesting that they capture different facets 
of social unrest. We find a negative relationship between communist activities and access to silver 
reserves. Whether communist activities propagate because workers at firms with little access to 
silver reserves spontaneously radicalize, or because the Communist Party targets exposed firms to 
recruit their workers, this result suggests a causal channel from credit provision to the spread of 
social unrest. 
The estimates imply that firms with access to the smallest pool of excess reserves (i.e. with 
the lowest 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙) experience a 3 to 6.5% larger increase in communist 
penetration after 1933. In terms of statistical significance, the results are weaker compared to the 
labor unrest results and, in particular, they are not significant for 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. 
A number of factors may account for this: communist activities were strongly repressed in 
Shanghai during the 1930s and the Communist Party itself was underground, making our 
dependent variable particularly noisy. Building on these arguments, we conservatively interpret 
our estimates as a lower bound on the relationship between the Silver Purchase shock and 
Communist Party penetration.  
In sum, we find a robust impact of the Silver Purchase shock on labor relations and the 
likelihood of labor unrest episodes. We also find an impact on underground communist activities 
consistent with the labor unrest effect; however, in this case the estimated effect is weaker. 
                                                   
29  Data on the duration of labor unrest episodes is only available for Shanghai, which restricts our sample. In 
unreported tests, we find a negative, but statistically not significant, relation between silver reserves and labor unrest 
episode duration. We omit these tests to conserve space; but they are available upon request. 
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1.5. Alternative explanations and discussion 
In this section, we present tests to rule out alternative interpretations, and we discuss the external 
validity of our findings. First, we compare industries exposed to and isolated from world markets, 
as a check for mechanical exchange rate effects and the impact of the worldwide Great Depression. 
Second, we present falsification tests based on a time period that precedes the silver shock and on 
data from neighboring Hong Kong, where banks did not face a mandatory reserve requirement to 
issue banknotes. Third, we show that the labor unrest episodes examined in the previous section 
are unlikely driven by the 1932 “Shanghai incident.” Fourth, we use instrumental variables 
estimation to rule out effects due to self-selection of banks into high- and low-silver reserves 
groups. Fifth, we document the impact of the credit shock on output, for a set of firms for which 
good quality output data survive. Finally, we briefly discuss the external validity of our findings. 
A. Exchange rates and the Great Depression  
The Silver Purchase program is announced in the midst of the Great Depression. The global decline 
in demand, thus, could affect Chinese firms. Moreover, because of the silver standard, the rise in 
silver prices leads to an appreciation of the Chinese dollar, hurting the competitiveness of Chinese 
exporters. Both effects may predict a generalized contraction of Chinese credit demand.  
But neither mechanism appears, in fact, to account for our findings. First, it is simply not 
clear why their effects should be more pronounced on banks with lower silver reserves, or the 
firms that borrow from them. Second, the loan-level estimates control for firm fixed effects, which 
capture firms’ credit demand. As a third argument against the alternative interpretation, we present 
further evidence by comparing firms with different exposure to international trade, splitting 
industries between Traded and Non-Traded sectors. Both mechanisms outlined above predict 
stronger effects in the Traded sector.  
Table 7 presents the estimates. We find similar results as in the overall sample: Banks with 
lower pre-1933 silver reserves reduce lending to firms in both Traded and Non-Traded sectors 
(columns (1)-(3)). The coefficient estimate on the interaction term between 1931 silver reserves 
and the Traded sector indicator is insignificant in all three specifications. When looking at social 
unrest (columns (4)-(9)), we also find similar results as in the overall sample; and in fact  the 
effects are, if anything, weaker for Traded-sector firms, contradicting the alternative argument. 
30 
 
These findings suggest that the exchange rate and Great Depression channels are unlikely driving 
our results.  
They also alleviate a remaining potential issue with the identification approach in our loan-
level tests. As Khwaja and Mian (2008), we rely on the fact that credit demand is unrelated to the 
shock to credit supply, i.e. to the banks’ silver reserves. Our results indicate that a major driver of 
credit demand, namely exposure to international trade, is essentially unrelated to our main effect. 
This is therefore consistent with our findings being attributable to credit supply.  
B. Falsification tests; the Shanghai incident 
We run two falsification tests. The first one provides additional evidence that no omitted factor 
related to the Chinese economy drives our results. To construct it, we look at bank lending between 
1927 and 1931, before the Silver Purchase Program was enacted. We set up an “artificial” shock 
in 1929, and estimate equation (1) on the banks for which balance sheet data are available between 
1927 and 1931, with the same treatment variable as in the previous tests (i.e. 1931 silver reserves). 
We present the results in Table 8. Across all specifications, there appears to be no significant 
relationship between silver reserves and the change in lending around 1929. Importantly, the 
implied effects are also economically very small, ranging between one-tenth and one-third of the 
effects from Table 3 (in addition, in columns (5)-(6), the sign of the coefficients is opposite to the 
estimates of Table 3). 
The second falsification test aims to rule out a spurious correlation with economic events 
that may have affected the whole East Asia, other than the Silver Purchase program. To construct 
it, we focus on Hong Kong, as the economy closest to China in geographic and cultural terms. We 
rely on data on lending from the archives of HSBC, the main lender in the city-state at the time.30  
In the 1930s, Hong Kong is also on a silver standard: only silver coins have legal tender, and only 
minted silver can be used to pay taxes. Banks are allowed to issue banknotes, but these do not have 
the status of legal tender and, crucially, they are not required to be backed by silver reserves. Since 
the legal reserve requirement is the key driving force behind the credit contraction in 1930s 
mainland China, we should expect no such contraction in Hong Kong. We use lending amounts in 
HSBC’s balance sheets, standardized by total assets and deposits, and track them over the period 
1931-1935. We find that the average loans-to-deposits ratio is about 50%, both before and after 
                                                   
30 In 1931, banknotes issued by HSBC correspond to 82% of the total banknotes issued in Hong Kong. 
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1933. Similarly, the loans-to-assets ratio is about 37%, both before and after 1933. In sum, we find 
that credit does not contract in Hong Kong, unlike in the Republic of China. 
Finally, we verify that Japanese influence in parts of Shanghai does not drive our labor 
unrest and communist penetration results. This possibility relates to the so-called Shanghai 
incident where, in January 1932, the Japanese secret service staged a beating of Japanese Buddhist 
monks to justify military action against China. Japanese influence on Chinese firms concentrated 
in the Zhabei (闸北) district in Shanghai. Excluding Zhabei district firms from our sample does 
not materially alter our findings. These results are reported in Appendix Tables C.8 (labor unrest) 
and C.9 (communist penetration). 
C. Selection into high- and low-reserves groups and instrumental variables estimation 
A further challenge might be that silver reserves are not randomly assigned to banks. In principle 
at least, they may be correlated with unobserved factors, related e.g. to the banks’ clientele and/or 
business model, affecting lending policies and the probability of labor unrest. Our results so far 
considerably raise the bar for a “selection” explanation of this sort. Since we observe changes in 
credit and labor unrest intensity after 1933, whatever unobserved sorting variable may drive our 
results must change precisely around the start of the Silver Purchase program, and must not be 
captured by the firm fixed effects tests reported in Table 4.  
To further alleviate concerns about selection, we resort to instrumental variables 
estimation. We exploit a unique feature of 1930s China’s monetary system: the parallel circulation 
of a traditional currency, issued by the “native” banks, and backed by copper instead of silver. The 
use of copper as a monetary base dates back to about 1100 BC (Kann (1927, pp. 403-404)). In the 
1930s, copper-backed money circulates only locally, and it is mainly used to clear small 
transactions (Tamagna (1942, p. 68)). It is, however, not a trivial quantity: Rawski’s (1989, p. 394) 
estimates indicate that it corresponds to about 13% of the silver-backed monetary base at the 
beginning of 1931. Moreover, this is a national average that hides local differences. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that copper currency circulation was considerably more widespread in  
Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Hebei, provinces that are relatively closer to copper mines, 
vis-à-vis  other provinces where the use copper money was less common (Tamagna (1942, p. 68)).  
We conjecture that the relative abundance of copper at mines near the headquarters of a 
given modern bank determines the availability of copper-backed currency. Further, if people use 
the copper-backed currency as a (partial) substitute for Chinese silver dollars, greater availability 
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of copper should associate with lower silver reserves, as the modern bank may face a lower demand 
for silver-backed currency for transaction purposes.  
We build an index of the local 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 in the same spirit as 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙  defined 
above, as the natural logarithm of the inverse distance-weighted-average copper capacity in the 
three copper mines nearest to a given bank. To the extent that the availability of copper mines near 
a given bank’s headquarters is exogenous to credit provision and to social unrest in Nanjing, 
Shanghai, and Tianjin (which are generally far from the bank’s headquarters), our instrument 
meets the exclusion restriction. 
The first-stage regressions reported in Appendix Table C.3 validate our conjecture, and the 
relevance of the instrument: where copper abounds, banks hold smaller silver reserves. The 
Kleibergen-Paap first-stage test statistic is also large, suggesting that our instrument is not weak. 
Table 9.A presents the second-stage estimates. They confirm our earlier findings: banks 
with lower 1931 silver reserves reduce credit provision after the 1933 Silver Purchase shock. In 
Table 9.B, we present the results for social unrest, defining an index of the available copper pool 
around a given firm in a way analogous to the previous index. The second-stage regressions are 
presented in Table 9.B for social unrest intensity (log-number of labor unrest episodes, and 
communist activities indicator).31 A larger pool of available silver reserves at the firm’s lenders is, 
again, negatively associated with the labor unrest episodes and communist activities. indicator. 
Overall, these tests suggest that selection is not a main driver of our results.32 
D. Layoffs, energy consumption, and output of cotton mills 
Figure 4 shows that the most common reasons for labor unrest episodes are layoffs and salary cuts, 
consistent with those episodes being driven by a contraction in investment and output at the firm 
level. A direct test of the impact of the Silver Purchase shock on output is limited by the availability 
of firm-level output data. Good quality information is available from Kraus (1980) on employment, 
energy consumption, and output for a sample of 38 cotton mills located in Shanghai and Tianjin.   
                                                   
31 Again, to conserve space we relegate a corresponding test looking at the duration of labor unrest episodes to 
Appendix Table C.2. 
32 The second-stage estimates are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates. One possible explanation is that banks’ 
silver reserves correlate with the investment opportunities of the firms they lend to. This suggests that the potential 
endogeneity actually works against us finding any effects, to the extent that banks have lower excess silver reserves 
because they lend more aggressively to firms with greater investment opportunities. As a result, credit demand should 
be stronger for banks with lower reserves, working against our main effect.  
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Using this information, we relate the probability that firms lay off workers, reduce 
electricity consumption (measured in kilowatts), and cut output (measured in standard units of 
pieces of cloth) to our measures of silver availability. We present the results in Table 10. 33 Across 
all specifications, the estimates document that firms with access to a smaller pool of silver reserves 
are more likely to curb employment and reduce energy consumption and textile output. In 
economic terms, the effects are sizable: firms with access to the lowest reserves pool are 48% more 
likely to curb employment, 60% more likely to reduce electricity consumption, and about 30% 
more likely to reduce output.  
E. External validity 
Because our results are based on data from 1930s China, it is important to discuss the extent of 
their external validity. That depends on (i) whether modern credit shocks can be similar in 
magnitude to the Chinese one of 1933-35, and (ii) whether a modern society will respond similarly 
to a shock of similar size. 
The answer to the first question is yes. Chinese credit-to-GDP drops by about 15% over 
1933-35 (Cheng (2003, Appendix II), Liu (1946, Table 1), and Figure 1). This value is very close 
to the drops experienced by Finland in 1991 (13%), Turkey in 2000 (18%), Spain in 2010 (10%), 
all identified by Laeven and Valencia (2012) as recent banking crises.34 
As for the second question, one key ingredient to the answer is labor mobility. If workers 
are able to move and seek employment at firms that are not credit-constrained, a shock such as the 
Silver Purchase program should generate less social tension in a modern economy. Labor mobility 
in 1930s China, however, is not especially limited compared to modern China. Regulatory 
restrictions on internal migration, in fact, are less stringent in 1931-35 than today.35 Moreover, 
internal migration is not uncommon in 1930s China. In 1935, immigration inflow (outflow) as a 
                                                   
33 The dependent variables are indicators that take the value of 1 if the firm reduces employment (Panel A), electricity 
consumption (Panel B), output (Panel C) by more than 2% from the previous year, and 0 otherwise. The 2% cutoff 
limits the impact of noise; more conservative cutoffs deliver even stronger results.  
34 Data on credit-to-GDP for these episodes are retrieved from the World Bank’s website. 
35 According to the Household Registration Law (户籍法), passed in 1931, individuals can register at a new location 
after living there for 6 years, and there is no further discrimination between temporary and permanent residents. In 
contrast, formally registering as a Shanghai resident in the 2010s requires at least 7 years of residence, minimum 
professional qualifications and social security contributions; temporary residents, moreover, face severe welfare 
discrimination (Li and Ren (2011)). 
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fraction of total population is 16% (13%), quite comparable with the 1995-2000 average of 13% 
(10%). 36  
Of course, this conclusion must be moderated by a number of other factors beyond the 
scope of our analysis, such as the government’s willingness and ability intervene to attenuate the 
negative effects of economic shocks. 
1.6. Conclusion 
Using a novel, hand-collected dataset and a natural experiment from 1930s China, we provide new 
micro-econometric evidence on the socio-political consequences of negative economic shocks. We 
exploit the 1933 U.S. Silver Purchase program, which, raising silver prices worldwide, generates 
a credit contraction in the Republic of China, on the silver standard in the 1930s. We find that (i) 
banks more exposed to the shock (with lower pre-1933 silver reserves) cut lending after 1933, and 
(ii) labor unrest episodes and Communist Party penetration at firms borrowing from exposed banks 
increase in intensity after 1933, relative to other firms. The level of detail of our micro-data helps 
a causal interpretation of the findings, addressing the reverse causality problem that often 
characterizes tests of the social impact of economic shocks. Our evidence is consistent with credit 
rationing (and more in general, economic shocks) having a material impact on social unrest. 
  
                                                   
36 Total Shanghai population for 1935 is retrieved from Statistics Monthly. No 32. (统计月报; 32 号), compiled by 
Statistics Bureau of the Guangxi (广西省政府统计局). Immigration inflow and outflow are obtained from Police 
Monthly No. 3, Roll 3 (警察月刊;第三期第三卷), compiled by the Shanghai Police Bureau (上海市公安局第一科
). Data for modern Shanghai are obtained from Fan (2005), and from the 5th National Population Census of the People’s 




Figure 1 Aggregate Credit in China, 1931-1935 
The graphs report measures of aggregate credit provision in the Republic of China over the sample period. Panel A plots the total credit-to-GDP ratio for the 
Republic of China, rescaled so as to take the value of 100 in 1933. Total credit is the aggregate of the loans data reported on bank balance sheets, used throughout; 
GDP is based on manufacturing output from factories (Brandt and Sargent (1989), Table 5). Panel B plots two additional ratios, again for the Republic of China: 
total loans-to-deposits and total loans-to-assets. Total loans are obtained as the aggregate of the loans data reported on bank balance sheets, used throughout; and 
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Figure 2 Chinese Credit and Political Unrest Intensity, 1931-1935 
Panel A reports the Chinese banks’ aggregate dollar lending over the 1931-1935 period, broken down into components due to banks with low (below the 25th 
percentile), high (above the 75th percentile), and medium 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟. All series are normalized such that the 1933 value equals 100. The credit data are based 
on the bank balance sheet data discussed in Section IV.A. Panel B plots the average number of labor unrest episodes per plant, and panel C plots the number of 
plants in which support for communist activities was detected, as a fraction of membership of the communist-sponsored union (Shen (1987, p.143) and Stranahan 
(1998, p.154)), in both cases based on the level of silver holdings available at banks in the plants’ vicinity, 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, as described in Section IV.B, again 
normalized such that the 1933 value equals 100. The figures show that, after the Silver Purchase program is initiated, banks with lower excess silver holdings in 
1931 reduce lending relative to banks with larger holdings. Furthermore, firms and plants with a greater exposure to the Silver Purchase shock – in the vicinity of 
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Figure 3 Silver Prices and Changes in Chinese Silver Stock, 1931-1935 
Panel A reports the silver price quotes in New York over the period 1931-35 (source: Economy Xun Kan (经济旬刊); Vol. 4, No. 13, p. 11). Panel B reports yearly 
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Figure 4 Causes of Labor Unrest Episodes, 1931-1935 
The figure reports the causes of labor unrest episodes taking place in Shanghai during the period 1931-1935, 
corresponding to Table 2.B. The labor unrest data are retrieved from surveys Strikes and lockouts in Shanghai since 
1918 (近十五年来上海之罢工停业) (1931-32), Strikes and lockouts in Shanghai in the Past Four Years (近四年来
上海的罢工停业) (1933-35), Industrial Disputes in Shanghai since 1928 (近五年来上海之劳资纠纷) (1931-32), 
conducted by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the city government of greater Shanghai, and the survey Industrial 
Disputes in Shanghai in the Past Four Years (近四年来上海的劳资纠纷), published by the International Labor 
Bulletin (1933-35). 
  










Figure 5 Loan Purpose, 1931-1935 
The figure reports the frequency of loan purposes in our sample, as a percentage of the number of loans with available 
purpose information. There are 244 loans with available loan purpose information. The sample comprises the set of 
loan contracts described in section III.A, with available loan purpose information. 
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Table 1 Bank Balance Sheets and Loans – Summary Statistics 
Panel A reports summary statistics on balance sheet data for the banks in our sample. All figures are expressed 
in thousands of Chinese dollars. Panel B provides summary statistics for the loan contracts in our sample. Loan 
amounts are expressed in thousands of Chinese dollars. The number of loans granted to each industry is counted 
based on observations with identifiable industry information, according to the International Labor Organization 
(1923) classification. The data are hand-collected, and retrieved from a number of archival sources described in 
greater detail Section III. 
A. Bank Level Variables (Chinese $000) 
 N Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Total assets 523 36,151 118,324 67 1,342,242 
Equity 527 2,976 7,839 23 103,845 
Cash 519 2,647 8,410 0 87,409 
Total loans 517 17,193 46,475 34 509,600 
Notes issuance 494 4,737 15,504 0 161,000 
Silver reserves 366 3,728 12,515 0 129,000 
Deposits 508 25,704 86,457 9 992,941 
Net income 517 301 1,093 -291 14,822 
1931 Silver reserves 505 1,932 7,205 0 64,440 
1931 Excess silver reserves 505 229 1,194 0 10,722 
1931 Excess reserves 505 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Return on equity (%) 517 10 9 -38 63 
Cash to assets ratio (%) 519 7 8 0 59 
Equity to assets ratio (%) 522 21 16 1 91 
No retained earnings 527 0.09 0.28 0 1 
No notes banks 690 0.37 0.48 0 1 
      
B. Loan Contract Characteristics 
  N Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Loan Amount (Chinese $000) 579 273 758 0.40 9,000 
      
Loan Contracts by Industry  
Transportation 145 Chemistry 13 Construction 1 
Services 125 Retail 9 Wood products 1 
Textiles 68 Agriculture 8 Other 1 
Power & utilities 28 Finance 6   
Specials (hospital, school, etc.) 23 Glass products 4   
Mining 21 Machinery 3   
Food 18 Paper products 2   
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Table 2 Political Unrest – Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics on political unrest from Shanghai, Tianjin, and Nanjing. Panel A 
summarizes first the political unrest intensity in terms of the number of labor unrest episodes, the duration of the 
episodes, and if communist activities are detected at a given firm. Information on the available silver pool for a 
given firm is also reported. For labor unrest episode duration and communist activities, due to data availability 
the sample is restricted to Shanghai firms. Panel B reports a breakdown of the causes of labor unrest cases in 
Shanghai. The labor unrest episodes data in Shanghai are retrieved from surveys Strikes and lockouts in Shanghai 
since 1918 (近十五年来上海之罢工停业) (1931-32), Strikes and lockouts in Shanghai in the Past Four Years 
(近四年来上海的罢工停业) (1933-35), Industrial Disputes in Shanghai since 1928 (近五年来上海之劳资纠
纷) (1931-32), conducted by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the city government of greater Shanghai, and the survey 
Industrial Disputes in Shanghai in the Past Four Years (近四年来上海的劳资纠纷), published by the International 
Labor Bulletin (1933-35). The labor unrest episodes data in Tianjin are hand collected from several newspapers 
described in the text. The labor unrest episodes data in Nanjing are retrieved from surveys Industrial Disputes 
in Nanjing 1932-1934 (南京市之劳资纠纷统计) and Industrial Disputes in Nanjing 1935 (民国二十四年南京
市劳资纠纷统计), published by the Labor Monthly journal (劳工月刊). The underground communist activities 
record among Shanghai firms are collected from the SMP files, as described section III. 
A. Political Unrest and Access to Silver Reserves 
 N Mean St. dev. Min Max 
No. of  labor unrest episodes 8,632 0.14 0.56 0 10 
Duration of  labor unrest episodes (Shanghai) 7,500 2.82 14.65 0 319 
Communist activities Y/N (Shanghai) 7,500 0.02 0.14 0 1 
1931 Silver pool (Chinese $000) 8,715 7,616 2,133 5,487 15,788 
1931 Excess silver pool (Chinese $000) 8,715 912 320 622 2,124 
1931 Excess reserves pool 8,715 0.47 0.09 0.38 0.82 
  
B. Causes of Labor Unrest (for Shanghai) 
Causes No. Episodes 
Layoffs 564 
Salary  217 
Work conditions 111 





Table 3 Silver Reserves and Credit around 1933 – Bank-Level  
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑏 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏 + 𝑏 
The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of the overall loans (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) extended by 
bank 𝑏 around 1933 (post-1933 average minus pre-1933 average). The variable 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 is the natural logarithm 
of bank’s silver reserves in 1931 (or the value in 1932 if not available, specifications (1)-(3)). We alternatively 
define it as the log-amount of silver reserves in excess of the mandatory 60% reserves (specifications (4)-(5)), 
or as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a given bank has silver-to-notes ratio strictly above 60%, and 0 otherwise 
(specifications (6)-(7)). 𝑥 is a vector of control variables, including bank size, equity ratio, cash to bank assets 
ratio, return on equity, and an indicator for no retained earnings. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004), the equation is estimated on changes around 1933, after collapsing and time-averaging the data before 
and after 1933. Specifications (3), (5) and (7) also include banks that do not issue banknotes throughout the 
sample period (and add an indicator for no notes issuance). All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. 
The Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Silver  0.124*** 0.125** 0.129***     
 (0.039) (0.047) (0.044)     
Excess silver    0.391*** 0.400***   
    (0.073) (0.070)   
Excess reserves (Y/N)      0.130*** 0.133*** 
      (0.041) (0.041) 
∆ Bank size  0.076 0.048 0.074 0.045 0.108 0.085 
  (0.087) (0.073) (0.095) (0.087) (0.084) (0.076) 
∆ Equity ratio  -0.006 -0.005*** -0.005 -0.004** -0.005 -0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
∆ Cash ratio  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆ ROE  0.004 0.003* 0.005* 0.004** 0.004* 0.004** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆ No ret. earnings  0.045 0.015 0.079 0.038 0.063 0.028 
  (0.082) (0.054) (0.077) (0.052) (0.068) (0.048) 
No notes    -0.015  -0.027  0.007 
   (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Intercept 0.034 0.020 0.018 0.042 0.038* 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) 
N 47 46 80 46 80 46 80 
R2 0.12 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.40 
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Table 4 Silver Reserves and Credit around 1933 – Loan-Level 
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑏𝑓 = 𝛼𝑓 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏𝑓 + 𝑏𝑓 
The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of loans (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) extended by bank 𝑏 to 
firm 𝑓 (average after 1933 minus average prior to 1933). The variable 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 is the natural logarithm of the 
bank’s silver reserves in 1931 (or the value in 1932 if not available (specifications (1) and (4)), the log-amount 
of silver in excess to compulsory reserves (specifications (2) and (5)), or an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
given bank has silver-to-notes ratio above 60%, and 0 otherwise (specifications (3) and (6)). 𝑥 is a vector of 
control variables. In addition, columns (4)-(6) include borrowing firm fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan (2004), the equation is estimated on changes around 1933, after collapsing and time-averaging 
the data before and after 1933. We focus on banks that issue banknotes. All variables are defined in detail in 
Appendix B. The standard errors, clustered by bank, are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 OLS  FE 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Silver  0.121**    0.176***   
 (0.049)    (0.057)   
Excess silver  0.078***    0.100***  
  (0.020)    (0.031)  
Excess reserves (Y/N)   0.282*    0.309** 
   (0.149)    (0.150) 
∆ Bank size 0.011 0.201 0.159  0.357 0.660** 0.558 
 (0.519) (0.440) (0.511)  (0.260) (0.292) (0.344) 
∆ Equity ratio -0.059 -0.026 0.006  -0.018 0.039 0.082 
 (0.052) (0.046) (0.047)  (0.039) (0.035) (0.058) 
∆ Cash ratio -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.035***  -0.016** -0.015* -0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
∆ ROE -0.009 0.009 0.018  -0.011 0.015 0.027 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.029)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
∆ No ret. earnings -0.387 -0.120 -0.134  -0.442 -0.147 -0.202 
 (0.328) (0.357) (0.401)  (0.281) (0.248) (0.303) 
Intercept -0.491 0.080 0.127  -0.732* 0.146 0.266 
 (0.390) (0.161) (0.159)  (0.411) (0.144) (0.174) 
Firm f.e. N N N  Y Y Y 
N 306 306 306  229 229 229 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.84 0.84 0.83 
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Table 5 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest – Labor Relations 
Panel A reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑓 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓 + 𝑓 
The dependent variable is either the change in the natural logarithm of the number of labor unrest episodes at 
firm 𝑓 in columns (1)-(3) (average after 1933 minus average prior to 1933), or the change in the natural logarithm 
of the duration of unrest episodes in firm 𝑓 in columns (4)-(6). The variable S𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is the inverse distance-
weighted average silver reserves around firm 𝑓 (columns (1) and (4)), the inverse distance-weighted average of 
the silver amount in excess of the 60% minimum reserve requirement, in columns (2) and (5) 
(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙), or the inverse distance-weighted average of the indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
a given bank has silver-to-notes ratio above 60%, and 0 otherwise, in columns (3) and (6) 
(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙). All specifications include city district, industry, and firm nationality fixed effects. In 
panel B, column (1), we report the estimates of: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑏 = 𝛼 +𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑓𝑏 + 𝑓 
The variable 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a given bank-firm pair has a lending 
relationship, and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the distance (measured 
in km) between a given bank-firm pair. In columns (2)-(4), the sample is restricted to bank-firm pairs where we 
observe a lending relationship, and we directly link labor unrest at the firms to their bank lenders’ silver holdings. 
All specifications include city fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), specifications 
(1)-(3) are estimated on changes around 1933. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. Standard errors 
reported in the parentheses in panel B, column (1), are clustered by firm. The Huber-White robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
A. Full sample 
Dep. variable: 
𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓  
𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒔) 
  𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Silver pool -0.246***    -0.611**   
 (0.065)    (0.244)   
Excess silver pool  -0.229***    -0.602***  
  (0.056)    (0.207)  
Excess reserves pool   -0.675***    -1.326* 
   (0.208)    (0.783) 
        
District f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,743 1,743 1,743  1,500 1,500 1,500 
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12  0.08 0.08 0.08 
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Table 5 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest - Labor Relations; continued 
 





𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒔) 
  (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Distance -0.018**     
 (0.007)     
Silver   -0.027*   
   (0.014)   
Excess silver     -0.024*  
    (0.013)  
Excess reserves (Y/N)     -0.180** 
     (0.085) 
      
City f.e. Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,899  60 60 60 
R2 0.01  0.09 0.09 0.13 
46 
 
Table 6 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest – Communist Activities 
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑓 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓 + 𝑓 
The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of the number of communist activities mentioned in the SMP files at firm 𝑓 (average after 
1933 minus average prior to 1933). Due to data availability, the sample contains Shanghai firms only. The variable S𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is the inverse distance-
weighted average silver reserves around firm 𝑓 (specifications (1)-(3)), the inverse distance-weighted average of the log-amount of silver in excess to 
compulsory reserves, in specifications (4)-(6) (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙), or the inverse distance-weighted average of the indicator variable equal to 1 if a given 
bank has silver-to-notes ratio above 60%, and 0 otherwise, in specifications (7)-(9) (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙). Specifications (1), (4) and (7) include firm 
nationality fixed effects. Specifications (2), (5) and (8) include industry, and firm nationality fixed effects. Specifications (3), (6) and (9) include city district, 
industry, and firm nationality fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), the equation is estimated on changes around 1933, after 
collapsing and time-averaging the data before and after 1933. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. The Huber-White robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Dep. Variable: 𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Silver pool -0.076** -0.085** -0.085*         
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.044)         
Excess silver pool     -0.069** -0.077** -0.084**     
     (0.028) (0.030) (0.036)     
Excess reserves pool         -0.167* -0.185* -0.156 
         (0.100) (0.108) (0.147) 
Intercept 0.494**    0.300**    0.070   
 (0.203)    (0.120)    (0.043)   
            
District f.e. N N Y  N N Y  N N Y 
Industry f.e. N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,500 1,500 1,500  1,500 1,500 1,500  1,500 1,500 1,500 
R2 0.19 0.24 0.24  0.19 0.24 0.24  0.19 0.24 0.24 
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Table 7 Traded vs. Non-traded Sectors: Credit and Social Unrest around 1933 
The table reports the estimates of regressions following specifications (4)-(6) of Table 4 in columns (1)-(3); specifications (1)-(3) of Table 5.A in 
columns (4)-(6); and specifications (3), (6) and (9) of Table 6 in columns (7)-(9). All specifications include the additional variables 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
(an indicator equal to 1 for traded-products industrial sectors) and the interaction term 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (columns (1)-(3)) or 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 (columns (4)-(9)). Specifications (1)-(3) include a borrowing firm fixed effects. Specifications (4)-(9) include city 
district, industry and firm nationality fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), all regressions are estimated on changes 
around 1933. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered by bank in columns (1)-
(3), and Huber-White in columns (4)-(9). The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Dependent var. 𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒂𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕)  
𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓  
𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒔) 
𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 +𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓  
𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Silver 0.183***   -0.613***   -0.305**   
 (0.062)   (0.113)   (0.130)   
Silver × -0.041   0.437***   0.257*   
Traded sector (0.046)   (0.108)   (0.131)   
Excess silver  0.103**   -0.569***   -0.300**  
  (0.038)   (0.101)   (0.124)  
Excess silver ×   -0.011   0.399***   0.249**  
Traded sector  (0.046)   (0.098)   (0.126)  
Excess reserves (Y/N)   0.275*   -1.370***   -0.725** 
   (0.148)   (0.327)   (0.320) 
Excess reserves (Y/N) ×     0.397   0.876***   0.683** 
Traded sector   (0.362)   (0.294)   (0.323) 
          
Control var. Y Y Y       
Firm f.e. Y Y Y       
District f.e.    Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry f.e.    Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Nationality f.e.    Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 229 229 229 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,500 1,500 1,500 




Table 8 Silver Reserves and Credit – Bank-Level Placebo Test (1927-1931) 
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑏 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏 + 𝑏 
The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of the overall loans (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠) extended by 
bank 𝑏 around 1929 (post-1929 average minus pre-1929 average). The variable 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 is the natural logarithm 
of bank’s silver reserves in 1931 (or the value in 1932 if not available, specifications (1)-(3)). We alternatively 
define it as the log-amount of silver reserves in excess of the mandatory 60% reserves (specifications (4)-(5)), 
or as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a given bank has silver-to-notes ratio strictly above 60%, and 0 otherwise 
(specifications (6)-(7)). 𝑥 is a vector of control variables, including bank size, equity ratio, cash to bank assets 
ratio, return on equity, and an indicator for no retained earnings. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004), the equation is estimated on changes around 1929, after collapsing and time-averaging the data before 
and after 1929. Specifications (3), (5) and (7) also include banks that do not issue banknotes throughout the 
sample period (and add an indicator for no notes issuance). All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. 
The Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Silver  0.030 0.037     
 (0.088) (0.084)     
Excess silver   0.054 0.114      
   (0.245) (0.260)      
Excess reserves (Y/N)     -0.012 -0.019    
     (0.108) (0.092)    
∆ Bank size 2.625** 2.634*** 2.657** 2.672*** 2.692** 2.702*** 
 (1.077) (0.549) (1.081) (0.560)    (1.130) (0.572)    
∆ Equity ratio -0.015 -0.024* -0.015 -0.024*   -0.016 -0.025*   
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)    (0.015) (0.013)    
∆ Cash ratio 0.008 0.000 0.008 -0.000    0.008 0.000    
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006)    (0.017) (0.006)    
∆ ROE 0.016 0.007 0.016 0.007    0.016 0.007    
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)    (0.012) (0.006)    
∆ No ret. earnings 0.058 0.024 0.063 0.031    0.066 0.033    
 (0.102) (0.088) (0.103) (0.088)    (0.113) (0.099)    
No notes   -0.116  -0.124     -0.143    
  (0.083)  (0.078)     (0.085)    
Intercept 0.160** 0.112 0.168** 0.121*   0.178* 0.136    
 (0.074) (0.068) (0.070) (0.062)    (0.089) (0.083)    
N 21 27 21 27    21 27    
R2 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.60    0.61 0.60    
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Table 9 Credit and Social Unrest around 1933 – IV Estimation, 2nd Stage 
Panel A reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑏𝑓 = 𝛼𝑓 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏𝑓 + 𝑏𝑓 
following the same specifications as in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4. 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 is instrumented by copper availability 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, defined as the natural logarithm of distance-weighted average copper capacity in the closest 3 
copper mines around bank 𝑏. 𝑥 is the vector of control variables used in Table 4. Panel B reports the estimates 
of: 
Δ𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑓 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓 + 𝑓 
following the same specifications as in columns (1)-(3) of Table 5.A. 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is instrumented by copper 
availability 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙, defined as the inverse distance-weighted average of the natural logarithm of copper 
capacity in the nearest 3 copper mines to a firm’s closest bank 𝑏. Columns (1)-(3) present the results for Δlog(1 
+ Number of unrest episodes), columns (4)-(6) present the results for Δlog(1 + Number of communist activities). 
All variables are time-averaged before and after 1933, and are defined in detail in Appendix B. The standard 
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered by bank in panel A, and Huber-White in panel B. The symbols *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
A. Dep. variable: 𝚫𝑳 (2nd stage) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Silver  0.334***     
 (0.109)     
Excess silver   0.301***   
   (0.113)   
Excess reserves (Y/N)     0.864*** 
     (0.298) 
Control var. Y  Y  Y 
Firm f.e. Y  Y  Y 
N 229  229  229 
First-stage F-stat 10.20  3.88  17.69 
 
B. Dep. variable: 𝚫𝑺𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒂𝒍 𝒖𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 (2nd stage) 
 
Δlog(1 + 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  
𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠) 
 
Δlog(1 + 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  
𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Silver pool -0.593**    -0.162   
 (0.273)    (0.155)   
Excess silver pool  -0.523**    -0.144  
  (0.242)    (0.138)  
Excess reserves pool   -1.874**    -0.495 
   (0.864)    (0.475) 
District f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,743 1,743 1,743  1,500 1,500 1,500 
First stage F-stat 132.82 132.31 105.14  129.75 124.33 115.40 
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Table 10 Shanghai and Tianjin Cotton Mill Operation and Silver Availability  
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓 + 𝑓 
The dependent variable is the change in an indicator variable that equals 1 if a cotton mill laid off workers (Panel 
A), reduced electricity consumption (Panel B), reduced output (Panel C) in a given year, and 0 otherwise 
(average after 1933 minus average prior to 1933). The variable S𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is the inverse distance-weighted 
average silver reserves around firm 𝑓 (columns (1)-(2)), the inverse distance-weighted average of the silver 
amount in excess to compulsory reserves, in columns (3)-(4) (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙), or the inverse distance-
weighted average of the indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a given bank has silver-to-notes ratio above 
60%, and 0 otherwise, in columns (5)-(6) (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙).  Specifications (2), (4) and (6) include firm 
nationality fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), the equation is estimated on 
changes around 1933. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. The Huber-White robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
A. Dep. variable: 𝚫𝑳𝒂𝒚𝒐𝒇𝒇  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Silver pool -1.186*** -1.178***       
 (0.257) (0.259)       
Excess silver pool    -0.879*** -0.872***    
    (0.185) (0.184)    
Excess reserves pool       -4.159* -4.035* 
       (2.058) (2.115) 
Intercept 7.890***   4.004***   1.950*  
 (1.756)   (0.888)   (0.963)  
         
Nationality f.e. N Y  N Y  N Y 
N 38 38  38 38  38 38 




B. Dep. variable: 𝚫𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Silver pool -6.212** -6.947**       
 (2.675) (2.584)       
Excess silver pool    -3.752** -3.995**    
    (1.595) (1.546)    
Excess reserves pool       -13.327** -15.072*** 
       (5.284) (5.022) 
Intercept 40.845**   16.683**   6.056**  
 (17.540)   (7.049)   (0.975)  
         
Nationality f.e. N Y  N Y  N Y 
N 29 29  29 29  29 29 
R2 0.19 0.30  0.16 0.24  0.15 0.25 
         
C. Dep. variable: 𝚫𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Silver pool -0.524* -0.524*       
 (0.259) (0.256)       
Excess silver pool    -0.406** -0.400**    
    (0.189) (0.182)    
Excess reserves pool       -2.739* -2.402 
       (1.572) (1.434) 
Intercept 3.594**   1.953**   1.381*  
 (1.736)   (0.872)   (0.740)  
         
Nationality f.e. N Y  N Y  N Y 
N 37 37  37 37  37 37 







Appendix 1.A.  
Interpreting the Effects of the Silver Purchase Program: Framework 
A.1 Economic historiography of the Silver Purchase program 
The argument that the Silver Purchase Program had negative effects on the Chinese 
economy can be traced back to contemporary commentators such as Lin (1936, pp. 5-77) 
and Leavens (1939, pp. 293-312). Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Friedman (1992) 
argue that the Silver Purchase program had a devastating impact. As silver was at the basis 
of the Chinese monetary standard, an outflow of silver corresponded to both a contraction 
in the money supply and an appreciation of the Chinese dollar vis-à-vis major foreign 
currencies. The decline in money supply produced a sharp reduction of imports, domestic 
consumption, and investment. At the same time, rising silver prices corresponded to an 
appreciation of the Chinese dollar, with detrimental effects on exports. Compared to 1929, 
the export value of China’s major goods such as silk and tea was down by 65% in 1935 
(Yu (1937, pp. 224-225)).  
Rawski (1989 and 1993) disputes Friedman’s findings and asserts that the silver 
outflow had a negligible impact on the Chinese money supply. Moreover, the Chinese 
economy already experienced deflation from 1931 and in 1935 the price level rose.   
Brandt and Sargent (1989) recognize that the Silver Purchase program led to an 
increase of silver prices and an outflow of silver from China. However, they argue that the 
program had mainly an effect on relative prices, but not on the real economy. With higher 
silver prices, Chinese banks could back up the same, or an even larger, amount of paper 
money with any given amount of silver. Brandt and Sargent (1989) further argue that 
Chinese banks exploited the arbitrage opportunity offered by higher silver prices and sold 
part of the silver abroad. As a result, they replaced part of their silver reserves with 
Republic of China Treasury bonds. 
Brandt and Sargent’s (1989) argument rests on two assumptions. First, Chinese 
Treasury bonds were “as good as silver” to back up the currency (i.e. the perceived risk of 
sovereign default was very low). This has become known as the “real bills” doctrine (e.g. 
Sargent and Wallace (1982)). Second, prices in China were flexible enough to insulate the 
real economy from any adverse effects of the outflow of silver and deflation. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, they show that M1 declines as a result of the outflow of Silver, but 
M2 remains constant or even increases during the 1930s. They also present macroeconomic 
evidence showing only a mild decline in GPD and other macroeconomic aggregates. 
Burdekin (2008) presents evidence supporting the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
and Friedman (1992) line of argument. He highlights how geographical differences in 
China are important in explaining the unfolding of the Silver Purchase shock. Shanghai, 
for instance, received large quantities of silver from the interior and, as a result, it was 
partially insulated from the shock until 1934. Internal areas experienced a sharp outflow of 
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silver already starting in 1933, leading banks into financial distress and sharply reducing 
the price level. He also presents macroeconomic time series evidence that links the silver 
purchase program to deflation, exchange rate appreciation, and bank distress in China. 
The evidence we present in the text is in line with this interpretation. In addition, 
we find that, at the macroeconomic level, credit sharply contracts in China after 1933, 
based on a variety of aggregate measures. Figure A.1 summarizes this evidence, showing 
that credit-to-GDP drops by nearly 15% between 1933 and 1935 (panel A), while aggregate 
credit-to-deposits and credit-to-total bank assets ratios drop by about 10% (panel B). 
Moreover, the credit contraction appears circumscribed to the Republic of China. There is 
no evidence, for instance, of a comparable credit contraction in neighboring Hong Kong. 
Based on data available for HSBC, at the time the largest credit institution in Hong Kong, 
it appears that credit provision, in fact, increased there between 1933-35 (panel C). 
At the end of the day, whether or not the Silver Purchase program had an impact 
on the Chinese real economy remains an empirical question. We examine in our tests a 
specific consequence of it: the silver outflow’s effect on credit provision and social 
stability. To the extent that silver was used to back the currency, an outflow of silver would 
drain banks of the necessary resources needed to support lending, thus leading to a credit 
crunch. Below we present a simple model, nesting the Friedman and Schwarz (1963) and 
Brandt and Sargent (1989) interpretations, which can be directly linked to our empirical 
analysis. 
A.2 Impact of the Silver Purchase program on lending  
We consider a simple model illustrating the impact of the Silver Purchase program on the 
Chinese credit market, encompassing both the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and 
Friedman (1992) interpretation and the alternative interpretation of Brandt and Sargent 
(1989).  
In 1930s China, modern banks serve two key roles: they generate the money supply, 
by issuing bank notes, and credit, by making loans. Consider for simplicity a bank financed 
entirely by bank notes, in an amount 𝑁. Under a pure silver standard, banknotes should be 
100% backed by an equivalent amount of silver. In practice, the law allows the bank to 
issue a volume of notes larger than its silver reserves 𝑆, as long as the silver reserves ratio 
𝜎 = 𝑆/𝑁 is  equal to 𝜎 = 60% or greater. The remaining (1 − 𝜎)𝑁 is “collateralized” by 
Treasury bonds with a total face value 𝐵. Banks convert bonds into banknotes, valuing 
bonds at their face value, which we normalize to 1.37  
                                                   
37 This assumption is based on historical evidence. Cheng (2003, p. 160) reports that banks converted 
Treasury bonds into banknotes valuing the bonds at their face value (even when they traded below par), but 
usually bonds were recorded on the assets of the banks at their market values. Between 1927 and 1928, the 
Nationalist government also introduced legislation intended to regulate the banking sector. In particular, the 
registration of new financial institutions had to follow new and detailed procedures, and banks were subject 
to capital requirements (Chen (2003), p. 90-91). The government also created a banking supervisory 
authority, called Bureau of Financial Supervision, with the intention of investigating the business of all the 
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Suppose now that Treasury bonds can be purchased on the market at a price 𝑝𝐵 ≤
1, so that the market value of the bank’s reserves is 𝑆 + 𝑝𝐵𝐵.38 Having issued bank notes 
for a value 𝑁 , the bank has a surplus 𝑁 − 𝑆 − 𝑝𝐵𝐵  that can generate loans 𝐿; simple 
manipulations show that 𝐿 = (1 − 𝑝𝐵)
1−𝜎
𝜎
𝑆. Thus, if government bonds trade at their face 
value and 𝑝𝐵 = 1 (or if a 100% silver reserve is mandated), in this simplified setting the 
bank only generates the money supply, but not credit. This situation corresponds to the 
interpretation of Brandt and Sargent (1989), where shocks to the silver supply will not have 
any impact on lending. 
The ability to make loans derives from the “arbitrage” between the face and market 
value of the non-silver collateral. However, to the extent that the bank’s silver reserves do 
not cover the full amount of bank notes in circulation 𝑁, the bank is exposed to a “run.” If 
all holders of banknotes want to convert them into silver, the bank has a silver shortage 




[(1 − 𝑝𝐵)(1 − 𝜎)𝑁]
2 in the event of a run. This can be interpreted either 
as the bank requiring an equity injection to overcome the shortfall or as an early liquidation 
of the outstanding loans. 
Summing up, the bank finances with an amount of notes 𝑁  its investment in 
reserves 𝑆 + 𝑝𝐵𝐵 plus loans 𝐿, facing the expected cost of a run equal to 𝜋
𝛾
2
[(1 − 𝑝𝐵)(1 −
𝜎)𝑁]2. Denoting the marginal return on loans by 𝑟𝐿, the bank’s profit function is thus: 
Π(𝜎, 𝑆) = 𝑟𝐿𝐿 + 𝑆 + 𝑝𝐵𝐵 − 𝑁 − 𝜋
𝛾
2
[(1 − 𝑝𝐵)(1 − 𝜎)𝑁]
2.  Expressing all the relevant 
quantities in terms of 𝑆 and the reserve ratio 𝜎, the bank’s optimization problem is: 
 max
𝜎












The bank’s optimal reserve and lending policy is thus determined, subject to the reserves 
constraint 𝜎 ≥ 𝜎 = 60%.  
Assume, as in Khwaja and Mian (2008), a linear loan demand 𝑟𝐿 = ?̅? − 𝛼𝐿𝐿 , 
which the bank takes as given (i.e. a competitive credit market). Under this assumption, 
solving (A.1) the bank holds a fraction of silver reserves: 





} . (A.2) 
If the reserves constraint is not binding, it will make an amount of loans equal to: 
 ?̂? = (𝛼𝐿 + 𝜋𝛾)
−1(?̅? − 1). (A.3) 
If the reserves constraint is binding, ?̂? = 𝜎 and the bank makes an amount of loans: 




                                                   
Chinese banks. However, the authority had neither the power nor the capacity to carry out its duties. While 
the four largest banks played a relevant role in placing treasury bonds on the market, there was no modern 
central bank entrusted to set interest rates or regulate the money supply. 
38 We are using silver as the numeraire, so that 𝑝𝐵 is in fact the market price of government bonds relative to 
the market price of silver. 
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Thus, if collateral other than silver is “as good as silver” (𝑝𝐵 = 1), as assumed by Brandt 
and Sargent (1989), shocks to the silver supply cannot affect the credit market – they just 
affect the money supply. In contrast, if 𝑝𝐵 < 1, shocks to the silver supply will be reflected 
in the credit supply as soon as the reserves constraint becomes binding. 
These observations allow us to understand the impact of the Silver Purchase. 
Suppose that the above model is played over two dates 𝑡 = 0, 1 (before and after the Silver 
Purchase). At each date the bank can lend on the credit market, and firms demand loans; 
assume that, prior to the Silver Purchase, the bank’s reserves constraint is not binding, i.e. 
𝑆 > 𝜎𝑁, and the credit market equilibrium is described by (A.3).  
At 𝑡 = 1, the bank’s silver reserves are hit by a shock bringing them down to 𝑆 −
Δ𝑆, so that the bank might need to adjust its lending decisions.39 The shock to reserves 
captures the attempt by banknotes holders to convert them into silver, to profit from the 
Silver Purchase. It is apparent from the above expressions that the silver shock will affect 
equilibrium loans only if the bank becomes constrained; this requires (𝑆 − Δ𝑆) <
𝜎(𝑁 − Δ𝑆), i.e. Δ𝑆 >
?̅?−1
(1−?̅?)(1−𝑝𝐵)(𝛼𝐿+𝜋𝛾)
 . In that case, the change in equilibrium lending 
becomes: 
 Δ?̂? = (1 − 𝑝𝐵)
1−?̅?
?̅?




Thus, a lower pre-1933 level of silver reserves 𝑆 is associated with a larger reduction in 
lending Δ?̂?.  
To take the above expression to the data, we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and 
Schnabl (2012) and we assume that, while each bank 𝑖 lends to only one firm 𝑗, any given 
firm can borrow from multiple banks. Furthermore, we allow for a shock to loan demand 
bringing it to ?̅?𝑗 + Δ?̅?𝑗 − 𝛼𝐿𝐿, so that the above expression becomes: 
  Δ𝐿𝑖𝑗 = (1 − 𝑝𝐵)
1−?̅?
?̅?
(𝑆𝑖 − Δ𝑆) −
?̅?𝑗+Δ?̅?𝑗−1
𝛼𝐿+𝜋𝛾
.  (A.5) 
Rewriting the above expression more compactly, we thus estimate, in section IV: 
  Δ𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝛿𝑆𝑖 + 𝜂𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗,  (A.6) 
i.e. regress changes in loans from bank 𝑖 to firm 𝑗 around the Silver Purchase program on 
the bank’s pre-shock silver holdings 𝑆𝑖, including borrowing firm fixed effects 𝜂𝑗. As we 
discuss in the text, the above is equivalent to a differences-in-differences setup, where the 
bank’s pre-Silver Purchase program silver reserves are the treatment.  
  
                                                   
39 Equivalently, one could rewrite the model having the bank purchase additional silver on the market in 
order to make new loans, so that a rise in the market price of silver restricts the lending supply. This would 
have identical predictions on the impact of the Silver Purchase program on banks with high and low ex ante 





Figure A.1 Silver Flows, Foreign Banks in Shanghai (1929-1935) 
The graph report the net percentage change (flow) in silver holdings of non-Chinese banks in Shanghai 
between 1929 and 1935. It indicates that silver holdings decline after the enactment of the Silver Purchase 















































Appendix 1.B.  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Total loans The total annual amount of outstanding loans of a bank in a given year 
(expressed in units of Ch$ 10 millions, in the tests in Table 3 and 8). 
Loan amount The loan amount granted by a bank to a firm (expressed in units of Ch$ 10 
thousands in Tables 4, 7, and 9). 
Number of unrest episodes Number of labor unrest episodes that occur at a given plant in a given year. 
Duration Number of days of labor unrest that a given plant experiences in a given year. 
Communist activities Number of times a given firm is mentioned in the Shanghai Municipal Police 
files in relation to either (1) The arrest of at least one of his employees for 
allegedly communist activities or (2) Being targeted for penetration by a 
communist cell in Shanghai. 
Silver  The silver reserves of a bank measured in 1931, or the earliest available date 
prior to 1933 (in our sample, never later than 1932). 
Excess silver The silver reserves in excess of the mandatory requirement of 60% of 
outstanding banknotes issued by a bank in 1931, or the earliest available date 
prior to 1933 (in our sample, never later than 1932). 
Excess reserves (Y/N) An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank has silver-to-notes ratio 
in excess of the 60% threshold in 1931, or the earliest available date prior to 
1933 (in our sample, never later than 1932), and 0 otherwise. In order to 
attenuate the potential effect of noise in the reserves data, we apply a 1% 
margin (i.e. the indicator equals 1 for reserves of at least 60.06%). 
Traded sector An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm belongs to one of the 
following sectors: Chemicals, Textile, Clothing, Food, Concrete & Glass, 
Leather, Machines & Metal, Paper & Printing, Transportation tools 
manufacture, Wood, Farming, and Other manufacture (Mano and Castillo 
(2015)). 
Silver pool The inverse distance-weighted average silver reserves around a given firm’s 






where 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏 denotes the silver reserves of bank 𝑏 as of 1931, or 1932 if not 




Excess silver pool The inverse distance-weighted average excess silver reserves around a given 
firm’s plant. For each firm plant 𝑓 in the sample, it is computed as: 





where 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏 denotes the excess silver reserves of bank 𝑏 as of 1931, 
or 1932 if not available, and 𝑑(𝑓, 𝑏) the distance between plant 𝑓 and bank 𝑏 
(measured in km). 
Excess reserves (Y/N) pool The inverse distance-weighted average of an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 if a given bank has silver-to-notes ratio above 60%, and 0 otherwise. 
For each firm plant 𝑓 in the sample, it is computed as: 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁) 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 =∑




where 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 (𝑌/𝑁)𝑏  denotes the dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if silver-to-notes ratio of bank 𝑏 as of 1931, or 1932 if not available 
is above 60%, and 𝑑(𝑓, 𝑏) the distance between plant 𝑓 and bank 𝑏 (measured 
in km). 
Copper pool (Loans) The inverse distance-weighted average copper capacity of the nearest 3 copper 
mines around the headquarters of a given bank. 
(w.a.) Copper pool (Labor 
unrest and Communist 
activities) 
The inverse distance-weighted average copper capacity of the nearest 3 copper 
mines to a given firm’s closest bank. 
Bank size Total amount of bank’s equity. 
Equity ratio Bank equity divided by total assets (expressed in percentage points). 
Cash ratio Bank cash holdings divided by total assets (expressed in percentage points). 
ROE Bank net income divided by bank equity (expressed in percentage points). 
No ret. earnings An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a given bank has 0 retained 
earnings in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
No notes An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a given bank has not issued any 
bank notes, and 0 otherwise. 
Relation An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a given bank-firm pair has 
relation, and 0 otherwise. 
Distance Distance, measured in kilometers, between a bank branch and a plant. 
Operation  An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a given cotton mill lays off 
any employees in a given year (Table 10.A), reduces electricity consumption 
(Table 10.B), or cuts down production (Table 10.C), and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 1.C.  
Additional Tests 
This appendix contains additional results that are omitted from the main text of the paper 
for brevity. 
Tables C.1 and C.2 report estimates corresponding to the models presented in 
Tables 7 and 9.B respectively, with the log-duration of labor unrest episodes as the 
dependent variable.  
Table C.3 reports the first-stage estimates associated with the IV estimates reported 
in Table 9.A and 9.B. 
Tables C.4, C.5, C.6, and C.7 report the estimates of panel regressions with fixed 
effects, corresponding to the models estimated in Tables 3, 4, 5.A, and 6. In this case, the 
data are not collapsed and time-averaged before and after 1933, but the standard errors are 
clustered. 
Tables C.8 and C.9 report the estimates of models identical to the ones reported in 
Tables 5.A and 6, excluding from the sample firms located in the Zhabei (闸北) district in 
Shanghai, which may be affected by Japanese interests. The estimates are very close to the 




Table C.1 Traded versus Non-traded Sectors: Labor Relation around 1933 – Unrest Episode 
Duration 
The table reports the estimates of regressions following specifications (4)-(6) of Table 5.A. All 
specifications include the additional variables 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟  (an indicator equals to 1 if sectors 
produce tradable products) and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙. The regressions in all columns include 
city district, industry and firm nationality fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004), all regressions are estimated on changes around 1933. All variables are defined in detail in 
Appendix B. The Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent var.  𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Silver -0.273   
 (0.557)   
Silver × Traded sector -0.394   
 (0.608)   
Excess silver  -0.272  
  (0.522)  
Excess silver × Traded sector  -0.379  
  (0.566)  
Excess reserves (Y/N)   -0.598 
   (1.457) 
Excess reserves (Y/N)  × Traded sector   -0.874 
   (1.593) 
    
District f.e. Y Y Y 
Industry f.e. Y Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y 
N 1,500 1,500 1,500 




Table C.2 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Labor Relations – IV Estimation, 2nd Stage – Unrest 
Episode Duration 
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑓 = 𝛿 + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓 + 𝑓 
following the same specifications as in columns (4)-(6) in Table 5.A. 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 is instrumented by 
copper availability 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 , defined as the inverse distance-weighted average of the natural 
logarithm of copper capacity in the nearest 3 copper mines to a firm’s closest bank 𝑏. All columns 
include city district, industry, and firm nationality fixed effects. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), the equation is estimated on changes around 1933. All variables are defined in 
detail in Appendix B. The Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep. variable:  𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) (2nd stage) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Silver pool -2.540***     
 (1.013)     
Excess silver pool   -2.261**   
   (0.908)   
Excess reserves pool     -7.756** 
     (3.068) 
      
District f.e. Y  Y  Y 
Industry f.e. Y  Y  Y 
Nationality f.e. Y  Y  Y 
N 1,500  1,500  1,500 
First stage F-stat 129.75  124.33  115.40 
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Table C.3 Credit and Social Unrest around 1933 – IV Estimation, 1st Stage 
Panel A reports the first-stage estimates of Table 9.A. The first stage is specified as: 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏,1931 = 𝜂𝑓 + 𝜌𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑏 + 𝜇′Δ𝑥𝑏𝑓 + 𝜈𝑏𝑓 
All specifications include a full set of borrowing firm fixed effects. The standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are clustered at the bank level. Panel B reports the first stage estimates of Table 8.B and 
Table C.1. The first stage is specified as: 
𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 = 𝜂 + 𝜌 (𝑤. 𝑎. ) 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑓 + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑓 + 𝜈𝑓 
All specifications include city district, industry and firm nationality fixed effects. Specifications (1)-(3) 
correspond to specifications (1)-(3) of Table 9.B; specifications (4)-(6) correspond to specifications (4)-
(6) of Table 9.B. The Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are 
time-averaged before and after 1933. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B.  
 
 
A. Dep. variable: 𝑺𝒊𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒆𝒔 (1st stage) 
 Silver  Excess silver  Excess reserves (Y/N) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Copper pool -4.872***  -5.417*  -1.884*** 
 (1.526)  (2.750)  (0.448) 
      
Control var. Y  Y  Y 
Firm f.e. Y  Y  Y 
N 229  229  229 
R2 0.71  0.38  0.69 


















 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
(w.a.) Copper pool -0.142*** -0.161*** -0.045***  -0.172*** -0.193*** -0.056*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.004)  (0.015) (0.017) (0.005) 
        
District f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,743 1,743 1,743  1,500 1,500 1,500 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.92  0.41 0.38 0.45 
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Table C.4 Silver Reserves and Credit around 1933 – Bank-Level (No Collapsing) 
The table reports replication of estimation in Table 3, without collapsing and time-averaging the data before and after 1933. All variables are 
defined in detail in Appendix B. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered by bank.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Silver × Post 0.119*** 0.140*** 0.136***     
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.029)     
Excess silver × Post    0.391*** 0.382***   
    (0.079) (0.080)   
Excess reserves (Y/N) × Post      0.131*** 0.134*** 
      (0.036) (0.037) 
        
Control var. N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No notes bank × Year f.e. N N Y N Y N Y 
N 214 211 365 211 365 211 365 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
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Table C.5 Silver Reserves and Credit around 1933 – Loan-Level (No Collapsing) 
The table reports replication of estimation in Table 4, without collapsing and time-averaging the data 
before and after 1933. All columns include bank-plant pair, year and firm-year fixed effects. All 
variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered 
by bank.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Silver × Post 0.159***   
 (0.047)   
Excess silver × Post  0.116***  
  (0.029)  
Excess reserves (Y/N) × Post   0.351*** 
   (0.140) 
    
Control var. Y Y Y 
Bank-plant pair f.e. Y Y Y 
Year f.e. Y Y Y 
Firm × Year f.e. Y Y Y 
N 1,077 1,077 1,077 
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 
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Table C.6 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest – Labor Relations (No Collapsing) 
The table reports the replication of estimation in Table 5.A, without collapsing and time-averaging the 
data before and after 1933. All columns include plant, year, district-year, firm industry-year, and firm 
nationality-year fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix B. The Huber-White robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep. variable: 
𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓  
𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒔) 
 
 𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Silver pool × Post -0.243***    -0.611**   
 (0.065)    (0.244)   
Excess silver pool × Post  -0.227***    -0.602***  
  (0.056)    (0.207)  
Excess reserves pool × 
Post 
  -0.673*** 
 
  -1.326* 
   (0.208)    (0.783) 
        
Plant f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
District × Year f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry × Year f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Nationality × Year f.e.  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 8,632 8,632 8,632  7,500 7,500 7,500 




Table C.7 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest – Communist Activities (No Collapsing) 
The table reports the replication of estimation in Table 6, without collapsing and time-averaging the data before and after 1933. Columns (1), (4), 
and (7) include plant and year fixed effects. Columns (2), (5), and (8) include plant, year, firm industry-year, and firm nationality-year fixed effects. 
Columns (3), (6), and (9) include plant, year, district-year, firm industry-year, and firm nationality-year fixed effects. All variables are defined in 
detail in Appendix B. The Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep. Variable: 𝚫𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Silver pool × Post -0.085    -0.083    -0.167   
 (0.049)    (0.049)    (0.132)   
Excess silver pool × Post  -0.058    -0.058    -0.109  
  (0.032)    (0.028)    (0.105)  
Excess reserves pool × Post   -0.056    -0.062    -0.061 
   (0.043)    (0.034)    (0.144) 
            
Plant f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Year f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
District × Year f.e. N N Y  N N Y  N N Y 
Industry × Year f.e. N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y 
Nationality × Year f.e.  N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y 
N 7,500 7,500 7,500  7,500 7,500 7,500  7,500 7,500 7,500 
R2 0.42 0.51 0.51  0.42 0.51 0.51  0.42 0.51 0.51 
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Table C.8 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest – Labor Unrest (Excluding Zhabei District) 
The table reproduces the estimates of Table 5.A, excluding firms located in the Zhabei (闸北) district in 
Shanghai. 
Dep. variable: 
𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 
𝒐𝒇 𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒖𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒔) 
  𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Silver pool -0.242***    -0.604**   
 (0.071)    (0.268)   
Excess silver pool  -0.224***    -0.588***  
  (0.061)    (0.226)  
Excess reserves pool   -0.627***    -1.138 
   (0.223)    (0.842) 
        
District f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,497 1,497 1,497  1,254 1,254 1,254 




Table C.9 Impact of the Liquidity Shock on Social Unrest – Communist Activities (Excluding Zhabei District) 
The table reproduces the estimates of Table 6, excluding firms located in the Zhabei (闸北) district in Shanghai. 
Dep. Variable: 𝚫𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Silver pool -0.085** -0.096** -0.103**         
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.047)         
Excess silver pool     -0.076** -0.084** -0.099**     
     (0.030) (0.034) (0.039)     
Excess reserves pool         -0.174* -0.193 -0.182 
         (0.104) (0.119) (0.151) 
Intercept 0.547**    0.329**    0.071   
 (0.217)    (0.131)    (0.045)   
            
District f.e. N N Y  N N Y  N N Y 
Industry f.e. N Y Y  N Y Y  N Y Y 
Nationality f.e. Y Y Y  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 1,254 1,254 1,254  1,254 1,254 1,254  1,254 1,254 1,254 
R2 0.22 0.27 0.27  0.23 0.27 0.27  0.22 0.27 0.27 
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Appendix 1.D.  
Data on Loans, Labor Unrest Episodes, and Underground Communist Activities 
This Appendix presents excerpts from our primary sources of data:  
 Loan contracts (Figure D.1);  
 Survey data on labor unrest episodes (Figure D.2); 







Figure D.1 Sample Loan Contract – Excerpt 
The figure shows the first and last pages of one of the loan contracts in the sample. The loan is made by 
Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank to Shanghai Print and Dye Co. (上海印染股份有限公司). The 
page on the left reports the loan amount (600,000 Chinese dollars, red circle 1.), the interest rate (0.9% on a 
monthly basis, red circle 2.), and the date of the contract (19 August 1932, red circle 3.). The page on the 






Figure D.2 Shanghai Survey of Labor Unrest Episodes – Excerpt 
The figure shows an excerpt from the survey Industrial Disputes in Shanghai since 1928 (近五年来上海之
劳资纠纷), conducted by the Bureau of Social Affairs of the city government of greater Shanghai between 
1931 and 1932, and used in the analysis. Each row in the table refers to an individual labor unrest episode. 
The table’s columns report the episode’s date (col. 1), the id of the case (col. 2), the motivation for the episode 
(col. 3), the industry of the affected company (col. 4) and its nationality (col. 5), the number of factories 
involved in the episode (col. 6), the number of workers involved in the episode (col. 7), the duration of the 





Figure D.3 Shanghai Municipal Police Records – Excerpt 
The figure shows an excerpt from the Shanghai Municipal Police records used in the analysis, reporting the 
findings of an agent infiltrated in the underground Communist Party. The excerpt, dated 15 July 1931, 
summarizes the meeting of a party cell. At the meeting, cell members were instructed to “go on strike or 
suspend work on August 1 to commemorate the anniversary of ‘International Red Day.’” 
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Using datasets on transactions within business groups and social sentiment in China, I show that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) use internal funds to address social unrest, complying with the 
government’s political goals. I use plausibly unexpected shocks to regional stability to analyze the 
response of SOEs to these events. I find that the government, as the controlling shareholder, adopts 
a carrot-and-stick approach. The government offers a “carrot” by injecting funds into SOEs located 
in the affected areas, which are then used to generate benefits to the public, such as larger labor 
payments and additional capital expenditures. However, if there are severe political conflicts that 
threaten its authority, the government applies a “stick” by withdrawing resources. The SOEs 
channel seems effective because local sentiment recovers around shocks when SOEs offer more 
benefits. Additional tests show that the SOEs channel is significant in economic magnitude 
compared to fiscal redistribution. As a result of the transfer, SOEs lose value after shocks, but 
firms in the region improve their performance later. This paper provides new evidence on how the 
intra-group allocation of resources incorporates political objectives, and has socioeconomic impact. 
 
JEL: G32, G34, D74, P16. 









The literature on the economic merits of state and private ownership provides ample evidence that 
SOEs are less efficient than their private counterparts.40 These differences in efficiency have been 
attributed to agency problems caused by the weak incentives offered to SOE managers and by poor 
monitoring, as well as to politicians’ rent-seeking at the expense of minority shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994, 1998), Shleifer (1998)). Successive waves of privatization since the 1980s have 
led to a marked reduction in state ownership, yet, in the post-privatization era, SOEs continue to 
be among the largest corporations in the world and account for a substantial share of the economy 
in many countries. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed a resurgence of state ownership, 
especially in emerging markets (Hsu, Liang, and Matos (2017); Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014); 
Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilera (2015)).  
What functions does state ownership carry to compensate for its economic inefficiency for 
government shareholders? Hart and Zingales (2017) imply that such functions lie in the embedded 
incentives for SOEs to address governments’ non-economic goals, and in the government’s 
willingness to trade short-run profits for achieving such goals. Their model shows that in the 
presence of shareholders who care about social issues, the function of the firms will be to maximize 
shareholders’ welfare by internalizing non-economic goals, rather than just wealth. Such 
shareholders are willing to accept lower returns when a firm achieve these goals. 
In this paper, I focus on the government’s political goal of maintaining social stability and 
study whether business groups of SOEs strategically deploy resources through internal capital 
markets in response to regional social unrest.41 Governments value social stability. Failing to 
address social unrest properly could result in a government’s loss of political power (Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2000b)) and lower economic growth (Alesina and Perotti (1996)). As controlling 
shareholders, governments could impose on SOEs the goal of addressing social unrest. More 
specifically, business groups allocate resources across their units by conducting transactions on 
internal capital markets. In this way, government owners can inject funds into SOEs located in 
regions affected by incidents of social unrest (e.g., terrorist attacks). When SOEs in such regions 
                                                   
40 For example, Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh (1994), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001), and Ljungqvist et al. (2017) 
41 A typical state-owned business group holds multiple SOEs. 
76 
 
receive additional funds, they can use these funds to distribute benefits to local residents. 
Government owners may accept losses in share value when the allocative strategy in state-owned 
business groups restores peace. 
Testing whether and how SOEs internalize government’s political goal of maintaining social 
stability poses three empirical challenges. First, such a test requires a direct measure of resource 
allocation within business groups to discover the channel through which government intervenes. 
Studies on business groups based on U.S. data rely largely on segment-level data (Berger and Ofek 
(1995); Shin and Stulz (1998); Hund, Monk, and Tice (2012)), which is collected annually and 
does not provide information on internal pricing. To document changes in resource allocation 
relative to the timing of incidents of social unrest, it is crucial to have both frequent measurements 
of intra-group resource flows and the pricing rules of each transaction. Price distortions, which are 
normally difficult to measure, are another important dimension for evaluating allocative 
distortions. Complicating matters further, the evidence shows that companies strategically disclose 
segment data to hide sensitive information (Berger and Hann (2007)). 
Secondly, in order to infer a causal relationship between resource flows and social stability, 
exogenous variations in the likelihood of regional social unrest are needed, because government 
intervention and social unrest are jointly determined. In fact, the benefits offered by SOEs may 
invite a potential threat of unrest. Without a shock to the probability of social unrest, one cannot 
conclude that changes in the intra-group resource flows are caused by instability. 
Thirdly, in order to show the social consequences of resource allocation in state-owned 
business groups, I need a proxy of social welfare. Typically, the literature either constructs proxies 
for social welfare using economic and demographic data (e.g., Jones and Klenow (2016)) or relies 
on surveys (e.g., Anderson and Guillory (1997)). However, proxies using economic and 
demographic data tend to introduce issues of endogeneity at the level of the firm, because 
economic performance is correlated with a firm’s activities. Surveys often report data at the annual 
frequency, and it is difficult to obtain systematic fine-grained data over multiple years. Therefore, 
capturing the immediate change of welfare around shocks is a challenge. 
I address these challenges in my empirical design by exploiting the unique features of the 
Chinese setting. First, I obtain deal-level data on related party transactions (RPTs) from the China 
Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The data records all transactions within 
Chinese business groups, which allows me directly to observe resource allocation within business 
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groups. The China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) mandates that all publicly listed 
firms disclose all transactions between related parties within a business group. The dataset reports 
pricing rules of each transaction, which enable me to differentiate transactions priced at market 
prices or at off-market prices. Off-market prices are mainly negotiated prices and government 
regulated prices that potentially involve price distortion. With all this information, I can measure 
resource allocation by both the amount of cash flow and the price distortion associated with each 
transaction. Secondly, I identify a set of arguably unanticipated adverse events that take place in 
different regions both within and outside of China. Examples of these events include riots over 
separatism, scandals involving high-ranking politicians, terrorist attacks, and escalating military 
tensions between China and Japan. While some of these events might be expected, their exact 
timing and location are difficult to anticipate, and it is this variation that I am using for 
identification. These events have the potential to disturb the balance of social unrest and 
government intervention in those cities where they occur, which allows me to identify the causal 
relation. Thirdly, I employ data compiled by Chen et al. (2015) to construct an index of local 
sentiment as an approximation for social welfare, based on a textual analysis of sampled posts 
from Weibo (a Chinese microblogging website, similar to Twitter). 
The evidence shows that SOEs internalize the political goal of maintaining social stability. 
First, I find that resource allocation in state-owned business groups responds to regional shocks to 
social stability and follows a carrot-and-stick approach. On the one hand, a government responds 
to shocks by injecting more funds into SOEs located in areas affected by social unrest events than 
into SOEs in unaffected areas, through transactions on the internal capital market of the business 
groups. These transactions also display a higher level of price distortion that potentially benefits 
SOEs in affected areas. This is the “carrot” approach. The ratio of net cash inflow generated by 
intra-group transactions to firm assets increases 0.9 percentage points, or 14% of one standard 
deviation, more for SOEs in affected areas than for SOEs in unaffected areas around shocks. This 
effect corresponds to 543 million Chinese yuan (about US$84 million) in additional funds in the 
year following a shock, equivalent to 2% of the average annual fiscal expenditure in Chinese cities 
in 2011.42 Regarding the level of price distortion, the ratio of net transactions with off-market 
prices that bring in funds to total number of transactions increases by 7.3 percentage points, or 
13% of one standard deviation, more for SOEs in affected areas than for those in unaffected areas. 
                                                   
42 The National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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On the other hand, when a government is faced with a severe political conflict that threatens its 
ultimate legitimacy, government applies the “stick”. Around the March 14, 2008 Tibet riot and the 
July 5, 2009 Urumqi riot, the ratio of net cash inflow to firm assets decreases by 0.5 percentage 
points, or 8% of one standard deviation, more for SOEs located in Tibet, Aba and Urumqi (though 
the magnitude of this change is smaller than that described above). This effect corresponds to a 
withdrawal of funds amounting to US$22 million. The ratio of net transactions with off-market 
prices to total number of transactions also decreases by 8 percentage points, or 16% of one standard 
deviation more for SOEs in affected areas. This carrot-and-stick approach matches the theory 
developed in the political science literature on state accommodation versus repression. The 
government tends to be tough and impose sanctions if its controlling position is challenged (e.g., 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a); Davenport (2007a, 2007b); Walter (2006)). The 2008 Tibet and 
2009 Urumqi riots triggered punishment from government shareholders, punishment that was 
intended to deter future demands for greater autonomy in those regions. Resource deployment in 
privately owned business groups, however, is insensitive to adverse social shocks. 
Secondly, regarding labor markets and firm investments, my results suggest that the injection 
(withdrawal) of funds is associated with increases (decreases) in labor payments, number of 
employees, and capital expenditure. As is shown by Besley and Persson (2011), increasing labor 
payments and investment levels is an important means of preventing conflicts from breaking out. 
The economic effect is sizable. Moving from the bottom to the top decile in the distribution of 
additional funds received around the time of shocks is associated with 17% higher labor payments, 
3% more employees, and 18% greater capital expenditure in SOEs located in affected cities. 
However, no significant changes are found in non-SOEs. 
Third, by addressing social unrest, SOEs’ incentives deviate from shareholder value 
maximization, and accordingly, shareholders of SOEs experience losses in market value relative 
to book value. Moving from the bottom to the top decile in the distribution of additional funds 
received around the time of shocks is associated with 11% higher book-to-market ratio in SOEs 
located in affected cities, which indicates that SOEs’ market values decrease relative to book 
values. In contrast, when it comes to value, non-SOEs are immune to these same shocks, 
presumably because non-SOEs lack incentives to respond with distortive resource allocations. 
Despite the damage to SOEs’ values, additional results suggest SOEs’ effort of maintaining 
stability may benefit local firms’ performance in relatively longer term. 
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Finally, to infer the impact on social sentiment of SOEs’ activities, I relate the city-level 
sentiment index to the operations of SOEs in those cities.43 I find local sentiment deteriorates in 
cities that experience shocks. However, it recovers to pre-shock levels if SOEs respond to the 
shocks by carrying out more related party transactions aimed at such cities. 
The paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, I add to the political economy 
literature on the interaction between governments and social unrest. To deal with social unrest, a 
state can either accommodate or repress, depending on which option yields higher net benefits 
(Acemoglu, Hassan, and Tahoun (2014); Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b, 2001); Aidt and 
Franck (2015); Besley and Persson (2011); Davenport (2007a, 2007b); Walter (2006)). My paper 
contributes to this literature by documenting a novel channel whereby resource allocation within 
state-owned business groups can potentially be used by governments to neutralize social tension 
created by adverse shocks to stability. 
Secondly, the findings in this study are closely related to a recent debate on firms’ non-
economic goals (Bénabou and Tirole (2010); Hart and Zingales (2017); Hsu, Liang, and Matos 
(2017)). I document SOEs’ non-economic goal of maintaining social stability and show that the 
benefits offered by SOEs to the public can help restore stability. 
Thirdly, this paper contributes to studies on allocative strategies in business groups. The 
previous literature documents the ways in which business groups can strategically deploy 
resources through internal capital markets to achieve expropriation (Dyck and Zingales (2004); 
Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006, 2010); Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010)), alleviation of financial 
constraints (Buchuk et al. (2014); Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2015)), or coinsurance (Jia, Shi, and 
Wang (2013); Ljungqvist et al. (2017)). Using transactional-level data, I show that the political 
goal of maintaining social stability is a driving force of resource allocation in business groups.  
Lastly, my paper speaks to political intervention in economic activities such as government 
procurements during times of crisis (e.g., Goldman (2017)) and regional favoritism (e.g., Hodler 
and Raschky (2014)). I show that governments intervene not only for economic reasons, but also 
for social ones. The time-varying shifts in resource allocation that I document are probably unlike 
the even spread of resources over time and across geographies implied by studies on regional 
favoritism. Overall, my paper provides new evidence on distortion in resource allocation in 
                                                   
43 The sentiment index starts in August 2009. Only incidents of social unrest that occurred after 2009 can be analyzed. 
The events that occurred after 2009 include all events that SOEs addressed by offering benefits to local residents. 
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politically connected firms, and documents its social consequences (e.g., Bertrand et al. (2006); 
Faccio (2006); Fisman (2001); Khwaja and Mian (2005); Shleifer (1998); Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994)).  
Section II of this paper develops testable hypotheses. Section III describes the institutional 
settings and introduces the shocks examined herein. Section IV provides the data, and Section V 
presents the empirical analysis and results. Section VI addresses robustness tests. My conclusions 
are presented in Section VII. 
2.2. Theoretical framework 
I develop a framework that predicts a government’s response to episodes of social unrest. 
Government shareholders could, then, bring the strategy to SOEs and implement it as a guideline 
for resource management in restless times. When a government perceives a threat to social stability, 
it can either accommodate the threat by offering benefits or repress it by imposing sanctions.44 
Before making the decision, the government weighs the costs and benefits of the two options. 
While it is difficult to discuss exhaustively all possible factors in the government’s assessment, I 
try to focus on the nature of unrest events. This focus is supported by the literature described below. 
In his review paper, Davenport (2007a) points out that the most vital aspect of social unrest 
that a government cares about is whether the unrest challenges its political power. When social 
unrest challenges the status quo, an authority generally employs some form of repressive action to 
counter or eliminate the threat. The net benefit of repression in this case is high because failing to 
resolve challenges to the authority’s position results in its losing control. 
When the threat to social cohesion is triggered by isolated incidents that do not directly 
challenge its political power, governments are reluctant to engage in repression, because the 
benefit of such an approach is low. Davenport (2007b) looks into different types of autocracies 
and finds that democratic and single-party regimes are generally less repressive than other 
autocracies because the former two have more flexibility in promoting alternative mechanisms of 
socio-political control. Unlike democratic governments, which can allow individuals and groups 
                                                   
44 I do not separately discuss the two extreme options where (1) the government launches a civil war or (2) full 
democratization is adopted. In my framework, I merge the option of civil war into state repression because sanctions 
and civil war share common roots (Besley and Persson (2011)), and they both mean that the government has chosen 
to be tough. Focusing on regional unrest, I rule out the possibility of full democratization. Democratization is 
ultimately an extreme form of accommodation. 
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to express their needs, single-party regimes can offer direct benefits to disaffected groups in order 
to offset social tensions. When the government imposes the above strategies on SOEs, I obtain the 
first set of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: If a social unrest event does not challenge an authority’s regional political power, 
government shareholders will transfer resources to business group units located in areas that 
experience adverse shocks to social stability (the “carrot”). 
Hypothesis 1b: If a social unrest event challenges an authority’s regional political power, 
government shareholders will withdraw resources from business group units located in affected 
areas (the “stick”). 
Given the resource reallocation strategies above, one might wonder through which channels 
the additional resources can effectively offset social panic. Besley and Persson (2011) provide an 
answer: they find that higher labor payments and levels of investment reduce the likelihood of 
conflicts. Following this finding, it is expected that SOEs use additional resources to improve labor 
conditions and boost capital expenditure in order to offset social panic. 
Hypothesis 2: Employment, labor payment and levels of firm investment in SOEs are positively 
correlated with the net cash inflow received by SOEs in affected cities around shocks. 
Financial economists care about the efficiency of resource allocation within firms because it 
ultimately affects firms’ value. The political objective of maintaining social stability deviates from 
the neoclassical efficiency of maximizing shareholders’ value because it requires resources to flow 
into areas that are experiencing unrest and generate benefits to the local residents rather than going 
to profitable projects. In this end, inefficient resource deployment rises within firms, which results 
in the destruction of shareholder value. 
Hypothesis 3: The political objective of maintaining social stability in SOEs results in the 
destruction of shareholder value. 
Adverse shocks to social stability are capable of generating tension in society. When local 
people experience such shocks (e.g., terrorist attacks), they can become worried. The spillover 
effects of the shocks can damage local sentiment. However, the benefits offered by SOEs to the 
local residents might offset the tension and restore peace. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 4: Local sentiment deteriorates in cities that experience adverse changes to stability. 
The presence or the response of SOEs to the events helps restore the level of sentiment. 
2.3. Institutional background 
A. Chinese business groups and related-party transactions 
Business groups play a major role in the Chinese economy. A typical business group in China 
comprises the holding company, listed firm(s) held by the controller, and many other 
(predominantly non-listed) subsidiaries, controlled either by the controller or by the listed firm(s). 
Based on the nature of ultimate controllers, Ljungqvist et al. (2017) identify in total 211 
government-owned business groups and 76 privately owned groups over the period 2004–2013. 
While it is difficult to estimate the total size of state-owned and non-state-owned business groups, 
among all A share listed firms, SOEs and non-SOEs account for 42% and 58%, respectively, of 
the total market value (2014) and both of them are spread across mainland China. 
The Chinese stock markets mandate the disclosure of related party transactions (RPTs), 
which are deals conducted within the same business groups. Figure 1 depicts a typical business 
group structure and RPTs. RPTs, as shown in the figure, enable resource allocation in the internal 
capital market of business groups. The details of the RPTs’ data are introduced in part IV. 
B. Social stability and regional shocks 
The Chinese government emphasizes the importance of social stability in the pursuit of economic 
development. The concept of a “harmonious society” was brought up in 2004, in the 16th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and the office of the central leading group 
for maintaining stability (中央维护稳定工作领导小组办公室) was set up one year later. Since 
then, maintaining stability has become a central goal of the Chinese government (Geis, John, and 
Holt (2009)). The emergence of the “harmonious society” concept lays out an accommodating 
attitude in handling social unrest. According to the guidelines, building a “harmonious society” is 
a continuing process of resolving social conflicts and nipping them in the bud. Vulnerable groups 
should be supported and guaranteed that they will be able to benefit from social and economic 
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development.45,46 SOEs are active agents in this process. The Chinese SOEs are believed to be 
shock absorbers in the economy. For example, SOEs could be required by the government to 
reserve vacancies to absorb unemployed individuals.47 However, despite the policies, the number 
of episodes of social unrest has increased substantially in the last two decades in China. According 
to Tanner (2014), various forms of protests grow from 8,700 in 1993 to 60,000 in 2003 and more 
than 120,000 by 2008 as reported. The total spending on domestic security reached 514 billion 
Chinese yuan (roughly US$76.7 billion) in 2009, which is comparable to the military budget of 
530 billion Chinese yuan.48 The spending outgrew the military budget in subsequent years.49 With 
the exception of subsidies of vulnerable groups, this spending reflects the build-up of domestic 
security forces such as police and surveillance facilities. 
Even though almost no incident has affected stability on the national level, China does not 
lack for incidents that disturb social stability regionally. Regional incidents, by generating pressure 
on local stability, contribute to identifying the causal inference from social instability to resource 
deployment in SOEs. I collect salient events for the tests from the survey “Conflict Barometer,” 
compiled by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, an annual survey that 
reports conflicts globally. For each country, the report creates a set of topics describing all the 
relevant conflicts in the country, and then tracks all the specific events that happen each year by 
category. Categories are rated each year according to severity, from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). I 
focus on the highest-rated categories, which include territorial disputes, social-economy conflicts, 
and ethnic conflict in China.50 
In the end, I include eight events between 2008 and 2014. The events are: (1) Japanese and 
Chinese boats collided near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2010; (2) Tibetan students 
protested education reform in October 2010, Qinghai province; (3) The Japanese government’s 
                                                   
45 J. Wang, “Build a harmonious society: Keep resolving social conflicts” (构建和谐社会：不断化解社会矛盾的过
程), People, October 12, 2006. 
46 S. Feng, “Building a harmonious society requires solving problems among vulnerable groups” (构建和谐社会必
须解决弱势群体问题), People, July 21, 2005. 
47 Y. Zheng, “Shocks and absorbers,” The Economist, January 16, 2016. 
48 C. Buckley, “Analysis: China price for stability raises alarm,” Reuters, October 14, 2010. 
49 B. Blanchard and J. Ruwitch, “China hikes defense budget, to spend more on internal security,” Reuters, March 5, 
2013. 
50 Regarding conflicts involving China since 2008, the highest-rated conflicts are, for ethnic conflicts, Tibet-Han and 
Uighur-Han (rated between 3 and 4); for territorial conflicts, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island disputes (rated 2); and 




nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in September 2012; (4) The Bo Xilai incident in 
March 2012, Chongqing; (5) A car bomb in Tian’anmen Square in October 2013, Beijing; (6) 
Muslim extremist groups randomly attacked civilians in Kunming, Guangzhou, Changsha, and 
Huaihua in March 2014; (7) The Tibet riot in March 2008; and (8) The Urumqi riot in July 2009. 
Table 1 gives an overview of dates, affected areas, a brief description, and media coverage of all 
these incidents. By selection, the eight events represent most severe social unrest episodes during 
the sample years, which might not be representative for unrest episodes with lower severity in 
China. In robustness test, I relax the selection criteria by including less severe events, and discuss 
the results accordingly. 
These eight events can be ex ante classified as either “carrot” events, which the government 
tries to resolve by offering benefits to groups at risk; or “stick” events, which the government 
represses. The 2008 Tibet and 2009 Urumqi riots are potential “stick” events. Riots due to a desire 
for ethnic separatism represent an extreme category of political conflicts and are the type of social 
unrest most likely to trigger state sanctions. By demanding high-level autonomy or total 
independence, such riots put the local rule of the CPC at risk. According to hypothesis 1b, 
government shareholders are more likely to apply the “stick” in cases such as the Tibetan and the 
Urumqi riots. In addition, several characteristics further prevent government accommodation in 
the two riot cases. First, Tibetans and Uighurs are very different from the majority Han Chinese in 
terms of culture, such as language, religion, and lifestyle, which undermines mutual trust (Avruch 
(1998)). Secondly, government tends to create a reputation of toughness for itself when faced with 
more than one separatist group (Walter (2006)). The purpose is to set a harsh example for other 
groups and deter future incidents. Thirdly, the two autonomous regions receive constant subsidies 
from the government. For example, Wei (2015) calculates the accumulated subsidies to Tibet from 
1952 to 2013 as 542 billion Chinese yuan, accounting for over 90% of Tibet’s financial revenues. 
For Xinjiang, it is reported that the central government planned to provide support I the amount of 
more than 25 billion Chinese yuan after 2010.51 Moore (2000) shows that government adopts 
tactics of repression when earlier accommodations are met with dissent, and of accommodation 
when they are accepted. In other words, government will withdraw regular subsidies to a target 
group when subsidies fail to prevent unrest. The remaining six events are more likely to be “carrot” 
                                                   
51 Y. Wang and J. Yang, “An update on the support to Xinjiang economy” (支援新疆经济发展政策全面维新), 
Caijing, May 14, 2010. 
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events, either because they disturb local stability but do not challenge the rule of the authority, or 
because local stability is affected by either external forces (e.g., foreign countries and terrorists) 
or government failures (scandals involving politicians and the failure of local policies). In Session 
V, I conduct separated tests for the six “carrot” events jointly and the two “stick” events jointly. 
Despite the ex ante classification according to the prediction of political science literature, I 
also take an agnostic approach to let data reveal how the government addresses each of the included 
unrest events by testing them individually in Session VI. 
2.4. Data 
I build my analysis on four main sources: (1) data on related related-party transactions; (2) firm 
ultimate controller information; (3) labor and financial data; and (4) local sentiment index. 
A. Related party transactions 
Data on related party transactions of Chinese listed firms is available in the CSMAR Related Party 
Transactions research database. CSMAR includes data on approximately 500,000 deals from 1997 
to the second quarter of 2015. A related party is defined as related according to one of twelve 
categories: between a firm and its (1) holding company, (2) subsidiaries, (3) commonly held firms, 
(4) major investors, (5) joint venture/associated firms, and (6) key managers, as well as six others.52 
I only include deals conducted between entities that have common shareholding. The data cover 
various aspects of business between firms. I focus on six types of transactions: (1) commodities, 
(2) assets, (3) intra-debt, (4) guarantees, (5) equity transactions, and (6) direct transfer free of 
charge.53 The data allows me to extract information about the transaction date, products, and/or 
services exchanged; the amount of the transaction; and pricing rules. Owing to a lack of financial 
and investment data regarding non-listed firms, I only include deals involving listed firms.54 I start 
with the year 2007 for the data quality of related party transactions. This screening strategy leaves 
me with 244,723 deals from 2,551 firms. The average size of transaction in terms of Chinese yuan 
                                                   
52 The CSMAR database defined 12 different categories for related parties. For conciseness, I merged them into 7 
categories. 
53 The CSMAR database offers a total of 21 different categories of transactions. The six categories in my sample 
account for 80% of all the deals. 
54 While I am collecting non-listed firms information, listed SOEs account for significant share of overall stated owned 
economy. At province level, listed SOEs account for on average 60% of the total assets during the sample year. In 
addition, listed firms receive substantially more attention from the investors. If the goal were to maintain stability 
through SOEs, government would make its effort as visible as possible by working through listed SOEs. 
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is 123 million—roughly US$18 million. Table 2, panel A, reports the summary statistics of related 
party transactions. 
B. Controlling shareholders 
Data on the controlling shareholders of listed firms is obtained from the RESSET database. The 
dataset classifies eight different controlling shareholder types, which enables me to classify firms 
into central-government-owned enterprises, local-government-owned enterprises, and all the other 
non-state-owned enterprises.55 I have 762 SOEs accounting for 30% of firms in my sample. 
C. Labor, investment, and financials 
From CSMAR, I collect firms’ quarterly total labor payment, capital expenditure, and number of 
employees. All the quarterly firm financial data is from CSMAR too, such as firm equity, leverage 
ratio, cash-to-assets ratio, and return on assets. Summary statistics for both labor and financial data 
are reported in Table 2, panel B. 
D. Local sentiment 
To construct the local sentiment index, I use the Weibo Social Moods data compiled by Chen et 
al. (2015). Weibo is a Chinese social-media platform similar to Twitter. Because Weibo is the 
major social media platform in China, the content of its posts could be a reflection of local 
sentiment.56 To construct the dataset, a random number of posts are scraped daily. In total, the 
dataset contains 1 billion posts from August 2009 to November 2014. Each post can be traced to 
the city from which it originates by tracking users’ IP addresses. The content of the posts is then 
compared to keywords indicating six emotions: Happiness, Anger, Sadness, Disgust, Fear, and 
Surprise. Each emotion has a list of keywords identified by the authors. There are in total 306 
keywords for Happiness, 93 keywords for Anger, 205 keywords for Sadness, 142 keywords for 
Disgust, 72 keywords for Fear, and 27 keywords for Surprise. When a post has a match with one 
of the above keywords, it is scored 1 point for the corresponding emotion. The data thus provides 
me with daily emotion scores calculated using a given day’s sampled posts across 500 cities and/or 
regions around the world. In my test, I focus only on 107 Chinese cities that can be matched to 
firms’ data. The data allows me to construct the sentiment index at a city level and at a high 
                                                   
55 The eight categories are (1) central-government-owned firms, (2) local-government-owned firms, (3) private firms, 
(4) collective firms, (5) university-affiliated firms, (6) foreign-owned firms, (7) trade-union-owned firms, and (8) 
other. 
56 Bollen, Mao, and Zeng (2011) argue that the tweets submitted to Twitter at any given time may provide an accurate 
representation of public sentiment, and they find the predictions of the Dow Jones industrial average can be 
significantly improved by including Twitter-based sentiment. 
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(quarterly) frequency. It is important to obtain a timely measure of local sentiment in my study, 
because low-frequency (e.g., annual) measures cannot capture the immediate change of sentiment 
around social unrest events. 
2.5. Empirical analysis and results 
In this part, I test the carrot-and-stick hypothesis of resource allocation in state-owned business 
groups. First, I examine the direction and magnitude of resource allocation within business groups. 
I always separate the firms sampled into SOEs and non-SOEs. Secondly, I look into the 
implications of the allocation strategy for the labor market, the firm’s investment level, and its 
valuation. Finally, I associate local sentiment with the presence and activities of SOEs. 
A. Resource allocation upon adverse shocks 
Resource assignment within business groups is revealed by the related party transactions. I define 
two measures to capture (1) the volume of transactions in monetary terms and (2) the intensity of 
price distortion. To measure the volume of transactions, I construct net inflow, which is the net 
cash inflow to a firm generated by related party transactions. In each deal, a firm is either a seller 
or a buyer and is expected to receive or pay out a certain amount of money. I aggregate the amount 
of net inflow at the quarterly level for each firm. A positive net inflow, then, means that a firm 
receives funds on average during the quarter, and vice versa. Net inflow is scaled by the firm’s 
total assets in the same quarter. To measure the price distortion in transactions, I define the ratio 
of political deals, which is the ratio of the net number of deals conducted following off-market 
prices that bring in cash to the total number of deals that occurred in a given quarter. The data 
provides an indicator variable and classifies pricing rules into thirteen categories, which enables 
me to differentiate whether deals follow market prices or not.57 I define deals that follow market 
prices as “market deals” (category 1) and all the remaining deals as “political deals”. Deals that do 
not follow market prices potentially benefit the recipients or expropriate them. The percentage of 
net off-market-priced deals in a given quarter, therefore, measures the intensity of price distortion 
in resource allocation. With this measure, I can show that even if the total amount of funds 
                                                   
57 The 13 categories are (1) market price, (2) conditional market price, (3) agreed-upon price, (4) nationally regulated 
price, (5) conditional nationally regulated price, (6) local-government-regulated price, (7) bank interest-rate-based 
price, (8) ex-factory price, (9) cost-based price, (10) tender price, (11) evaluated price, (12) face-value-based price, 
and (13) other. 
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transferred does not change around a shock, the level of price distortion may increase. The 
summary statistics of both scaled net inflow and ratio of political deals are presented in Table 2, 
panel B. 
With respect to shocks to regional social stability, I try to identify that resource allocation 
within state-owned business groups is driven by the political goal of maintaining stability. The 




=  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 × 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 (1) 
The dependent variable is the ratio of Net inflow to Total assets of firm 𝑓 in quarter 𝑞. I regress 
the variable on an indicator, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, equal to 1 in four quarters, subsequent to each shock listed in 
Table 1; another indicator, 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓, equal to 1 if a firm is located in a city that experiences social 
unrest events; and the interaction term 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 × 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓 . The term 𝑥  is a vector of firm and 
macroeconomic control variables, including the natural logarithm of firm equity, return on assets, 
leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, the natural logarithms of local GDP, population, and fiscal 
expenses. The cities treated in each event are listed in Table 1, in the “affected area” column. Firm 
fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, and economic zone–quarter of the year fixed effects are 
included, and therefore only the coefficient of the interaction term is identified. Government policy 
makers designed the concept of economic zones with the aim of smoothing the promotion of the 
collective economy and cooperation between provinces. Controlling economic zone–quarter of the 
year fixed effects, therefore, helps to absorb confounding effects from the business cycle. Using 
the broadest definition of economic zone, China is divided into four zones. A positive 𝛽 coefficient 
in equation (1) indicates the “carrot”, approach where firms located in affected cities receive 
additional funds. Otherwise, a negative 𝛽  coefficient indicates the “stick” approach. Standard 
errors are double-clustered at the city and quarter level. 
In practice, I conduct tests by merging multiple events together and generate a continuous 
treated variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 that equals 1 in the following 4 quarters in cities after unrest breaks 




=  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 (1′) 
I use equation (1′) to test the groups of “carrot” and “stick” events separately. 
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In order to examine the change in the level of price distortion around each, I alternatively 
replace the dependent variable in (1′) with the Ratio of political deals: 
 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑓𝑞 =  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 (2)  
A positive 𝛽 coefficient in equation (2) implies that firms located in affected cities engage 
in more distorted transactions, while a negative 𝛽 suggests a lower price distortion in transactions. 
Estimates of (1′) and (2) are reported in panels A and B of Table 3, respectively. Columns 
(1)–(2) present results for “carrot” events; columns (3)–(4) present results for “stick” events. 
According to hypothesis 1a, for “carrot” events I expect to observe that government shareholders 
inject funds into SOEs located in affected areas, and that the level of distortion in deals increases 
after shocks. Indeed, the results in column (1) in both panel A and panel B confirm my hypothesis. 
SOEs located in areas of unrest receive on average 0.9 percentage point more net cash inflow 
relative to firm assets, which is 14% of one standard deviation (6.6) more than SOEs located in 
areas not affected by unrest. This amount corresponds to 543 million Chinese yuan (0.9% × 15.1 
billion × 4), roughly US$84 million, in the year following the shocks. The total dollar value 
transferred through related party transactions accounts for 2% of the total average fiscal 
expenditure of Chinese cities in 2011. Regarding price distortion, the ratio of net political deals to 
total number of deals increases by 7.3 percentage points, or 13% of one standard deviation more 
for SOEs in affected areas. Results for “stick” events focus on the March 14, 2008 Tibet riot and 
the July 5, 2009 Urumqi riot. The hypothesis predicts that government shareholders punish 
defiance and deter future rioting by withdrawing funds after a riot. The results in column (3) 
confirm hypothesis 1b. I find a significant drop in the net cash inflow and in the level of price 
distortion among transactions involving SOEs located in Tibet, Aba, and Urumqi. However, at a 
smaller magnitude, the coefficient suggests that the riots led to a decrease of 0.5 percentage point 
(8% of one standard deviation) in the ratio of net cash inflow to firm assets, and a decrease of 8 
percentage points (16% of one standard deviation) in the ratio of political deals. The outflow of 
funds was on average US$22 million per SOE in the year after each riot. This suggests that the 
government reduces the level of subsidies to Tibet and Xinjiang economies after riots. 
Regarding non-SOEs, I conduct the same analysis; the results are reported in columns (2) 
and (4). I expect resource allocation in non-SOEs to be insensitive to social unrest. The primary 
goal of non-SOEs is to generate value for their owners. On the one hand, without government 
shareholders, non-SOEs lack any incentive to comply with a given political objective. On the other 
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hand, even if the business environment becomes unstable, non-SOEs would not necessarily take 
away from the affected areas because they anticipate that the government (shareholders) would 
respond to incidents of social unrest. The cost of relocation could be too high to be a viable option. 
Throughout, the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. To the extent that I do not 
find resource allocation in non-SOEs to change significantly with respect to shocks, the results are 
in line with my expectations.  
In addition, I explore two potential heterogeneous effects between different types of SOEs. 
Ljungqvist et al. (2017) show that CEOs in SOEs tend to comply with government’s political goals 
because of promotion incentives. The finding implies that local-government-owned SOEs might 
react to local social unrest more strongly than central-government-owned SOEs. To test this cross-
sectional variation within SOEs, I interact the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞  with a dummy variable, 
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑓, equal to 1 if a firm is owned by the central government, and 0 otherwise. The estimates 
are reported in Table B.1 columns (1) and (3). Throughout, the coefficients on the interaction term 
are statistically insignificant. The result implies that central-government-owned SOEs respond to 
adverse events as strongly as do local-government-owned SOEs. Another expectation is that firms 
in sectors owned by the government with less external competition could display stronger effects 
in responding to social unrest events. Due to the lack of competition, firms in these sectors could 
cater more to the political pursuit of the government. To test it empirically, I classify SOEs into 
so-called state monopoly industries and non-state monopoly industries according to Du (2010) and 
Chen (2008), which identify 13 sectors as Chinese state monopoly sectors. 58 The results are 
reported in columns (2) and (4) in Table B.1, I find no statistically significant coefficients on the 
interaction term, suggesting the difference between state monopoly sectors and non-monopoly 
sectors in terms of address social unrest events is insignificant. 
In shock-based studies, it is crucial to show that a parallel trend assumption holds between 
treated and controlled firms (Atanasov and Black (2016)). A parallel trend indicates that (1) results 
are not contaminated by any pre-treatment shocks to either firms that are treated or control firms; 
and (2) the treatment is not anticipated before it happens. I provide empirical support by showing 
                                                   
58 The state monopoly sectors include 1) oil and gas exploration, 2) tobacco, 3) petroleum processing, 4) coking and 
nuclear fuel processing, 5) electricity, heat production and supply, 6) gas production and supply, 7) water production 
and supply, 8) railway transport, 9) postal service, 10) telecommunications and other information transmission 




that resource allocation in SOEs located in affected areas only starts to change after a shock. I plot 
the point estimates from a modified version of equations (1′) and (2), where I introduce the cohort 
dimension to create control groups for each individual event and allow the effect of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 to 
vary by quarter. Figure 2 suggests that, around “carrot” events, the increase in net cash inflow 
(graph on left) and the level of price distortion (graph on right) are significant only after the 
normalized event dates. 
In sum, this section presents the carrot-and-stick strategy in SOEs’ decisions to allocate 
resources with the aim of maintaining social stability. Depending on the nature of the shock, funds 
are injected into or taken away from SOEs in affected areas. The level of price distortion also 
changes around the shocks. A natural question would be: does the allocation plan have real effects 
on the labor market and on the firm’s investment decisions? 
B. Labor market and firm investment decisions associated with resource allocation 
Hypothesis 2 states that SOEs, upon receiving (the withdrawal of) resources, increase (decrease) 
various benefits to employees or local residents with the purpose of neutralizing the negative effect 
of the shock. In practice, firms can generate or reduce benefits to the public by altering their 
policies in the labor market and in investment decisions. I therefore relate (1) labor payments, (2) 
hiring decisions (the number of employees), and (3) investment levels (capital expenditure) to the 
changes in funds received by SOEs around shocks. In this test, I merge both “carrot” and “stick” 
events together. As SOEs’ policies hinge only on whether they obtain additional resources around 
shocks, there is no need to differentiate between “carrot” and “stick” cases. The equation is 
specified as: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑓𝑞 =  
  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦+𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 (3) 
On the right-hand side, the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 interacts with ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓, which is the change in 
funds received by firm 𝑓 around a shock. As shown in equation (4), I compute it by taking the first 
difference of the medians of the net cash inflow to total assets ratio in firm 𝑓 in shock- and non-
shock periods.  
 ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 (
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑓𝑞
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑓𝑞
, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 = 1) −  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 (
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑓𝑞
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑓𝑞
, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 = 0) (4) 
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A positive ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓, therefore, means firm 𝑓 receives more funds after a shock. In the regression, 
firm fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, and economic zone–quarter of the year fixed effects are 
included. A positive and statistically significant 𝛽0 is expected for SOEs, while firm policies in 
non-SOEs should be insensitive to events that threaten social cohesion. 
Estimates of (3) are reported in Table 4 for SOEs (odd-numbered columns) and non-SOEs 
(even-numbered columns). The coefficients on the interaction term in columns (1), (3), and (5) are 
positive and statistically significant. The results indicate that moving from the bottom to the top 
decile in the distribution of additional funds (1.06) received around the time of a shock is 
associated with 17% (1.06 ×  0.04 ×  4) higher labor payments, 3% (1.06  ×  0.007 ×  4) more 
employees, and 18% (1.06 × 0.045 × 4) higher capital expenditure in an SOE located in an 
affected city in the year following a shock. 
Results of the interaction term for non-SOEs are presented in columns (2), (4), and (6), and 
throughout, coefficients are not statistically different from 0. It confirms that resource allocation 
and various firm policies in non-SOEs do not aim to address social issues. 
To sum up, my finding consistently supports the prediction that SOEs use the funds received 
around a shock to generate benefits to employees or local residents. Specifically, SOEs increase 
payments for labor, capital expenditure, and the number of employees.  
C. Valuation implication for firms 
In this section, I study the valuation implication when SOEs meet the political goal of maintaining 
social stability. It is costly to shareholders if a firm’s incentive deviates from value maximization 
toward the political goal. Inefficiency arises because scarce resources, rather than being deployed 
at the best investment opportunities, flow now to regions of unrest. To show the value implication 
of the carrot-and-stick strategy around a shock, I follow equation (3) and replace the dependent 
variable with a firm’s book-to-market ratio. 
I estimate the equation for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively, and the results are presented 
in Table 5. In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 is positive 
and statistically significant for SOEs. Moving from the bottom to the top decile in the distribution 
of additional funds received around the time of a shock is associated with 11% (1.06 × 0.03 × 4 / 
1.1) higher book-to-market ratio in SOEs located in affected cities, indicating lower market-to-
book values. Investors indeed perceive the injection of funds into affected areas as a source of 
inefficiency. They are able to form this belief and trade on it because listed firms are required by 
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regulators to disclose related party transactions. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term 
in column (2) for non-SOEs is negative and statistically insignificant. Shareholder value for non-
SOEs seems to be insulated from shocks to regional social stability and any resource allocation 
around them. 
Overall, the results confirm hypothesis 3, along with the finding in the political connection 
literature that political incentives can distort resource allocation within firms, resulting in 
inefficiency. Given the value destruction of the carrot-and-stick strategy in SOEs, the more 
important question is: does a strategy that aims to maintain social stability generate positive 
externalities? 
D. Local sentiment and firm action 
In my study, it is important to document empirically that the benefits offered by SOEs indeed 
help to offset social tension caused by various kinds of shocks. To capture local sentiment across 
Chinese cities and measure it at the quarterly frequency, I use the “Weibo Social Moods” dataset 
(Chen et al. (2015)). Since the dataset ranges from August 2009 to November 2014, it allows me 
to conduct analysis only on “carrot” events for the coverage of both pre- and post-shock periods. 
I take the keyword score of “happiness” as a measure of positive sentiment. I normalize keyword 
scores of positive sentiments by the number of corresponding keywords used to generate the scores 




𝑛𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑞×𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜.𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑞
 (5) 
As the test can only be conducted at the city level, I need an aggregated measure of SOE and non-
SOE activities in each city. I first consider whether a city has listed SOEs or not (𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁)). I 
expect sentiment to improve more in cities where listed SOEs operate, compare to other treated 
cities that have no listed SOEs at all. The implicit assumption is that SOEs would always 
implement the carrot-and-stick strategy in resource allocation. Second, more directly, I measure 
the relative size of related party transactions conducted by SOEs and non-SOEs in a city. To do 
so, I take the median of net cash inflow to total assets ratio for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively, 
at the quarter and city levels. I then compute the ratio (𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠) between the two medians. A 
higher 𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠 means SOEs conduct more RPTs in a given city-quarter. I again use the first 
difference between the median of 𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠  at the city level to gauge the change in SOEs’ 
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activities around a shock. I expect greater improvement of local sentiment in cities where SOEs 
conduct more RPTs around a shock.  
The regression equation is specified as: 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑞 = 
 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑐𝑞 + 𝑐𝑞 (6) 
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 is either of the above two measures, 𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁) or ∆𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠. I control for the same set 
of macroeconomic variables, namely, local population, fiscal expenditures, and GDP. Instead of 
including firm fixed effects, I control city fixed effects in this city-level analysis. Table 6 presents 
the results. Focusing first on columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on the interaction term 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁)𝑐𝑞  are positive and statistically significant, while coefficients on the 
variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞  are negative and significant. The combination indicates that social unrest 
events damage sentiment in the treated cities. However, the presence of listed SOEs in such cities 
alleviates social tension. In terms of economic magnitude, the level of happiness decreases by 17% 
in cities where social unrest events occur, but conditional on listed SOEs exist in such cities, the 
level of happiness bounces back by 19%. The results shown in columns (3) and (4) lend further 
support to the finding: cities where SOEs conduct more RPTs around a shock experience an 
improvement in sentiment. The results confirm hypothesis 4. The benefits generated by SOEs are 
positively associated with local sentiment. The more benefits SOEs offer, the more positive 
sentiment is reflected on social media. It suggests that the strategy adopted by government 
shareholders works for relieving tension caused by adverse events. 
In addition, the change in the sentiment could be revealed slowly on social media. I, therefore, 
replicate the test using one-quarter forward sentiment, and controlling for the contemporaneous 
sentiment. Results are reported in columns (5) and (6). Coefficients are slightly bigger, indicating 
that the variation in sentiment is captured better with forward sentiment. It does seem to take time 
for the change of sentiment to reveal. 
Another potential concern is that Weibo users might choose to express their true emotion 
only when they use virtual private network (VPN) due to government online censorship. This 
concern can be alleviated by two reasons: 1) I use the emotion “happiness”, which is positive, as 
my sentiment measure. Compared to expressing negative emotion, it is less likely that Weibo users 
express happiness only with VPN. 2) The usage of VPN on Weibo seems to be limited. VPN 
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enables Weibo users to disguise themselves with non-Chinese IP addresses, and these users will 
be located as “overseas”. The number of overseas posts only accounts for less than 5% of the total 
number of posts in the “Weibo Social Mood” dataset. Considering the 5% of posts also include 
posts from actual overseas users, the precise number of VPN users is likely to be even smaller.  
2.6. Additional tests 
A. Reverse causality 
In this section, I address the issue of reverse causality: knowing that government shareholders 
would offer benefits to maintain stability, one could threaten to create trouble and ensure that such 
benefits would be forthcoming. This possibility undermines the exogeneity of various events. I 
address the issue by testing to find whether current benefits predict future conflicts. Specifically, 
I conduct analysis at the city level following the procedure described in section V.D (analysis of 
local sentiment). The goal is to find out whether conflicts happen more often in cities where listed 
SOEs are located, or whether listed SOEs conduct more RPTs around a shock. I combine both 
labor conflicts and terrorist attacks as a proxy for overall conflict incidents in China. I obtain the 
number of labor conflicts at the city level from the China Labor Bulletin—Strick Map, a database 
that has collected data on labor conflicts in Chinese cities since January 2011. I obtain data on city-
level terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database. The earliest terrorist attack recorded 
was in 2005. For the sake of consistency, I set the start of the merged dataset as January 2011. I 
use all the cases, including unconfirmed events (rumors), which can be mapped into a certain city. 
I focus solely on labor conflicts and terrorist attacks because these two types of events in China 
are surveyed systematically. Ideally, of course, I would like to obtain a more comprehensive 
measure of conflict. The regression follows equation (6), but the dependent variable becomes the 
number of conflicts at (1) the current time, (2) one quarter later, and (3) two quarters later. Table 
B.2 reports the estimates. Throughout, the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically 
insignificant, indicating that neither the presence of SOEs nor the RPTs conducted by SOEs predict 
future conflicts. The results alleviate the concerns about revers causality in my tests.59 
B. Individual events 
                                                   
59 Alternatively, I regress the number of conflicts directly on the median of an SOE’s net cash inflow to the total 
assets ratio at the city level. The ratio is not predictive with respect to future conflicts. 
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In the main test, I classify the eight events ex ante into “carrot” events and “stick” events. Even 
though the prediction closely follows conclusion from the political science literature, the 
application could be questioned in the Chinese context. To lend support to the ex ante clarification, 
I test how SOEs respond to the eight social unrest events individually. In this approach, I let data 
reveal government shareholders’ strategies. The results are reported in Table B.3 in the appendix. 
All the signs of the coefficients are in line with expectation. Namely, all tests on individual “carrot” 
events obtain positive coefficients, and tests on individual “stick” events obtain negative ones. 
C. Alternative channels 
Conflict resolution is a topic that concerns political, economics, and legal studies. To my best 
knowledge, there is no literature that review all potential channels that government can adopt to 
address social unrest across the three disciplines. I therefore first provide my incomplete summary, 
and then test one major direct channel. Finally, I discuss the relevance of the SOEs channel I 
discover. Merging discussion in the political science and the economics studies, a government can 
accommodate and/or repress unrest events. Major forms of state accommodation include 
democratization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a)) which enables citizen to express their 
needs within the political system, and the provision of direct benefits, which could range from 
selective incentives, wages, bribes, fiscal redistribution to welfare systems (Davenport (2007b). In 
terms of state repression, mostly cited channels include both political and economic sanction, 
harassment, surveillance/spying, arrests, torture, and mass killing in the extreme (Davenport 
(2007a). The legal procedures to resolve conflicts and disputes are primarily negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration, and litigation. Compared to all the channels raised, the channel that 
government uses SOEs to address social unrest events is an indirect one. However, as Davenport 
(2007a) mentions, the use of alternative channels by government to address conflicts is not 
examined extensively, and it is important to investigate because alternative channels could help 
maintain political order.  
Despite my results suggesting the channel of SOEs is important and effective, I test one 
direct channel: fiscal redistribution around social unrest events. I focus only on this direct channel 
due to the lack of data on state surveillance/spying, harassment, or arrests, etc. Instead of using the 
network of government-owned business groups, the government could resolve threats to social 
stability by offering subsidies to everyone in affected cities directly through fiscal budgets. I show 
that the fiscal redistribution channel exists along the channel of strategic resource allocation in 
97 
 
SOEs. I use the amount of “civil affair expenses” disclosed by the Chinese government at province 
and year level as a proxy for general social-welfare benefits provided by the government to the 
public regionally. Civil affair expenses are moneys spent by the government to guarantee civilians’ 
basic welfare; it includes expenses for social welfare, a minimum living allowance, resettlement 
funds, etc. 
I test the change of civil-affairs expenses relative to the GDP around shocks to social 
stability. The results are reported in Table B.4. The analysis is conducted at the province and year 
levels. I obtain positive coefficients. Based on the coefficient in column (3), the annual ratio of 
civil-affairs expenses to GDP increases 11.3% (0.096 / 0.85) in the provinces that experience 
shocks to social stability. The results indicate that the government employs multiple tools 
simultaneously to maintain social stability. Comparing the magnitude between the two channels, 
the results in Table B.4 suggest government transfer 241 million USD on average into affected 
provinces after shocks, while according to Table 3, one SOE transfers 84 million USD on average. 
The comparison shows that the SOEs channel is material. 
D. Firm performance 
Results in Session V.C show that SOEs incur immediate value destruction for addressing social 
unrest. However, it is not clear if maintaining social stability damages firm performance in the 
immediate future. On the one hand, shifting resources is costly for firms during social unrest, which 
could damage firm performance. However, on the other hand, stability allows firms to operate 
safely, and could contribute to future profits generation. Empirically, I replicate estimation in 
Session V.C, and replace the dependent variables as half-year or one-year forward return on assets 
(ROA). Results are reported in Table B.5. The positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term in columns (1) indicates that related party transactions conducted during social 
unrest is associated with increased profitability for the SOEs in two quarters after the shocks. 
However, the effect becomes insignificant one year later as results shown in column (3). For non-
SOEs, results in column (2) and (4) show that non-SOEs in treated areas experience an increase in 
profitability two quarters and one year after the shocks, which does not depend on any related party 
transactions. It suggests non-SOEs may benefit from SOEs’ increased investment. The results 
confirm, to some extent, that maintaining stability may benefit business growth. 
E. Price distortion 
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In the test of price distortion in Table 3, an implicit assumption is that the prices in the political 
deals are distorted toward the benefits of the recipient SOEs. However, this may not be the case in 
practice. If prices are set in such a way that SOEs are overcharged, then the increase of political 
deals around shocks indicates not the injection of resources but their withdrawal. To address this 
concern, I focus on the percentage of guarantees deals provided to SOEs. By providing guarantees 
to the SOEs, the business groups offer collaterals and bear ultimate responsibility for repayment 
of the loans. SOEs could then potentially obtain loans that could not be obtained otherwise. The 
guarantees themselves are also severely mispriced and seem like free money.60 To some extent, 
the guarantees represent a form of distortion that is beneficial to the receivers. Therefore, I compute 
the ratio of the net number of guarantees received by the SOEs to the total number of deals in each 
quarter and test how it changes around shocks. The results are reported in Table B.6. The test 
follows exactly the specifications in Table 3, and I obtain results here that are very similar to those 
in Table 3. In particular, with respect to the subset of guarantees deals, the results suggest that 
distortion increases around “carrot” events and favors SOEs. Accordingly, distortion decreases 
around “stick” events and disadvantages SOEs. 
F. More events 
The eight social unrest events are more severe ones during the sample period. Consequently, 
results based on these events might not be applicable to unrest events with lower severity. To 
investigate government shareholders’ respond to less severe unrest episodes, I replicate the test in 
Table 3 by including social unrest events with lower severity according to the survey. The 
relaxation in selection criteria increases the number of “carrot” events from 6 to 25.61 The number 
of “stick” events remains the same. The results for “carrot” events are reported in Table B.7. The 
coefficients have the same signs and similar level of significance as those in Table 3. However, 
the economic magnitude reduces. On the one hand, the carrot-and-stick strategy is robust to 
including less severe unrest events. On the other hand, the reduced economic significance indicates 
that the government shareholders tend to use SOEs to address the most disturbing unrest episodes, 
possibly due to the large consumption of firm resources and the damage to firm values. 
                                                   
60 J. Zhang, “Credit default swaps are storing up trouble for China,” Financial Times, August 30, 2017. 
61 The 25 social unrest events include episodes with detailed information on the events and identifiable location with 
severity rated at 2 and above on the survey. Nevertheless, these events are still of high significance and visibility 
internationally. For the newly included events, there are 4 subnational predominance conflicts, 8 socioeconomic 




Relying on arguably unexpected shocks to regional stability, I find evidence that resource 
allocations within government-owned business groups respond to that threat of social stability at 
a cost of firm value. Government shareholders adopt a carrot-and-stick approach: On the one hand, 
the government gives a “carrot” by injecting funds into firms located in areas of unrest, funds that 
firms use to increase payments to employees, boost investment levels, and hire more employees. 
On the other hand, in cases of riots involving separatist movements, the government applies a 
“stick” by withdrawing funds. The switch in strategies matches theories from studies on state 
repression: political conflicts that challenge the rule of the incumbent government invite sanctions 
in various forms. It also matches the “reputation-building” hypothesis: governments tend to build 
a reputation of toughness when dealing with separatists, especially when there is more than one 
minority group involved. I also show that various benefits provided by government shareholders 
around shocks help to recover local sentiment. My paper provides new evidence that resource 
allocation in firms can deviate away from the neoclassical approach to fulfill political goals, and 






Figure 1 Hypothetical Business Group Structure and Related Party Transactions 
The black arrows represent the direction of ownership, and blue arrows depict the direction of potential related party 
transactions. In my sample, I focus on transactions that involve listed firms for limited information on non-listed firms. 
Relevant information on related party transactions includes trade entities, cash flow, trading targets, announcement 






Figure 2 Resource Allocation by Quarter 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates from regressing the two measures of resource allocation (net cash inflow to total asset ratio, and the ratio of political 
deals) on an indicator for treatment. The regression follows a modified version of equations (1′) and (2), where I introduce the cohort dimension to create control 
groups for each individual event and alter the fixed effects as year-by-cohort, firm-by-cohort, and area-by-quarter-by-cohort fixed effects.  
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Table 1 Adverse Shocks to Regional Stability 
The table lists eight adverse shocks to regional stability. They can be classified into 3 categories: (1) territorial disputes, 2) socioeconomic conflicts, and 
(3) ethnic conflicts. 
Category Time Event Affected Area Description Nature Notes 
Territorial dispute:  
China vs. Japan 
2010q3 





A PRC fishing trawler allegedly collided 
with a Japanese coast guard ship north of the 
disputed islands. The Chinese crew was 
arrested, resulting in the cancellation of 
bilateral dialog. 
Carrot 
 “Rising tension” 
—BBC, Sept. 8, 2010 
Territorial dispute:  







The Japanese government purchased the 
island on September 11, which invited 
strong protests from the Chinese. Six more 
Chinese Marine Surveillance patrols were 
sent to the disputed areas. The Chinese 
government further condoned a boycott of 
Japanese products and suspended the 40th 
anniversary of Sino-Japanese relations. 
Carrot 
“The most serious for Sino-
Japanese relations in the post-war 
period in terms of the risk of 
militarized conflict.” 




2012q1 Bo Xilai incident Chongqing 
High-ranking government politician; party 
chief of Chongqing; legacy of Bo Yibo, a 
top 25 senior party official; high flyer tipped 
for top office. He and his family were 
prosecuted on charges of bribery, abuse of 
power, corruption, and murder.  
Carrot 
“China’s biggest political 
scandal” 




Car bomb in 
Tiananmen Square 
Beijing 
Car bomb suicide attack initiated by the 
East Turkestan Islamic Movement, or 
Turkistan Islamic Party; 5 killed, 38 injured. 
Carrot 
“Major incident”  
—CN government 
“Unstable society”  
—Yomiuri Shimbun 
Attack “in the most politically 
sensitive place in China” 






Random attack in 





Violent attacks in public areas by the East 
Turkestan Islamic Movement, or Turkistan 
Islamic Party. 




Education reform in 
Tibetan schools 
Qinghai 
Over 9,000 students protest against 
language-education reform promoting 
Mandarin over Tibetan. 
Carrot   
Ethnic conflict: 
Tibet-Han 
2008q1 Mar. 14, Tibet riot Tibet, and Aba 
Starts with street protests by monks and 
later descends into rioting, burning, looting, 
and ethnic killing of Hui and Han; 18 killed, 
382 injured.  
Stick 
World attention, massive protest 
against Beijing Olympics 
Ethnic conflict: 
Uighur-Han 
2009q2 July 5, Urumqi riot Urumqi 
Protests turn violent when thousands of 
Uighurs attack Han and rampage through 
Urumqi. According to state media, the riots 
left 197 people dead and 1,721 injured, while 
the World Uighur Congress (WUC) 






Table 2 Summary Statistics 
Panel A reports a summary of statistics on related party transactions in my sample; all figures are expressed in 
thousands of Chinese yuan in Panel A. Panel B provides a summary of statistics for variables at the firm level; 
all figures are expressed in millions of Chinese yuan. 
A. Related Party Transaction (Chinese Yuan 1000) 
  N Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Transaction amount 244,723 123,329 359,258 3 2,742,000 
 
B. Firm-Level Variables (Chinese Yuan 1 million) 
 N Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Net cash inflow to firm assets (%) 63,002 -0.03 7 -28 30 
Political deal ratio (%) 64,262 -0.80 54 -100 100 
Number of employees 75,179 2,715 3,447 145 14,137 
Total labor payment 67,860 119 841 .33 40,302 
Capital expenditure 65,175 153 1,880 0 132,114 
Book-to-market ratio 60,506 0.92 1.32 0.10 26 
Firm assets 63,008 8,098 26,687 150 265,557 
Firm equity 61,719 2,982 6,577 0 58,912 
Leverage (%) 62,607 17 16 0 68 
Cash-to-firm assets (%) 63,000 20 16 0.13 72 











Table 3 Resource Allocation at Adverse Shocks—SOEs and Non-SOEs 
The table reports the estimates of: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑞 =  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 
In panel A, the dependent variable is the total net cash inflow scaled by the total assets of firm 𝑓 in quarter 𝑞. In 
panel B, the dependent variable is the percentage of net off-market-priced deals (political deals) of firm 𝑓 in 
quarter 𝑞. On the right hand side, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is a continuous treated variable equal to 1 in the four quarters after 
an adverse shock breaks out in a city where firms are located, and 𝑥 is a vector of control variables, including 
the natural logarithm of firm equity, return on assets, leverage ratio, cash-to-assets ratio, the natural logarithm 
of local GDP, population, and government fiscal expenses. Columns (1)–(2) report results based on “carrot” 
events for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. Columns (3)–(4) report results based on “stick” events for SOEs 
and non-SOEs, respectively. All columns include firm fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, and the product of 
economic zones and quarter of the year fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard 
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Net flow / total assets Carrot Events Stick Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.858** 0.167 -0.489* -0.271 
 (0.36) (0.21) (0.24) (0.38) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y 
N 15,932 29,693 8,024 8,501 
R2 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.17 
 
Panel B 
Political deals / total deals Carrot Events Stick Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 7.329*** 0.755 -8.019** -0.795 
 (1.93) (1.47) (2.99) (5.76) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y 
N 15,932 29,693 8,024 8,501 
R2 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.26 
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Table 4 Labor Costs, Employees, Investment Decisions, and Resource Allocation 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑓𝑞 =  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 
The sample contains both “carrot” and “stick” events. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of labor payments (columns (1)–(2)), the log-amount 
of capital expenditure (columns (3)–(4)), or log-number of employees (columns (5)–(6)) in firm 𝑓 in quarter 𝑞. On the right-hand side, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is a 
continuous treated variable equal to 1 in the four quarters after an adverse shock breaks out in a city where firms are located. ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ is the change in the 
median of net cash inflow to total asset ratio between event period and event-free period for firm 𝑓. All specifications include 𝑥, which is a vector of control 
variables used in Table 3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report results for SOEs. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report results for non-SOEs. All columns include 
firm fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, and the product of economic zones and quarter of the year fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in 
Appendix A. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Dep. variable: 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑳𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒂𝒚𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕) 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆) 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝟏 + 𝑵𝒐.𝒐𝒇 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒆𝒔) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 0.040** -0.001 0.045** 0.005 0.007** 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.013* 0.040** 0.111* -0.010 0.054*** 0.057*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 21,999 35,401 21,338 33,881 22,003 35,418 
R2 0.90 0.87 0.72 0.62 0.90 0.90 
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Table 5 Firm Value and Resource Allocation 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑓𝑞 =  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 
The sample contains both “carrot” and “stick” events. The dependent variable is the book-to-market ratio of firm 
𝑓 in quarter 𝑞. On the right-hand side, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is a continuous treated variable equal to 1 in the four quarters 
after an adverse shock breaks out in a city where firms are located. ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ is the change in the median of net 
cash inflow to total asset ratio between event period and event-free period for firm 𝑓, and 𝑥 is a vector of control 
variables used in Table 3. Column (1) reports results for SOEs. Column (2) reports results for non-SOEs. All 
columns include firm fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, and the product of economic zones and quarter of the 
year fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, 
are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
 SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 0.031** -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
   
Controls Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y 
N 21,540 34,168 
R2 0.81 0.79 
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Table 6 Local Sentiment and SOEs Payout 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑞 =  𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑐𝑞 + 𝑐𝑞 
Due to data limitation, the sample only include the “carrot” events. The dependent variable is the index for local sentiment generated based on the happiness 
emotion score from the “Weibo Social Moods” data in columns (1)-(4), or the one quarter forward sentiment index in columns (5)-(6). On the right-hand 
side, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is a continuous treated variable equal to 1 in the four quarters after an adverse shock breaks out in a city where firms are located. 𝑆𝑂𝐸 is a 
variable measuring the relative operation intensity between SOEs and non-SOEs in cities. It is defined either as a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is 
any listed SOE in a given city and quarter, or 0 otherwise (columns (1), (2) and (5)), or as a change in the relative intensity of conducting related party 
transactions between SOEs and non-SOEs in a given city (columns (3), (4) and (6)); 𝑥 is a vector of local macroeconomic control variables in columns (2), 
(4) and (6), including the natural logarithm of local GDP, population, and government fiscal expenses. All columns include city fixed effects, quarter fixed 
effects, and the product of economic zones and quarter of the year fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, reported 
in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
Dep. Variable:  𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 One quarter forward 𝑺𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 
 𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁) ∆𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠 𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁) ∆𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 0.024** 0.023* 0.001** 0.001** 0.028*** 0.002*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞  -0.020* -0.020* -0.004 -0.004 -0.023** -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 -0.106 -0.103 - - -0.005 - 
 (0.08) (0.08) - - (0.01) - 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑞 - - - - 0.160*** 0.162*** 
 - - - - (0.05) (0.05) 
Controls N Y N Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
City f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 4,541 4,541 2,311 2,311 4,326 2,203 






Appendix 2.A.  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Net inflow The sum of net inflow of cash generated by related party transactions for 
firm f in a given quarter q 
Ratio of political deals The ratio of the net number of political deals that bring in funds over total 
number of deals for firm f in a given quarter q 
Labor payments The total cost of employees for firm f in a given quarter q 
Capital expenditure The total amount of gross capital expenditure in firm f in a given quarter q 
Number of employees The total number of employees in firm f in a given quarter q 
Book-to-market ratio The book to market ratio of firm f in a given quarter q 
Sentiment 
The keyword score of Happiness scaled by the number of Happiness 
keywords and the total number of posts in a given quarter q 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑞 =
𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑞
𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑐𝑞 × 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑐𝑞
 
City Dummy variable that equals 1 if firm f is located in shock-area(s), or 0 
otherwise  
Post Time dummy variable that equals 1 in the four quarters following each 
shock, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm assets Total assets of firm f in a given quarter q 
Firm equity Total equity of firm f in a given quarter q 
Return on assets The ratio of total profits to total assets of firm f in a given quarter q 
Leverage ratio The ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets of firm 
f in a given quarter q 
Cash-to-assets ratio The ratio of the cash holdings to total assets of firm f in a given quarter q 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁) Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least 1 SOE located in a city 𝑐 
quarter 𝑞, or 0 otherwise 
𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠 The relative intensity of related party transactions conducted between SOEs 
and non-SOEs in a city 𝑐 
Unrest The natural logarithm of the number of labor conflicts and terrorist attacks 
in a city 𝑐, quarter 𝑞 
𝐶𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 The ratio of civil affairs costs to local GDP at province p, year y. The civil 
affairs costs include government expenditures on social welfare, minimum 
living allowance, settlement funds, etc. 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 The ratio of number of net guarantees deals that bring in funds to the total 
number of deals for firm f in a given quarter q 
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Central Dummy variable that equals 1 if a SOE is owned by the central government, 
or 0 otherwise 
Monopoly Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm belongs to the 13 sectors that are 
classified as state monopoly sectors, or 0 otherwise. The 13 sectors include 
1) oil and gas exploration, 2) tobacco, 3) petroleum processing, 4) coking 
and nuclear fuel processing, 5) electricity, heat production and supply, 6) 
gas production and supply, 7) water production and supply, 8) railway 
transport, 9) postal service, 10) telecommunications and other information 
transmission services, 11) financial services, 12) non-ferrous metals 
exploration and processing, and 13) ferrous metal exploration and 
processing. 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ The change in funds received by firm 𝑓 around a shock. It is computed by 
taking the first difference of the medians of the net cash inflow to total assets 
ratio in firm 𝑓 in shock- and non-shock periods.  
 ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 (
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑓𝑞
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑓𝑞




, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞 = 0) 
 
Local population Annual population statistics at the province level 
Local GDP Annually GDP statistics at the city level 
Local fiscal expenditure Annual government fiscal-expenditure statistics at the city level 
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Appendix 2.B.  
Additional Tests 
Table B.1 Resource Allocation at Adverse Shocks— Heterogeneous Effects among SOEs 
The table reports the estimates following specifications in Table 3 with additional variables 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 and the 
interaction term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  in columns (1) and (3), and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦  and the interaction term 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ×𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦 in columns (2) and (4). All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Net flow / total assets Carrot Events Stick Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOE SOE SOE SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.865** 0.960* -0.658 -0.422 
 (0.42) (0.54) (0.57) (0.25) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑓 -0.054  1.118  
 (0.67)  (1.15)  
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 ×𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑓  -0.383  -0.427 
  (0.74)  (0.81) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y 
N 15,932 15,932 8,024 8,024 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 
 
Panel B 
Political deals / total deals Carrot Events Stick Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOE SOE SOE SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 7.479*** 7.966*** -11.067 -6.616* 
 (2.42) (1.66) (7.78) (3.36) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑓 -1.204  20.143  
 (6.31)  (26.52)  
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 ×𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑓  -2.386  -8.887 
  (3.77)  (12.64) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y 
N 15,932 15,932 8,024 8,024 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.24 
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Table B.2 Resource Allocation and Future Unrest 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞 =  𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑐𝑞 + 𝑐𝑞 
Due to data limitation, the sample only contains “carrot” events. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of the number of labor conflicts and terrorist attacks in a city 𝑐 quarter 𝑞. The data on labor conflicts is retrieved 
from the China Labor Bulletin, and data on terrorist attacks is collected from the Global Terrorism Database. On 
the right-hand side, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is a continuous treated variable equal to 1 in the four quarters after an adverse 
shock breaks out in a city where firms are located. 𝑆𝑂𝐸 is a variable measuring the relative operation intensity 
between SOEs and non-SOEs in cities. It is defined either as a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is any listed 
SOE in a given city and quarter, or 0 otherwise (columns (1)–(3)), or as a change in the relative intensity of 
conducting related party transactions between SOEs and non-SOEs in a given city (columns (4)-(6)); 𝑥 is a 
vector of local macroeconomic control variables including the natural logarithm of local GDP, population, and 
government fiscal expenses. All columns include city fixed effects, quarter fixed effects, and the product of 
economic zones and quarter of the year fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard 
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 𝑆𝑂𝐸 (𝑌/𝑁) ∆𝑆𝑂𝐸 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑠 
 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞+1 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞+2 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞+1 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑞+2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × 𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑐𝑞 -0.272 -0.230 -0.123 3.433 0.971 0.019 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.36) (13.09) (14.18) (0.03) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.161 0.187 0.108 0.028 0.066 0.049 
 (0.21) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.25) (0.06) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1,059 1,197 1,197 423 484 484 
R2 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.65 0.65 
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Table B.3 Resource Allocation at Adverse Shocks—Individual Events 
The table reports the estimates following specification in Table 3. Tests are conducted on individual events without ex ante merging. All variables are 
defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Net flow / total assets 
Territorial disputes: 
China vs. Japan 
2010q3 
Territorial disputes: 
China vs. Japan 
2012q3 
Bo Xilai incident 
2012q1 
Auto bomb on 
Tiananmen Square 
2013q4 
Random attack in 
public areas 
2014q1 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 1.172 1.553** 3.425*** 0.604** 0.116 2.345*** -0.070 -0.195 
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.18) (0.24) (0.70) (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 5,256 5,613 5,540 5,725 5,770 5,314 4,872 5,013 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.25 
 
Panel B 
Political deals / total deals         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 7.616 6.018 7.565*** 6.270*** 12.349*** 10.820*** -18.674*** -15.243*** 
 (4.68) (6.09) (1.54) (1.68) (4.08) (1.74) (2.07) (1.55) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 5,256 5,613 5,540 5,725 5,770 5,314 4,872 5,013 
R2 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.29 0.31 
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Table B.4 Alternative Policy Tools at Adverse Shocks 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑝𝑦 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑝𝑦 + 𝑝𝑦 
The sample contains both “carrot” and “stick” events. The dependent variable is the ratio of civil affairs cost to 
GDP in province 𝑝, year 𝑦 in columns (1)–(3). The civil affairs cost is the sum of government expenditures on 
social welfare, minimum living allowance, settlement funds, etc. On the right-hand side, the continuous treated 
variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is adapted to the province-year level. It equals 1 in the first year after an adverse shock breaks 
out in a province. Specification in columns (2) includes province fixed effects. Specification in columns (3) 
includes year and province fixed effects. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the province level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
All Events 
Dep. Variable: 𝑪𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒍 𝒂𝒇𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒓𝒔 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑝𝑦 0.141* 0.138* 0.096 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Intercept 0.834*** 0.359*** 0.904*** 
 (0.08) (0.00) (0.02) 
    
Year f.e. N N Y 
Province f.e. N Y Y 
N 279 279 279 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.17 
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Table B.5 Firm Performance and Resource Allocation 
The table reports the estimates following specifications in Table 5. The dependent variable is the two-quarter 
forward return on assets (ROA) of firm 𝑓 in columns (1)-(2), and the one-year forward ROA of firm 𝑓 in 
columns (3)-(4). All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Dep. Variable Two quarters forward 𝑹𝑶𝑨 Four quarters forward 𝑹𝑶𝑨 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 × ∆𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓 0.066* 0.017 0.090 0.008 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.120 0.183*** -0.121 0.248*** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.16) (0.07) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y 
N 21,290 33,939 19,857 30,988 
R2 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.60 
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Table B.6 Resource Allocation upon Adverse Shocks—SOEs and Non-SOEs 
The table reports the estimates of: 
 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑓𝑞 =  𝛼𝑓 + 𝛼𝑞 + 𝛼𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎,𝑞𝑜𝑦 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 + 𝛾′𝑥𝑓𝑞 + 𝑓𝑞 
The dependent variable is the percentage of the net guarantees deals that bring in funds of firm 𝑓 in quarter 𝑞. 
On the right-hand side, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is a continuous treated variable equal to 1 in the four quarters after an adverse 
shock breaks out in a city where firms are located; 𝑥 is a vector of control variables as in Table 3. Columns (1)–
(2) report results based on “carrot” events for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. Columns (3)–(4) report results 
based on “stick” events for SOEs and non-SOEs, respectively. All columns include firm fixed effects, quarter 
fixed effects, and the product of economic zones and quarter of the year fixed effects. All variables are defined 
in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Guarantees / total deals Carrot Events Stick Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 5.580*** -0.038 -7.394** -1.076 
 (1.90) (2.23) (3.32) (7.39) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y Y Y 
N 15,932 29,693 8,024 8,501 
R2 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.29 
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Table B.7 Resource Allocation at Adverse Shocks—More Events 
The table reports the estimates following specifications (1)-(2) in Table 3. Additional social unrest events are 
included. In total, there are 25 events including peasants protests, labor riots, religion repression, subnational 
predominance, and social economic protests. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city and quarter levels. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A 
Net flow / total assets Carrot Events 
 (1) (2) 
 SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 0.585** 0.164 
 (0.25) (0.21) 
   
Controls Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y 
N 20,396 35,298 
R2 0.17 0.17 
 
Panel B 
Political deals / total deals Carrot Events 
 (1) (2) 
 SOE Non-SOE 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑓𝑞 5.003** 0.317 
 (2.16) (1.23) 
   
Controls Y Y 
Quarter f.e. Y Y 
Firm f.e. Y Y 
Area × QoY f.e. Y Y 
N 20,396 35,298 
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Chapter 3 
 
Can Technology Undermine Macroprudential Regulation? 





We study whether and to what extent peer-to-peer (P2P) credit helps circumvent loan-to-value 
(LTV) caps, a key macroprudential tool to contain household leverage. We exploit the tightening 
of mortgage LTV caps in a number of cities in China in 2013 as our testing ground, in a difference-
in-differences setting, and we base our tests on a novel, hand-collected database covering all 
lending transactions at RenrenDai, a leading Chinese P2P credit platform. P2P loans increase at 
the cities affected by the LTV cap tightening relative to the control cities, consistent with 
borrowers tapping P2P credit to circumvent the regulation. The granularity of our data allows us 
to separate credit demand from credit supply effects, with a fixed effects strategy. Our results also 
indicate that P2P lenders do not adjust their pricing and screening to the influx of new borrowers 
after 2013, despite the fact that their loans ex post have higher delinquency and default rates. 
Symmetric effects are associated with a loosening of mortgage LTV caps in 2015. Our test 
provides empirical evidence on the capacity of P2P credit to undermine LTV caps. More broadly, 
our analysis informs the debate on the challenges posed by the interaction between FinTech and 
credit regulation. 
 
JEL codes: G23, G01, G28. 






The global crisis of 2007-2009 has alerted economists and regulators about the risks that excessive 
household leverage poses to the financial system.62 The debate on how best to contain household 
debt has focused on macroprudential tools; among them, much emphasis has been placed on loan-
to-value (LTV) caps, which prevent borrowing beyond a certain fraction of the value of the assets 
to be purchased with the loan.63 LTV caps typically target traditional financial intermediaries, such 
as banks. That, however, might be too narrow if households have access to alternative, lightly 
regulated credit channels that allow them to circumvent limits on borrowing from regulated 
lenders. In this paper, we study one emerging – and so far neglected – such channel: peer-to-peer 
(P2P) credit. 
By now rivaling traditional consumer loans in size and reach (Morse (2015)), P2P credit 
has experienced double-digit growth in developed economies such as the U.S., where lending 
volumes amounted to $77bn in 2015.64 The fastest-growing P2P credit market, however, is China, 
which is also estimated to be the largest in the world (Deer, Mi, and Yuxin (2015)), with volumes 
totaling over $90bn (RMB 600bn) as of June 2016, and corresponding to about 20% of 
consumption loans to households provided by traditional banks.65  
A P2P credit company acts as a “broker,” offering an online platform that brings together 
borrowers and prospective lenders. P2P credit can be a channel to elude LTV caps, because it 
provides borrowers with: (i) a form of anonymity, since P2P platforms typically receive much less 
regulatory scrutiny than banks, and (ii) access to an unprecedentedly large potential funding pool, 
in comparison to traditional non-bank credit sources such as family and acquaintances, payday 
                                                   
62 There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of (household) leverage on the 2007-2009 crisis, 
too large to sum up here. Part of the theory contributions stress the role of collateralized lending, with arguments based 
on Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) seminal work, see e.g. Geanakoplos (2010), Gorton and Ordoñez (2014). Hall (2011) 
and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) show that high debt levels can exacerbate the downturn of the economic cycle 
even in the absence of collateralized lending. In several studies Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2012, 2016), Mian 
and Sufi (2009, 2011), Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2015) document the relationship between U.S. household leverage and 
the severity of the 2007-2009 crisis. Bordo (2008), Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012), and Schularick and Taylor 
(2012) find that crises are typically preceded by periods of rapid credit growth. Mian and Sufi (2010) and Di Maggio 
and Kermani (2017) document the real economy disruptions associated with high household leverage.  
63 See for instance Allen and Carletti (2011), Crowe, Dell’Arriccia, Igan, and Rabanal (2011), Hanson, Kashyap, and 
Stein (2011), Claessens (2015), Jácome and Mitra (2015). 
64 E. Robinson, “As money pours into peer-to-peer lending, some see bubble brewing”, Bloomberg, May 15, 2015.  
65 G. Wildau, “Chinese P2P lending regulations target hucksters and risk-takers”, Financial Times, August 24, 2016.  
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lenders, credit cards, etc. We aim to assess to what extent the availability of P2P credit poses a 
vulnerability to LTV-based policies and contributes to fueling household debt creation.  
Taking this question to the data confronts us with two empirical challenges. First, we are 
interested in gauging the capacity of P2P credit supply to undermine LTV caps. But the equilibrium 
in the market for loans also depends on credit demand; and separating demand and supply is 
difficult, because the econometrician only observes lending outcomes ex post. An increase in P2P 
loans, for instance, could be due to inefficient lending induced by excess credit supply, but just as 
well to improved economic prospects raising credit demand. Since Koopmans (1949), the 
approach to identify supply is to trace it out with demand shifts. Thus, we require a shock to the 
demand for P2P lending, which does not separately affect its supply. 
Second, in order to trace out credit supply with demand shocks, we must control for 
potential supply-side drivers, mainly in the form of unobserved heterogeneity among P2P lenders. 
For instance, lenders may differ in terms of their proximate knowledge, due to their expertise 
(Morse (2015)) or their ability to harness information from social circles for screening and 
monitoring (Freedman and Jin (2014), Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2013)). To the extent that 
lenders’ characteristics such as these can vary with the exposure of their borrowers to a demand 
shock, the resulting simultaneous changes in credit demand and supply can confound the 
interpretation of any test. Thus, while we study the effects of a change in P2P credit demand, we 
want to be able to hold the P2P lending supply curve fixed. 
In sum: To design our test, we need a shock to the demand for P2P credit, as well as a way 
to hold P2P credit supply fixed. The setting of our analysis allows us to address the first challenge. 
The structure of our data helps us address the second one. 
We study P2P credit around a regulatory change in the Chinese real estate market, which 
takes place in November 2013. The city governments of a number of large Chinese cities impose 
a 16.7% increase in the minimum down-payment required to obtain a mortgage for the purchase 
of a second home, raising it from 60% to 70% of the property’s value. The objective is to slow 
down the growth in real estate prices, following a policy impulse in this direction by the Chinese 
central government.66 Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that real estate investors circumvent 
                                                   
66  “Shanghai Raises Home Down-Payment Requirement as Prices Jump”, Bloomberg, November 8, 2013, and 
“China’s Nanjing, Hangzhou Raise 2nd Home Down Payments”, Bloomberg, November 27, 2013. 
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the new requirements, borrowing via P2P credit platforms to meet the increased down-payment.67 
In other words, with a relatively small P2P loan, households are able to increase their leverage by 
the (much larger) full amount of the mortgage. Importantly, the regulatory change creates a 
positive shock to P2P credit demand, thus addressing our first empirical challenge.68  
We exploit this policy intervention in a difference-in-differences setting, studying changes 
in P2P credit around this episode, for affected and un-affected cities. We assemble a novel, hand-
collected database containing all loan applications and credit outcomes for a leading Chinese P2P 
credit platform, RenrenDai (人人贷). Our database contains all the transactions executed within 
the platform, and it matches each borrower with her lenders.   
Our results are consistent with P2P lending providing an unregulated source of credit with 
the potential to undermine LTV caps. In the analysis, our baseline effects, however, are already 
visible in Figure 1, which plots loan application volumes at RenrenDai, for “treated” and “control” 
cities, around the last quarter of 2013. The lines corresponding to treated and control cities closely 
overlap over the entire two-year period preceding the regulatory change. Following the last quarter 
of 2013, however, loan applications in the treated cities increase sharply relative to the control 
cities, consistent with an influx of applications to help meet the higher down-payments. While 
RenrenDai loan applications grow in both groups, due to the boom in P2P credit in China during 
our sample period, in the first six months of 2014 applications in the treated cities grow by 50%, 
as opposed to only 16% in the control cities. These findings are in line with our key predictions, 
and provide a first piece of evidence consistent with P2P credit being instrumental to 
circumventing the regulatory LTV cap. 
Our subsequent tests validate this visual check, and strengthen the case for a causal 
interpretation. City- and borrower-lender level regressions confirm the evidence from Figure 1. In 
particular, we leverage the depth of our data with the borrower-lender level regressions, which 
allow us to trace the impact of the P2P lending demand shock controlling for lender × date fixed 
effects. These estimates compare the P2P credit received by different borrowers from the same 
                                                   
67 D. Weinland, and Y.Yang, “China to Crack Down on P2P Lenders,” Financial Times, March 14, 2016.  
68 The cities imposing the increase in down-payment requirements are Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, 
Nanjing, Nanchang, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, and Wuhan. Most cities increase mortgage down-payment 
requirements in November, with the only exception of Beijing, which increases them in March. For that reason, the 
visual analysis of Figure 1 is focused on the last quarter of 2013. In the tests reported in the subsequent tables, however, 
Beijing is considered a treated city starting in the second quarter of 2013. 
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lender at the same point in time, thus holding credit supply capacity fixed and addressing our 
second empirical challenge.  
Our estimates imply that the increase in P2P loans we observe accounts for about 10% of 
the increase in down-payment requirements for large cities like Shanghai or Beijing, and over 35% 
in smaller cities like Changsha, Shenyang, or Wuhan. Given that RenrenDai, though an important 
market player, is but one of a large number of P2P platforms active in China, and that borrowers 
may be able to obtain credit on multiple platforms at the same time (Aggarwal and Stein (2016)), 
this estimate provides a lower bound on the importance of P2P lending as a channel to circumvent 
regulatory LTV caps. Consistent with this view, the regulatory intervention itself appears largely 
ineffective: house price growth at the treated cities does not slow down relative to the control cities 
after November 2013. 
Our results also suggest that P2P lenders fail to adjust their screening and loan pricing 
decisions in the face of the influx of borrowers seeking to circumvent down-payment requirements. 
We find little evidence of changes in the credit scores and rates of on-site verification for borrowers 
who obtain a loan after the 2013 episode (tighter screening would imply increases for both), nor 
do we observe any significant changes in loan yields or maturities. This is in spite of the fact that 
default rates increase, driven primarily by “new” borrowers, who come to RenrenDai only after 
November 2013. These results suggest that lenders have an “inflexible” lending technology, and 
do not adjust their lending decisions, even though they are making loans that turn out to be riskier. 
We validate this analysis studying a symmetric change in LTV caps, which takes place in 
September 2015. Starting from that month, all the city governments in China, with the exceptions 
of Beijing, Guangzhou, Sanya, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, impose a 16.7% reduction in minimum 
down-payment requirements, now as well for first home purchases (from 30% to 25% of the 
property’s value). In this case the demand for P2P lending at the treated cities decreases relative 
to the controls, reversing the effects observed around the 2013 episode. 
Our findings make three contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper empirically studying the interaction between new financial technologies and credit 
regulation. One could view FinTech, and in particular P2P lending, as a form of shadow banking. 
Regulatory arbitrage has long been considered one of the main drivers of the growth of shadow 
banking. Interestingly, however, a large part of the literature has focused on the elusion of 
regulatory constraints by financial intermediaries such as banks, i.e. on the side of credit supply 
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(Adrian and Ashcroft (2012), Plantin (2014)). Our results are consistent with the view that 
regulatory arbitrage on the side of credit demand (facilitated by the presence of the more lightly 
regulated P2P channel) can also be economically very relevant. 
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the drivers of household leverage. 
Financial (il)literacy (Lusardi and Tufano (2009)), real estate prices (Mian and Sufi (2011), Crowe 
and Ramcharan (2013)), and import competition (Barrot, Loualiche, Plosser, and Sauvagnat 
(2017)) have been found to be important factors behind household debt. Our findings suggest a 
new, and so far neglected factor: The development of financial technology and the 
disintermediation of financial services.  
Third, our test speaks to the ongoing debate on the systemic impact of household leverage, 
and on the design of policies to contain it. Much of the literature has focused on U.S. data, and two 
views prevail. One view focuses on credit supply, and blames financial innovation and incentives 
in the financial sector for the buildup of mortgage debt leading to the 2007-2009 crisis (Mian and 
Sufi (2009), Claessens, Dell’Arriccia, Igan, and Laeven (2010)). A second view focuses on credit 
demand, on the grounds that household leverage growth encompassed not only lower-income 
borrowers, but also the middle-class ((Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2012, 2016), Foote, Gerardi, 
and Willen (2012), Foote, Loewenstein, and Willen (2016), Albanesi, De Giorgi, and Nosal 
(2017)). Our findings present fresh evidence from a different context – China – and time period – 
2010-2016 – and highlight the role of both credit demand (to meet the down-payment 
requirements) and credit supply (from P2P lending). They also point to a vulnerability of LTV 
caps, a tool on which much of the debate on macroprudential regulation has focused (Allen and 
Carletti (2011), Crowe, Dell’Arriccia, Igan, and Rabanal (2011), Claessens (2015), Jácome and 
Mitra (2015)). A potential solution would be to monitor other indicators than LTV (for example, 
debt-to-income), as well as the borrowers’ overall indebtedness. The risk, however, is to throw out 
the baby with the bathwater, losing the flexibility that makes P2P credit successful in the first 
place. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out our empirical 
predictions with the aid of a simple model. Section III presents our data and discusses our 
identification strategy. Section IV reports our baseline findings on changes in P2P lending volumes 
around the 2013 increase in down-payment requirements, and Section V on changes in loan pricing 
and screening in the P2P lending market. Section VI presents similar tests around the 2015 
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decrease in down-payment requirements. Section VII discusses the policy implications of our 
findings. Section VIII concludes. 
3.2. Predicted impact of the change in LTV caps 
We analyze the impact of the unregulated P2P credit channel on the effects of changes in 
regulatory LTV caps (mortgage down-payment requirements), using a framework that builds on 
Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997) workhorse fixed investment model. The rise in down-payment 
requirements to borrow from traditional lenders is analogous to a “collateral squeeze,” which curbs 
credit in Holmstrom and Tirole’s model. We show that the availability of P2P lending allows 
borrowers to circumvent the tightened LTV cap, sterilizing its effects such that the levels of new 
credit, aggregate interest costs, and defaults are not reduced. These results allow us to formulate 
the key empirical predictions for our proposed test. 
First, we consider an economy populated by households (borrowers) and competitive 
traditional, regulated lenders (“banks”). At a later stage, we introduce unregulated (“P2P”) lenders. 
Households seek credit to acquire real estate, and when borrowing from a bank they are subject to 
an endogenous down-payment requirement ?̅?  (derived below), plus an additional margin 𝛿 
imposed by the regulator. We model the 2013 tightening of the LTV cap as an increase in 𝛿, and 
study its effects on the total amount of debt promised interest payments level, and default rates in 
the economy. 
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), borrowers are subject to moral hazard. They are able 
to generate future cash flows 𝑌 ∈ {0, 𝑦} , which they will use to pay back their loans. The 
probability of positive cash flows Pr(𝑌 = 𝑦) = 𝑝 takes values in {𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝐻}, with 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 = Δ𝑝 >
0. A borrower needs to exert “effort” to raise the success probability to 𝑝𝐻, and the borrower’s 
utility from not exerting effort is 𝐵. 
Each would-be borrower has assets-in-place 𝐴, representing to her ability to meet a down-
payment requirement, and needs to borrow 𝐼 − 𝐴 to make her real estate purchase. If the borrower 
does not default, she splits her cash flow with the bank such that 𝑦 = 𝑑𝑏 + 𝑑𝑙. If the borrower 
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defaults, the bank recovers a value 𝑅 < 𝐼  (e.g. as the result of a foreclosure process).69 𝑅  is 
exogenously given.70 Intuitively, the bank wants to induce 𝑝𝐻, providing the borrower with an 
incentive contract. 
The participation constraint for the bank is 𝑝𝐻𝑑𝑙 + (1 − 𝑝𝐻)𝑅 ≥ 𝐼 − 𝐴, i.e. the bank must 
expect a larger payoff if it makes the loan than if it holds on to its cash 𝐼 − 𝐴. This implies: 
  𝑑𝑙 ≥
1
𝑝𝐻
[𝐼 − 𝐴 − (1 − 𝑝𝐻)𝑅]. (1) 
Since banks are competitive, (1) holds with equality. The incentive compatibility constraint for the 
borrower is 𝑝𝐻𝑑𝑏 ≥ 𝑝𝐿𝑑𝑏 + 𝐵, i.e. the borrower must prefer to exert effort, so that:   
   𝑑𝑏 ≥ 𝐵/Δ𝑝.  (2) 
Combining (1) and (2) with the resource constraint 𝑦 = 𝑑𝑙 + 𝑑𝑏, and assuming 𝑦 ≥ 𝐵/Δ𝑝 + 𝑑𝑙, 
we have the following condition for the bank to make a loan: 
  𝐴 ≥ ?̅? = 𝐼 − 𝑝𝐻 [𝑦 −
𝐵
Δ𝑝




Expression (3) implies that only borrowers with sufficiently high assets-in-place (i.e. able to meet 
the down-payment requirements) obtain credit.  
To analyze the equilibrium of the credit market in this setting, suppose that there is a 
continuum of borrowers indexed by their assets-in-place 𝐴, distributed according to a cdf 𝐺(𝐴). 
The total amount of credit in equilibrium is then 𝐼[1 − 𝐺(?̅?)]. Denoting the bank’s required 
interest rate by 𝑖𝑙, by definition 𝑑𝑙 = (𝐼 − ?̅?)(1 + 𝑖𝑙), so that from expression (1) we have: 






] − 1 (4) 
and the aggregate interest owed in the economy is 𝑖𝑙[1 − 𝐺(?̅?)].  
Consider now the effects of an “LTV cap tightening,” in which the regulator mandates that 
borrowers possess an additional 𝛿 > 0 over and above ?̅?, in the form of a mandatory minimum 
down-payment requirement (in the language of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), this is equivalent to 
a “collateral squeeze”). The resulting total amount of lending is 𝐼[1 − 𝐺(?̅? + 𝛿)]. As the function 
                                                   
69 This ingredient is not present in Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997) original formulation. We introduce it for two 
reasons. First, it simplifies the exposition in our setting. Second, it better reflects the reality of real estate mortgages, 
where the lending bank’s recovery can correspond to the value of the property, following the foreclosure. 
70 One could think of an extension of this analysis where the value of 𝑅 is determined in equilibrium. Household 
leverage could then affect the value of collateral 𝑅 and impose fire sale externalities, similar to the arguments of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Such externalities could provide a rationale for the regulator’s intervention (i.e., raising 
𝛿 with the aim of limiting credit growth). 
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𝐺(⋅) is monotone increasing, this is less than 𝐼[1 − 𝐺(?̅?)], i.e. the new LTV cap curbs the level of 
debt in the economy. Because the bank has a smaller exposure to each borrower, moreover, interest 
rates decrease via expression (4), and the aggregate interest costs are reduced. Finally, because 
there are fewer borrowers, there are also fewer aggregate defaults (1 − 𝑝𝐻)[1 − 𝐺(?̅? + 𝛿)]. In 
sum: tightening the LTV cap reduces new credit, as well as aggregate interest payments and 
defaults. 
What happens when unregulated P2P lenders are introduced? The P2P lenders are assumed 
to be competitive, as well as “small,” in the sense that they cannot lend more than 𝛿  to any 
borrower. These assumptions mimic the features of the P2P lending market in China (Deer, Mi, 
and Yuxin (2015)). A simple strategy for a borrower who fails to obtain credit from the bank 
because her assets-in-place are below ?̅? + 𝛿, then, is to borrow ?̅? + 𝛿 − 𝐴 from the P2P lenders, 
so as to be able to make the full ?̅? + 𝛿 down-payment. We study whether this strategy can be 
sustained in equilibrium, and its implications. 
There are two main differences between P2P lenders and banks. First, the P2P lenders are 
not collateralized, i.e. in the event of default their payoff is equal to 0. Second, they do not 
condition their lending decisions on the borrower’s assets-in-place, but simply take her default risk 
as given. This implies that the participation constraint for the P2P lenders is: 
  𝑝𝐻𝑑𝑃2𝑃 ≥ ?̅? + 𝛿 − 𝐴, (5) 
where the P2P lender payoff is scaled by 𝑝𝐻 because the borrower also receives credit from the 
bank, which provides the incentive to exert effort.71  
For large enough 𝑦 , this will be true in equilibrium. Because the P2P lenders are 
competitive, the constraint (5) holds with equality, and 𝑑𝑃2𝑃 = (?̅? + 𝛿 − 𝐴)/𝑝𝐻. The participation 
constraint for the bank (1) is now modified as 𝑑𝑙 =
1
𝑝𝐻
[𝐼 − (?̅? + 𝛿) − (1 − 𝑝𝐻)𝑅] , and the 
incentive constraint for borrowers remains 𝑑𝑏 ≥ 𝐵/Δ𝑝. The minimum level of assets-in-place ?̅? 
required to obtain credit from the bank is again pinned down by the resource constraint 𝑦 = 𝑑𝑙 +
𝑑𝑃2𝑃 + 𝑑𝑏, and because the ?̅? + 𝛿 terms in 𝑑𝑙 and 𝑑𝑃2𝑃 cancel out, ?̅? is again given by expression 
                                                   
71 As we verify below, in equilibrium borrowers turn to the bank first, and only if they do not have sufficient assets-
in-place 𝐴 they also borrow from the P2P lenders. This allows the P2P lenders to “free ride” on the incentives provided 
by the bank. P2P credit is still more expensive, because the recovery under default is 0 (while the bank recovers 𝑅). 




(3). In other words, regardless of the size of the increase in the down-payment requirement 𝛿, an 
identical mass 1 − 𝐺(?̅?) of borrowers obtains credit, and the level of debt in the economy is 
unchanged. Similarly, the expected number of defaults remains (1 − 𝑝𝐻)[1 − 𝐺(?̅?)] . Also 
similarly, aggregate promised interest payments do not change. The interest rate demanded by the 
P2P lenders, implied by (6), is: 𝑖𝑃2𝑃 =
1
𝑝𝐻
− 1. This is larger than 𝑖𝑙, because of the recovery value 
𝑅. However, the banks make loans with a lower LTV ratio, and as a result demand lower interest. 
These two effects balance each other exactly. Aggregate interest costs, in other words, are equal 
to: 
  𝑖𝑙 × [1 − 𝐺(?̅? + 𝛿)]⏟            
To the bank






(𝑑𝑙 + 𝑑𝑃2𝑃) = 0, aggregate interest payments are unchanged. In sum: the objective of 
the tightened LTV cap is to curb new credit, reducing aggregate interest costs and aggregate 
defaults. The availability of P2P credit, however, sterilizes the cap, leaving new credit, aggregate 
defaults, and aggregate promised interest payments unchanged.  
This analysis allows us to formulate our key empirical predictions. The 2013 increase in 
down-payment requirements corresponds to an increase in 𝛿 . Changes in 𝛿  do not affect the 
overall level of credit in the economy, but simply shift demand into and out of P2P lending. 
Therefore: Following the 2013 increase in down-payment requirements, we will observe a larger 
volume of new P2P loans in cities that raise mortgage down-payment requirements (treatment 
group) than in other cities (control group).72  
3.3. Data and identification 
A. Data 
We base our analysis on a large, loan- and loan application-level database from a leading Chinese 
online P2P credit platform, RenrenDai. RenrenDai was launched in 2010, and quickly developed 
into one of the main players in the Chinese P2P credit sector, with cumulative turnover of RMB 
                                                   
72 This model provides a simple framework to form expectations on the impact of P2P lending on the effectiveness of 
the 2013 (and, in a further test described below, 2015) policy intervention in the mortgage markets. A byproduct of 
its simplicity is that aggregate defaults remain unchanged at (1 − 𝑝𝐻)[1 − 𝐺(?̅?)], because individual borrower default 
risk is constant. A more flexible model might generate increasing default rates as borrowers turn to P2P lending 
(consistent with the evidence we discuss in section V). We feel that such a model is beyond the scope of our study, as 
our focus is mainly empirical. 
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25bn ($3.7bn, as of February 2017) and over 3 million registered accounts (2016). Among the over 
2,000 Chinese P2P credit platforms active as of December 2016, RenrenDai ranks, by turnover, in 
the top 1%.73  
Our database spans the period from October 2010, when RenrenDai first opens to the 
public, until November 2016. In total, the data contain 909,649 loan applications, made by 703,028 
individual borrowers, and involving 277,761 lenders.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for out data, over a window of 37 (–18, +18) months 
around the 2013 mortgage LTV cap tightening. The average loan has a size of RMB 59,674 
($8,730), with an annualized interest rate of 12.5% and duration 27 months. The average 
RenrenDai borrower has a pre-tax monthly income of RMB 11,000 ($1,610), or about RMB 
130,000 ($19,018) yearly. Based on data from the China Household Finance Survey, the mean 
after-tax yearly income for Chinese individuals with outstanding debt, living in non-rural areas in 
the provinces where RenrenDai is active, is RMB 74,000 ($10,240).74 With an average income tax 
rate of about 40%,75 therefore, RenrenDai borrowers appear in line with the population average. 
The loan face value is typically about 40% of the borrower’s annual income. In comparison, Morse 
(2015) reports average interest rates of about 14%, loan duration of 41 months, and loan face value 
of 20.5% of the borrower’s annual income. We thus observe higher loan-to-income ratios and 
shorter durations, but similar interest rates as in the U.S. There is also sparse information on the 
purpose of the loans; the most common purposes are “Short Term Liquidity Needs” (48%), 
“Consumption/General” (25.7%), and “Entrepreneurship” (8.8%). In their survey of P2P lending 
in China, Deer, Mi, and Yuxin (2016) find that 51% of survey participants claim to use P2P lending 
to “accumulate credit worthiness,” consistent with borrowing to meet a down-payment 
requirement, as in the 2013 episode on which we focus. The data also report each borrower’s credit 
score, based on RenrenDai’s internal scoring system. There appears to be relatively little variation 
in credit scores: the average score is 172 (with standard deviation about 30), the median is 180, 
and the maximum is 181. 
                                                   
73 In 2017, RenrenDai accounts for 1% of total p2p market share in China according to industrial level data from 
wdzj.com. 
74 The China Household Finance Survey is administered by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. 
The data are based on the 2011 wave of the survey (the only one available at the time of writing). 
75  Income taxes are progressive in China (cf. e.g. https://www.ecovis.com/focus-china/individual-income-tax-iit-
china-ground-rules/). The 40% average tax rate is based on a back-of-the-envelope calculation for an individual with 
a pre-tax income of RMB 130,000 as in our data.  
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For each borrower in our data, in addition to her income level we are able to observe a 
number of characteristics, including demographics such as gender, age, city of residence, etc. 
Additional data items are disclosed by the borrowers on a voluntary basis, such as education, home 
ownership, and whether or not they have a mortgage. Average borrower age is about 38 years; 
around 50% of borrowers have a college degree, and 64% are male. Unlike in the U.S. (Balyuk 
(2016)), the median RenrenDai borrower is a home owner, and about 69% of borrowers who are 
home owners have a mortgage. Disclosing more information allows the borrower to obtain a higher 
credit score on RenrenDai’s internal rating system, so that borrowers have an incentive to greater 
disclosure. In our data, 99.86% of all successful loan applications are associated with borrowers 
who disclose at least some of these non-mandatory items. The median borrower in our data only 
obtains one loan; there are, however, repeat borrowers, with up to 148 loans in their history on 
RenrenDai. 
Similar to studies based on U.S. P2P credit data (e.g. Balyuk (2016), Morse (2015)), we 
are not able to directly observe lender characteristics, but we can characterize them by looking at 
the features of the lenders’ loan portfolios. In Table 1.C, we report the characteristics of the average 
lender on a given loan (the mean number of lenders per loan is 45; median: 30). On average, 
lenders hold a portfolio of 235 loans, with a total face value of RMB 387,978 ($58,197). 76 
Portfolios are generally diversified, with an HHI concentration index of 0.007 on average, and the 
average lender on a given loan has an experience on RenrenDai of about 7 months. Finally, lenders 
can choose to make their loans directly to borrowers, or delegate the allocation of their funds across 
different loans to Uplan (U计划), an algorithm that matches lenders to borrowers mostly based on 
returns and maturity preference parameters set by the lender. Around 70% of all loans are made 
via Uplan. 
B. Identification approach  
The structure of our data helps us address the identification challenges discussed in the 
introduction. In particular, to each lender on the RenrenDai platform is associated a unique ID 
code, and the typical lender invests in multiple loans at the same time. This allows us to control 
for unobserved lender heterogeneity and hold credit supply fixed with a fixed effects strategy. 
                                                   
76 The average lender’s portfolio size is about three times the annual income of the average borrower in our data. This 
suggests that RenrenDai lenders are relatively wealthy, and may have some degree of financial sophistication. 
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Intuitively, our test compares two loans, made by the same P2P lender, at the same point in time, 
to two different borrowers, Fang and Wei. Fang is exposed to the increase in down-payment 
requirements; Wei is not. Because the P2P lender is the same on both loans, any factor affecting 
the supply of credit from the lender, related e.g. to her lending capacity, market strategy, 
technology etc. can thus be ruled out, allowing us to focus on the difference in credit demand 
between borrowers Fang and Wei. Operationally, we exploit the wealth of information at our 
disposal by running our tests on loan-lender level data, with lender × date fixed effects.77 
We analyze changes in P2P loans, comparing affected and un-affected real estate markets 
around the 2013 and 2015 changes in minimum mortgage down-payment requirements described 
above. The baseline test takes the form of a classic difference-in-differences regression: 
 𝐿𝑏𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑏𝑙𝑡 + 𝑏𝑙𝑡 (7) 
where 𝐿𝑏𝑙𝑡  denotes a loan associated with borrower 𝑏  and lender 𝑙  at time 𝑡 . 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower is located in one of the cities affected by the change 
in minimum down-payment requirements. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the period 
subsequent to the change in down-payment requirements. To be immune to the Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan (2004) critique of standard errors in difference-in-differences tests, we collapse 
the data and take averages over two periods, before and after the change in down-payment 
requirements, and then take first differences, estimating: 
 Δ𝐿𝑏𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑡 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏𝑙 + 𝜂𝑏𝑙 (7’) 
where Δ𝐿 denotes the change in loan applications around the regulation change, associated with 
borrower 𝑏 and lender 𝑙. 
Given the features of the data at our disposal, we are going to be able to estimate model 
(7)-(7’) on different levels of granularity, allowing to control for alternative potential confounding 
factors. In the simplest specification, we aggregate equation (7’) to the city-date level, i.e. studying 
the behavior of all loans (applications) in a given city at a given point in time around each change 
in down-payment requirements.   
In a second specification, we estimate model (7) on the individual loan-lender level, i.e. 
where each observation corresponds to a given loan, associated with a given lender and borrower. 
                                                   
77 This approach is close in spirit to the fixed effects strategies adopted in the literature on bank liquidity shocks (e.g. 
Khwaja and Mian (2008); Schnabl (2012)). Note, however, that studies in that literature typically control for borrower 
fixed effects, as their objective is to hold credit demand constant, to examine the effects of credit supply shocks. In 
our case, we want to hold credit supply constant, and thus control for lender fixed effects. 
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This specification allows us to exploit the full depth of our data, and hold the credit supply curve 
fixed, saturating the model with lender × date fixed effects as discussed (this is equivalent to 
including lender fixed effects in equation (7’)).  
C. Comparison of treatment and control groups prior to November 2013 
Our main tests are focused on the 2013 increase in down-payment requirements. The cities that 
experience it include four of the ten largest cities in China (Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen) and overall make up about 9% of the population of urban China in our sample on 
average.78 In addition, the treatment affects both “tier-1” (Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen) and “tier-2” (Changsha, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Shenyang, and Wuhan) cities. We take all 
other Chinese cities with active borrowers on RenrenDai and population over 5 million as our 
control group.  
In Table 2, we compare the loans associated with the treatment and control cities along 
observable dimensions, prior to November 2013. Panel A focuses on borrowers. Borrowers from 
treated and control cities do not exhibit significant differences in terms of monthly income (RMB 
11,216 and 11,872 on average), age (about 39 for both groups), gender (59% and 57% males), or 
the number of loan applications since registering on RenrenDai (1.5 and 2). Treated borrowers are 
modestly more likely to have a college degree (50.6% have one, compared to 45.1% for the control 
group; t-stat: 1.695), and less likely to be home owners (18%, compared to 27% for the control 
group; t-stat: -2.04).79 Panel B compares lenders across the two groups. In terms of portfolio size, 
concentration, experience, and participation to Uplan, there are no significant differences between 
the treated and control groups, in statistical as well as economic terms. Finally, in Panel C the 
treated and control cities are compared in terms of macroeconomic variables. We detect no 
significant differences along the dimensions of per capita GDP (level and growth), population 
(level and growth), household net debt to income, real wages, and RenrenDai penetration rates.  
In sum, we do not observe large differences along observable dimensions between the 
treatment and control groups prior to the increase in down-payment requirements of November 
2013. That confirms the intuition from Figure 1, which shows parallel trends in P2P lending in the 
                                                   
78 Communiqué of the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China on the Major Figures of the 
2010 Population Census. We restrict the sample to cities with an average population of at least 5 million during our 
sample period (all the results are robust to including smaller cities). 
79 These values are based on observations prior to November 2013, explaining the difference from the average home 
ownership rates in Table 1, which are based on the entire sample. 
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two groups in the pre-down-payment increase period, and validates the difference-in-differences 
setting for our test. 
3.4. Baseline tests 
We first run a set of preliminary regressions on city-level data. We estimate model (7’) by time-
averaging, collapsing the data, and taking first differences, as described above, to control for 
serially correlated standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)).  
The results are reported in Table 3. The estimates in Table 3.A support the evidence from 
Figure 1, as well as the arguments illustrated in Section II. They imply that, following the 2013 
rise in down-payment requirements, the RMB volume of P2P loans in cities affected by the rise 
increase by 26.4% on an annual basis (specification (2)), which appears economically substantial.  
Separate tests show that house price growth does not slow down in the treated cities – 
despite the fact that was precisely the aim of the regulatory intervention. The estimates reported in 
Table 3.B have specification analogous to Table 3.A, where the dependent variable is the quarterly 
change in house prices in a given city. The implied effects are near zero, and may be positive or 
negative depending on the specification. In specification (3) we actually observe a positive and 
significant coefficient on the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 indicator, implying an increase in house price growth in the 
treated cities relative to the control cities. Economically, however, the difference is modest, at 1.6 
percentage points per quarter. In sum, it appears that the rise in down-payment requirements was 
largely ineffective in slowing down house price growth at the treated cities.  
The evidence from these preliminary tests is consistent with the notion that borrowers use 
P2P lending to circumvent the increase in down-payment requirements. A rise in P2P loans, 
however, can be in general the result of a combination of shifts of the credit demand and credit 
supply curves. For instance, a faster development of P2P lending, or a greater popularity of P2P 
as a form of investment at the treated cities, might generate similar effects as the ones we observe 
in Table 3. To control for credit supply side effects, we estimate model (1) on data matching 
individual lenders and borrowers, controlling for lender × date fixed effects. As discussed above, 
this allows us to hold credit supply fixed, and isolate the effect of a shock to credit demand.  
The estimates are reported in Table 4. Specifications (1)-(3) include lender × date fixed 
effects; specification (4) reports the corresponding estimates without them. Overall, the estimates 
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are in line with those of Table 3, and consistent with an increase in P2P lending demand to 
circumvent the down-payment requirement increase. Economically, the effects are also 
meaningful: they imply a 2.5% monthly increase in P2P lending at the treated cities, or 30% on an 
annual basis. Compared to the average loan size of about RMB 60,000 (about $8,700), this 
corresponds to a RMB 18,000 increase. 
The value of a medium-size apartment (70 sq. meters) in 2013 in Shanghai, one of our 
treatment group cities, is RMB 1.8m (about $260,000), so that the increase we document accounts 
for 10% (= RMB 18,000 / RMB 180,000) of the 10-percentage point increase in down-payment 
requirements.80 In tier-2 cities included in our treatment group, like Changsha, Shenyang, and 
Wuhan, the economic effect is even larger, corresponding to over 35% of the increase in down-
payment requirements. Given that RenrenDai, though an important market player, is but one of a 
large number of P2P lending platforms active in China, and that borrowers may be able to obtain 
credit on multiple platforms at the same time (Aggarwal and Stein (2016)), these figures likely 
provide a lower bound on the importance of P2P lending as a channel to circumvent the new 
requirement.  
We also separately analyze the intensive margin (borrowers already active on RenrenDai 
increase their borrowing) and the extensive margin (new borrowers turn to RenrenDai once down-
payment requirements increase). To do so, we estimate two additional regressions, in columns (5) 
and (6). In column (5) (intensive margin), the sample is restricted to borrowers who are active on 
RenrenDai (have at least one loan) both before and after November 2013. In column (6) (extensive 
margin), the sample is restricted to borrowers who are active (have at least one loan) only before 
or only after 2013. The coefficient estimate on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 in the intensive margin regression is -
0.001, indistinguishable from zero; the corresponding estimate in the extensive margin regression 
is 0.025 (t-stat: 2.08). The difference between the two coefficients is approximately equal to the 
estimated coefficients on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 in specifications (1)-(3), suggesting that the effect is driven by 
the extensive margin: in other words, the influx of new borrowers after the 2013 increase in down-
payment requirements explains our baseline effect.  
Further analysis based on borrower characteristics, reported in Table 5, provides a richer 
characterization of these findings. We document that the increase in P2P borrowing at the treated 
                                                   
80 We obtain city-level data on house prices per square meter from the databank of China Index Academy, a leading 
real estate research organization in China. 
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cities is driven by loans to home owners (specifications (1)-(2)). This is consistent with the fact 
that the LTV cap tightening only affects second-home mortgages. The implied economic effects 
are also larger in this case, accounting for 12% of the required additional down-payment in tier-1 
cities and over 50% in tier-2 cities. We also find that our baseline effect is driven by cities where 
house price growth over the 18-month period prior to November 2013 has been above the 
median.81 These findings corroborate the link between the increase in P2P credit at the treated 
cities and the increase in down-payment requirements in November 2013, given that the new 
regulation only applies to second-home mortgages, and was aimed at overheating real estate 
markets. 
Finally, in Table 6 we partition the sample based on lender characteristics: lending via 
Uplan/direct lending, experience, and portfolio size. Table 6.A shows that our effect is mainly 
associated with lenders who make loans as part of Uplan, which account for the majority of loans 
in our data (specifications (1)-(2)).82 Moreover, borrowers in the treated cities receive financing 
from lenders regardless of the level experience: in both specifications (3) and (4), the coefficient 
on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is positive and statistically significant. The estimated effect is, however, larger in 
magnitude for lenders with below-median experience.  
Table 6.B distinguishes lenders based on their portfolio size.83 Across lender portfolio size 
quartiles, the coefficients on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 are positive; but they are larger and statistically significant 
in the third and fourth quartiles, suggesting that the increase in P2P lending at the treated cities 
after November 2013 is driven primarily by larger lenders. To the extent that lenders with larger 
loan portfolios are likely financially more sophisticated, it appears that greater lender 
sophistication is no obstacle to the increased P2P lending.84  
                                                   
81 The estimates in Table 5 keep the control group observations fixed between the home-owner/non-home-owner and 
the above/below median house price growth subsamples. In this way, we consider increments in P2P lending that 
happen both on the extensive margin (more homeowners borrow from the platform in treated cities) and intensive 
margin (homeowners demand larger loans in treated cities).  
82  One concern is that Uplan algorithm might evolve from learning, and our identification strategies would be 
insufficient to control the credit supply effect. This concern can be alleviated for the reason that the algorithm needs 
time to learn, and it is less likely to change significantly during our relatively short period of focus. 
83 Because RenrenDai opens to the public in 2010, the range of lender experience (which we measure as months since 
making the first loan on RenrenDai) is limited. For that reason, we split the sample by lender experience at the median. 
In contrast, lender portfolio size has a much larger range, allowing us to split the sample by quartiles. 
84 At the same time, even lenders in the largest portfolio size quartile do not appear to have especially large amounts 
invested via RenrenDai. The average portfolio size in that quartile is about RMB 530,000 ($79,500), and the largest 
portfolio in our sample has size about RMB 4,100,000 ($615,000), indicating that we are looking at individual lenders 
(rather than e.g. institutions).  
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Taken together, these findings suggest that P2P lending supply responds to the credit 
demand generated by the 2013 increase in down-payment requirements as predicted by our 
discussion of Section II. P2P lenders are able to supply an economically substantial amount of 
credit, accounting for 12%-49% of the implied increase in borrowing as per our back-of-the-
envelope calculation. The expansion of credit is driven by borrowers from cities that experience 
faster house prices growth, as well as by a broad range of lenders.85  
3.5. Other loan features; loan performance 
A. Screening, pricing, and duration of loans 
P2P lenders may respond to an influx of loan applications following the 2013 down-payment 
requirement increase by adjusting lending volumes (which we analyzed in the previous Section), 
but also other contract features. We consider three central features of loan contracts: the degree of 
screening to which the borrower is subject, pricing, and duration.  
Although the treated cities generate an abnormal amount of P2P borrowing after 2013, we 
find that P2P lenders do not appear to alter their screening in response. Our first measure of 
screening is on-site verification. Borrowers on RenrenDai self-declare their characteristics such as 
income, age, etc. In addition, they may also provide on-site verification, whereby an officer from 
RenrenDai verifies that the information provided is true, by visiting the borrowers at their stated 
address. If lenders respond to the influx of new borrowers by stepping up screening and tightening 
their lending standards, they may more frequently demand on-site verification in order to invest in 
a given loan. We should therefore expect higher rates of on-site verification among the loans made 
after the last quarter of 2013. We detect, however, no evidence of a change in on-site verification 
rates in Table 7 (in fact, we observe a slight, although statistically insignificant, decrease in 
specification (1)). Similarly, tighter screening predicts higher borrower credit scores on the loans. 
However, we also find little evidence of an increased borrower credit score (specifications (3)-
                                                   
85 Throughout our analysis we implicitly assume that borrowers use P2P funds to purchase a home in the city where 
they live. A possible concern is that borrowers in control cities borrow funds on RenrenDai to buy a house in a treated 
city. In principle, this possibility would make our control and treatment groups more alike, working against our test 
and suggesting that our estimates represent a lower bound of the effects of interest. In addition, every city in our treated 
group has home purchase restrictions in place that actually prevent residents from other cities to purchase a second 
home in the areas under their jurisdiction. For instance, only a registered resident in Shenzen is  allowed to buy a 
second home in Shenzen, ruling out the possibility that a P2P borrower in, say, Chengdu (a city in our control group) 
may borrow on the platform to fulfil the down payment requirement set by another city. 
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(4)). Taken together, these results indicate that the lenders simply do not become more 
discriminating after November 2013.  
In line with these findings, the pricing and duration of loan contracts issued after 2013 also 
do not change appreciably. We find no significant changes in yield spreads (specifications (5)-
(6)), nor in duration (specifications (7)-(8)), after 2013. In sum, P2P lenders treat the influx of 
borrowers from the treated cities just like their old borrowers, and lend to them at conditions that 
are no different. This suggest that lenders make no adjustments to their lending terms following 
2013. The interesting question is, of course, whether this can be rationalized ex post, for instance 
because the “new” loans perform similarly to the “old” ones. 
B. Loan performance 
We test for this possibility by looking at two measures of loan performance: delinquencies (the 
proportion of months during which the borrower is delinquent over the loan’s life) and loan default 
rates. The sample size shrinks in this case, because of a truncation problem: for some ongoing 
loans, default may simply not have been declared yet.  
The evidence, reported in Table 8.A, indicates a deteriorating loan performance at the 
treated cities following 2013. We observe an increase in delinquency rates by 0.90 percentage 
points (specification (1)) and in default rates, also by 0.90 percentage points (specification (2)). 
Similar to the estimates reported by Morse (2015) for the U.S., default rates are on average about 
2% among RenrenDai loans (Table 1). 86 Our estimates imply, therefore, that defaults increase by 
45% in relative terms, which appears economically very relevant. Here too, we find that the effect 
is entirely driven by the extensive margin, and disappears once we control for borrower fixed 
effects. The interpretation is that the increased default rates occur primarily among “new” 
borrowers, who register on RenrenDai or start borrowing after 2013, and are thus more likely 
driven by the minimum down-payment increase. 
We further find, in Table 8.B (specifications (1)-(2)), that the increase in defaults is mainly 
associated with borrowers who are home owners. This is consistent with our earlier results, as 
                                                   
86 In the second half of 2015, there was a wave of defaults on P2P loans across mainland China, with much higher 
default rates than the 2% average associated with the entire sample (“China’s Unregulated P2P Lending Sites are Still 
Spreading Financial Instability”, China Economic Review July 28, 2015; “China Imposes Caps on P2P Loans to Curb 
Shadow-Banking Risks”, Bloomberg News, August 24, 2016). We are able to observe the increase in defaults in our 
data; however, given its timing, it has a minimal impact on our estimates around the 2013 increase in minimum down-
payment requirements. In particular, the 2015 default wave does not appear to have affected the treated cities in our 
test differently from the control cities. 
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home owners are more likely attempting to circumvent the minimum down-payment increase. We 
combine this test with a further one, in which we estimate an AR(1) model for house price indexes, 
obtaining house price growth forecasts for the treated cities. We then compute forecast errors, and 
run separate tests for cities where the forecast proves to be higher/lower than actual house price 
growth (specifications (3)-(4)). We find that the increase in defaults is estimated more precisely in 
cities where house price growth underperforms the forecast, but the point estimates are similar 
across the two groups. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in this section and the previous one indicates that: 
(i) Following the 2013 tightening of LTV caps, P2P borrowing rises abnormally at the treated 
cities; (ii) P2P lenders do not respond by adjusting their screening procedures, nor do they alter 
the pricing and duration of their loans in response; and (iii) Default rates among “new” post-2013 
borrowers are systematically higher. This suggests that the “lending technology” of the RenrenDai 
lenders is not flexible enough to induce them to tighten their lending standards in response to the 
influx of borrowers in the treated cities after November 2013, even though the loans they make 
turn out to be riskier.  
3.6. Evidence on the 2015 episode 
As explained, in September 2015 a reverse policy intervention is implemented across the country. 
As part of a broader stimulus package, the minimum down-payment requirements on first and 
second homes are lowered by 16.7%, from 30% to 25% of the asset’s purchase value and the 
minimum down-payment requirements on second homes are lowered from either 60% or 70% to 
40%, in all cities except Beijing, Guangzhou, Sanya, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Based on the 
arguments of Section II, this should curb the demand for P2P lending.  
Two caveats are in order here, to correctly interpret the tests we are about to present. First, 
the demand for P2P lending will decrease, under the assumption that the existing credit demand 
as of September 2015 incorporates a “P2P component” of borrowers who resort to P2P to meet 
existing down-payment requirements. This appears plausible, based on our findings on the effects 
of the 2013 policy intervention discussed in the preceding sections. Second, although the 2013 
episode provides a relatively “clean” experiment based on the unintended effects of the regulatory 
intervention, in 2015 the credit authorities may be more aware of the potential role of P2P lending.  
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Bearing these caveats in mind, we run tests similar to the ones presented in Sections IV 
and V. First, we examine changes in lending volumes following September 2015, comparing 
“treated” and “control” cities, where the treatment group includes all Chinese cities with the 
exception of Beijing, Guangzhou, Sanya, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, which form the control group. 
The results are illustrated in Table 9.A. Consistent with our expectations, we find that P2P lending 
drops at the treated cities, mainly driven by the extensive margin. In other words, some borrowers 
abandon the P2P channel altogether. In economic terms, the effects are similar to the ones 
presented in Section IV, but with the reverse sign.  
Second, we look at lending outcomes, in Table 9.B. Once again, we do not observe large 
changes in screening: the coefficient estimate in specification (4) on on-site verification, although 
statistically significant, is economically small at 2.4 percentage points; furthermore, we do not find 
any significant changes in credit scores, and the magnitude of the coefficient estimate in 
specification (3) is economically negligible. Given that, following the lowering of down-payment 
requirement, the P2P lenders should expect fewer bad borrowers, there is no reason they should 
tighten their screening. 
We do observe statistically significant changes in the loan terms (pricing and duration), but 
again they appear economically small. Yield spreads are reduced by about 10 bps, compared to 
the sample average of nearly 8%; loan duration drops by about 6%, or 1.5 months compared to the 
sample average of 27 months. Taken together, these findings, as well as those of Sections IV and 
V, suggest that P2P lenders are generally unresponsive to changes in mortgage LTV caps (and 
potentially policy interventions in the credit market in general), i.e. they do not condition their 
lending decisions to the expected “type” of borrower they may face. This is perhaps consistent 
with the lower sophistication anecdotally associated with P2P lenders, although as we documented 
RenrenDai lenders have relatively large loan portfolios, suggesting some degree of financial 
sophistication. On the other hand, this evidence indicates that the benefits of P2P in terms of 
informal contracting and “proximate knowledge” found by the earlier literature may be limited in 
this context.  
Finally, we do not observe any material changes in delinquencies. Default rates decline by 
3.8 percentage points in the treated cities, but the coefficient estimate is at best marginally 
statistically significant (t-stat: 1.52).  
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3.7. Discussion and policy implications 
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, evidence has accumulated documenting the negative 
effects of household leverage, and how high levels of debt exacerbate the business cycle (Lamont 
and Stein (1999), Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017)). Macroprudential 
tools have been the focus of much of the debate on how to design policies to contain household 
leverage (Allen and Carletti (2011), Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011)), and there is evidence 
showing that they can be effective (Igan and Kang (2011)). 
Our findings, on the other hand, point to a vulnerability of LTV caps affecting loans made 
by traditional credit providers such as banks. Long considered one of the main tools of 
macroprudential regulation, we provide evidence suggesting that they can be eluded via the P2P 
credit channel. By themselves, P2P loans are not a threat to financial stability; however, because 
of the nature of LTV caps, even a relatively small amount of P2P credit can lead to a large mortgage 
debt.  
A policy solution may not be trivial. One possible approach is to broaden the scope of 
mortgage credit regulation to ratios other than LTV, such as debt-to-income (DTI), which take into 
account the entire debt position of the prospective borrower; and indeed the literature on 
macroprudential regulation discusses DTI as a relevant additional tool (Crowe, Dell’Arriccia, Igan, 
and Rabanal (2012)). That, however, requires setting up a credit registry; and monitoring P2P loans 
implies collecting information to a level of detail which, to the best of our knowledge, is 
unprecedented in most developed economies. DTI caps, moreover, may limit households’ ability 
to (efficiently) borrow against future income to smooth consumption over their life cycle. Finally, 
subjecting P2P platforms to more stringent documentation and transparency requirements risks 
eroding the very flexibility that makes them a viable business in the first place. 
3.8. Conclusion 
We investigate the capacity of P2P credit to undermine loan-to-value (LTV) caps in mortgage 
markets. We rely on a novel, hand-collected database containing all loan transactions at 
RenrenDai, a leading Chinese P2P credit platform, and focus on the increase in 2013 of down-
payment requirements on second-home mortgages at several major Chinese cities. This tightening 
of LTV caps raises the demand for P2P credit by borrowers, who try to circumvent the new down-
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payment requirement. Consistent with this argument, P2P loans increase at the treated cities 
relative to the control cities following the new LTV cap. Importantly, the structure of our data 
allows us to separate credit demand and supply effects, using a lender × date fixed effects strategy 
– we are thus able to isolate the capacity of the P2P channel to fuel household debt. We validate 
this analysis with evidence from a reverse experiment in 2015, when city governments lower 
minimum down-payment requirements, resulting in a drop in P2P credit demand. In either episode, 
we find little evidence that P2P lenders adjust their policies in response to the expected 
characteristics of their borrowers, suggesting that the information benefits of P2P credit that have 
been observed by part of the literature may be limited. Our results indicate that P2P credit can act 
as a channel to circumvent LTV caps affecting loans made by traditional credit providers (and 
potentially other macroprudential tools). The rapid growth of P2P credit in recent years and its 
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Figure 1 P2P Loan Applications at RenrenDai around the 2013 Increase in Down-Payment Requirements 
The graphs plot the P2P loan applications on the RenrenDai platform, for treated and control cities, around the 2013 increase in mortgage down-payment requirements. 
In panel A, the vertical axis reports the city-level RMB loan applications volume per capita, averaged across all treated cities (Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, 
Hangzhou, Nanjing, Nanchang, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, and Wuhan) and control cities (all other Chinese cities with population above 5 million). In panel B, 
the vertical axis reports the number of loan applications per capita, averaged across treated and control cities. We normalize each series so as to equal 1 on the date of 
the change in down-payment requirements (the fourth quarter of 2013), such that the vertical axis represents the relative change in P2P loan applications compared to 


























Table 1 Summary Statistics 
The table reports summary statistics. Panel A describes loan characteristics, panel B borrower characteristics, and panel 
C lender characteristics. All variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. The sample consists of all loans on the 
RenrenDai platform, over the period 2011Q1-2015Q2 for borrowers located in metropolitan areas in mainland China 
with population above 5 million. 
  Mean St. dev. Min Median Max N 
A. Loan characteristics 
Loan amount (RMB) 59,674 53,816 3,000 52,900 3,000,000 107,502 
Interest rate (%) 12.49 1.01 7.00 12.60 24.40 107,502 
Interest rate spread (%) 7.78 1.07 2.89 7.84 19.81 107,502 
Duration (months) 27.06 9.78 1 24 36 107,502 
On-site verification (Y/N) 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 107,457 
Borrower credit score 171.82 29.71 0 180 181 107,339 
Proportion of months delinquent (%) 1.96 11.35 0 0 100 107,502 
Default (0/1) 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 78,289 
              
B. Borrower characteristics 
Income (monthly RMB) 11,334 13,254 0 5,000 50,000 107,494 
Age 37.74 8.41 23 36 56 107,502 
College degree (0/1) 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 107,498 
Male (0/1) 0.64 0.48 0 1 1 107,502 
Home owner (0/1) 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 107,502 
Number of applications since registration 1.35 3.54 1 1 148 107,502 
Total amount borrowed since registration (RMB) 66,079 99,927 3,000 53,600 9,000,000 107,502 
       
C. Lender characteristics 
Portfolio size (RMB) 387,978 485,871 4,689 289,434 4,215,150 107,502 
Portfolio size (nr. loans) 234.53 156.08 4.00 199.99 1,975 107,502 
Uplan lending (% of RMB) 67.18 31.26 0 86.02 100 107,502 
Uplan lending (% of loans made) 71.94 30.49 0 91.20 100 107,502 
Portfolio concentration (HHI) 0.007 0.019 0 0.001 1 107,502 
Experience (months since first loan) 6.86 4.31 0 5.80 37 107,502 







Table 2 Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups pre-November 2013 
The table compares the characteristics of borrowers and lenders on loans associated with cities in the treatment (Beijing, 
Changsha, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Nanchang, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, and Wuhan) and control 
groups (all other Chinese cities with over 5 million inhabitants) prior to the November 2013 increase in minimum 
mortgage down-payment requirements. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. The column labeled 
“Treated” reports the average of each characteristic for the treatment group, the column “Control” for the control group, 
the column “Difference” their difference, and the column “t-statistic” the t-test statistic for the difference, based on 
standard errors clustered around cities.  
  Treated Control Difference t-statistic 
A. Borrower characteristics 
Income (RMB) 11,216 11,872 -656.27 -0.731 
Age 39.18 38.73 0.449 1.175 
College degree (0/1) 0.51 0.45 0.06 1.695* 
Male (0/1) 0.59 0.57 0.02 0.877 
Home owner (0/1) 0.18 0.27 -0.09 -2.040** 
Number of applications since registration 1.51 2.06 -0.56 -0.974 
Total amount borrowed since registration (RMB) 69,501 65,005 4,494 0.536 
    
B. Lender characteristics 
Portfolio size (RMB)  468,649   492,152   -23,503  0.833 
Portfolio size (nr. loans) 268.2 275.6 -7.385 0.579 
Uplan lending (% of RMB) 68.93 71.64 -2.712 0.640 
Uplan lending (% of loans made) 72.76 75.57 -2.805 0.655 
Portfolio concentration (HHI) 0.006 0.005 0.001 -0.530 
Experience (months since first loan) 4.492 4.396 0.095 -0.745 
Number of lenders per loan 33.37 33.81 -0.44 -0.272 
 
C. Macroeconomic characteristics 
    
Province GDP per capita (RMB) 60,301 46,991 13,310 1.060 
Province population (× 10,000) 5,251 6,249 -998 -0.649 
Province annual GDP per capita growth (%) 8.16 11.20 -0.03 -1.336 
Province annual population growth (%) 1.04 0.76 0.28 0.690 
Monthly % change in house prices (past 18 months) 44.3 60.1 -15.8 0.543 
Household net debt-to-income -0.745 -0.422 -0.323 -1.299 
Real wage index 1.425 1.613 -0.188 -0.826 
Annual wage growth (%) 10.7 11.0 0.3 0.261 
Unemployment rate (%) 13.4 14.5 1.5 0.544 
RenrenDai penetration (applications per 10,000 inhabitants) 1.725 1.411 0.314 0.773 
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Table 3 P2P Lending around the 2013 Increase in Mortgage Down-Payment Requirements: City Level 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝐿𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 
Each observation corresponds to a given city 𝑐 on a given calendar quarter 𝑡. The dependent variable is the log-loan 
amount associated with the aggregate loan applications or actual loan volume in the city. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the city belongs to the treatment group (Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Nanchang, 
Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, and Wuhan). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 over the period followinga change 
in mortgage down-payment requirements. In specifications (1)-(2), the sample period covers a window of ±1 year around 
the down-payment increase; in specifications (3)-(4), ±2 years. Specifications (1) and (3) focus on loan applications, and 
specifications (2) and (4) restrict the focus to loans that are actually granted. To control for serial correlation in the standard 
errors, we time-average and collapse the data (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)), and estimate: 
Δ𝐿𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑐 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑐 + 𝜂𝑐 
where Δ𝐿𝑐 denotes the change in log-loan amount from before to after the change in down-payment requirements. In all 
specifications, the vector of control variables 𝑥 includes province GDP and population level and past growth rates, city-
level house price % growth over the past 18 months, and yearly real wages and wage growth, and city-level net household 
debt over income. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the city level. Panel B estimates analogous 
specifications, where the dependent variable is the (change in) house price growth rate in city 𝑐, before and after the down-
payment requirement increase. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively.  
A. Credit volumes 
 
± 1 year around down-payment 
requirement increase  
± 2 years around down-payment 
requirement increase 
 Applications Loans  Applications Loans 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  0.105*** 0.066*  0.131*** 0.074* 
 (0.035) (0.037)  (0.040) (0.039) 
      
Controls Y Y  Y Y 
R2 0.54 0.49  0.60 0.54 
N 51 51  51 51 
      
B. House price growth 
 
± 1 year around down-payment 
requirement increase  
± 2 years around down-payment 
requirement increase 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  0.009 -0.004  0.014** -0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.005) 
      
Controls N Y  N Y 
R2 0.10 0.47  0.14 0.75 
N 51 51  51 51 
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Table 4 P2P Lending around the 2013 Increase in Mortgage Down-Payment Requirements: Lender-Borrower 
Level 
The table reports the estimates of: 
Δ𝐿𝑙𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏𝑐 + 𝜇
′Δ𝑥𝑏𝑐 + 𝑙𝑏 
Each observation corresponds to a given pair borrower 𝑏-lender 𝑙. The dependent variable is the change in the natural 
logarithm of loans made by lender 𝑙 to borrower 𝑏 (average after the 2013 increase in down-payment requirements minus 
average before that). 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if borrower 𝑏 is located in a city 𝑐 that belongs to the 
treatment group (Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Nanchang, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, and 
Wuhan). Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), the equation is estimated on changes around the down-
payment requirement increase, after collapsing and time-averaging the data around the policy intervention. All 
specifications except (4), include lender fixed effects, corresponding to controlling for a lender-specific intercept before 
and after the 2013 increase in down-payment requirements. Specifications (1)-(4) focus on loan volumes in the full 
sample, specification (5) on the sub-sample of borrowers who borrow on RenrenDai both before and after the down-
payment increase, and specification (6) on the subset of borrowers who borrow on RenrenDai only before or only after. 
Province controls include province GDP per capita level and GDP growth over the past 12 months, province population 
level and population growth over the past 12 months, and the % change of the city house prices in the previous 18 months. 
Labor market controls include city-level unemployment rate, yearly real wages and wage growth. Household finance 
controls include city-level household net debt over income. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at 
the city level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  





 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 0.020* 0.025** 0.025** 0.034*  -0.001 0.025** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019)  (0.013) (0.012) 
        
Province controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
Labor market controls N Y Y Y  Y Y 
Household finance controls N N Y Y  Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
Lender FE Y Y Y N  Y Y 
        
R2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.03  0.58 0.38 
N 5,051,602 5,051,602 5,051,602 5,065,546   94,542 4,938,974 
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Table 5 Credit Volumes, Borrower Home Ownership, and House Price Growth 
The table reports the estimates of regressions with identical specification as in Table 4, estimated over alternative sub-
samples. Specifications (1)-(2) focus on borrower home ownership (Y/N); specifications (3)-(4) on the borrower’s city 
house price growth rate (High – above the median/Low – below the median). The standard errors (reported in parentheses) 
are clustered at the city level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 Borrower  
home owner 
 Borrower city  
house price growth 
 Yes No   High Low 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 0.038*** -0.006  0.014* 0.010 
 
(0.013) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.024) 
      
Province controls Y Y  Y Y 
Labor market controls Y Y  Y Y 
Household finance controls Y Y  Y Y 
Region FE Y Y  Y Y 
Lender FE Y Y  Y Y 
      
R2 0.37 0.40  0.38 0.40 





Table 6 Credit Volumes and Lender Characteristics 
The table reports the estimates of regressions with identical specification as in Table 4, estimated over alternative sub-
samples defined by lenders’ characteristics. Panel A focuses on whether a loan is made via Uplan or direct peer-to-peer 
and whether the lender’s experience is low or high (below/above the median). Panel B focuses on the size of the lender’s 
portfolio, which we divide into quartiles. The standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the city level. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
A. Lending channel and experience 
 Lending channel  Experience 
 Uplan Direct  Low High 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 0.029** 0.008  0.018* 0.012** 
 (0.013) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.006) 
      
Province controls Y Y  Y Y 
Labor market controls Y Y  Y Y 
Household finance controls Y Y  Y Y 
Region FE Y Y  Y Y 
Lender FE Y Y  Y Y 
      
R2 0.35 0.60  0.65 0.26 
N 3,990,351 1,053,846  2,480,133 2,445,586 
 
B. Portfolio size 
 Quartile 
 Bottom 2  3 Top 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 0.004 0.017  0.034** 0.032** 
 (0.006) (0.011)  (0.013) (0.013) 
      
Province controls Y Y  Y Y 
Labor market controls Y Y  Y Y 
Household finance controls Y Y  Y Y 
Region FE Y Y  Y Y 
Lender FE Y Y  Y Y 
      
R2 0.69 0.55  0.42 0.26 






Table 7 P2P Loan Pricing and Screening of the Borrowers around the 2013 Increase in Down-Payment 
Requirements 
The table reports the estimates of: 
𝑌𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑏 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇
′𝑥𝑏𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡 
Each observation corresponds to a given borrower 𝑏 on a given calendar date 𝑡. The dependent variable 𝑌𝑏𝑡 is the on-site 
verification indicator ((1)-(2)), the borrower’s credit score ((3)-(4)), the interest rate spread associated with the loan (spec. 
(5)-(6)), and the natural logarithm of the duration of the loan ((7)-(8)). 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
city belongs to the treatment group (Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Nanchang, Shanghai, Shenyang, 
Shenzhen, and Wuhan). 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 over the period following a change in mortgage down-
payment requirements (after November 2013 for all treated cities, with the exception of Beijing, where it is equal to 1 
following May 2013). In all specifications, the vector of control variables 𝑥 includes city fixed effects, calendar month 
fixed effects, administrative region × calendar month fixed effects, city-level house price % growth over the past 18 
months, borrower age, income, college degree, gender, number of applications the borrower, total amount borrowed since 
registration, number of lenders per loan, and yearly macroeconomic controls province GDP and population level and past 
growth rates, city-level unemployment rate, real wage level and wage growth, and city-level household net debt over 
income (in these specifications, fixed borrower characteristics and yearly macroeconomic controls are dropped). 
Specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) also control also for borrower fixed effects. The standard errors (reported in 
parentheses) are clustered at the city level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels respectively.  
 On-site 
verification 
 Credit score  Spread  Duration 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.060 0.006  -0.031 0.002  -0.000 -0.002  -0.020 -0.073 
 (0.054) (0.039)  (0.031) (0.010)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.025) (0.066) 
            
Controls Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
City FE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Month FE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Region × Month FE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
Borrower FE N Y  N Y  N Y  N Y 
            
R2 0.50 0.98  0.20 0.99  0.45 0.77  0.44 0.90 





Table 8 P2P Loan Performance following the 2013 Increase in Down-Payment Requirements 
The table reports the estimates regressions analogous to Table 7. In panel A, the dependent variable is delinquency, the 
proportion of months during the borrowing period in which the borrower is delinquent (spec. (1)-(2)), or a default indicator 
(spec. (3)-(4)). In panel B, the dependent variable is delinquency, and the sample is split between loans to borrowers who 
own a home or not (spec. (1)-(2)), as well as between loans to borrowers located in cities with high/low (above/below the 
median) ex post house price forecast error (spec. (3)-(4)). The vector of control variables 𝑥 is the same as in the regressions 
of Table 7. Specifications (2) and (4) in Panel A also control also for borrower fixed effects. In both panels and all 
specifications, the standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the city level. The symbols *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
A. Full sample 
 Delinquency  Default 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.009* -0.027  0.009* -0.056 
 (0.004) (0.040)  (0.004) (0.042) 
      
Controls Y Y  Y Y 
City FE Y Y  Y Y 
Month FE Y Y  Y Y 
Region × Month FE Y Y  Y Y 
Borrower FE N Y  N Y 
      
R2 0.20 0.65  0.12 0.52 
N 98,601 4,111  70,469 3,547 
 
B. Borrower home ownership and house price forecast error 
 Borrower  
home owner 
 Borrower city  
house price forecast error 
 Yes No  High Low 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.010* 0.006  0.008* 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.090) 
      
Controls Y Y  Y Y 
City FE Y Y  Y Y 
Month FE Y Y  Y Y 
Region × Month FE Y Y  Y Y 
      
R2 0.21 0.21  0.21 0.21 





Table 9 P2P Lending around the 2015 Decrease in Down-Payment Requirements 
Panel A reports the estimates of regressions analogous to Table 4, estimated around the September 2015 decrease in 
down-payment requirements. In this case, the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 indicator equals 1 for all Chinese cities with at least 5 million 
inhabitants except Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanya, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Panel B reports the estimates of regressions 
analogous to Tables 7 and 8, estimated again around the September 2015 decrease in down-payment requirements. The 
control variables are the same as in the regressions of Table 7. Specifications (2) and (4) in Panel A also control also for 
borrower fixed effects.  In all panels and specifications, the standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the 
city level. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
A. Credit volumes 
 Full Sample 
 Intensive margin Extensive margin 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 -0.048* -0.027**  -0.017 -0.027** 
 (0.028) (0.011) 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
      
Controls Y Y  Y Y 
Region FE Y Y  Y Y 
Lender FE N Y  Y Y 
      
R2 0.012 0.390  0.444 0.398 
N 14,367,497 13,960,421  313,499 13,589,210 
      






Spread Duration Delinquency Default 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.024** -0.088 -0.001*** -0.064*** 0.006 -0.038 
 (0.011) (0.058) (0.000) (0.019) (0.005) (0.025) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region × Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
R2 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.15 0.09 







A. Loan characteristics 
Loan amount (RMB) Amount of the loan in RMB. 
Interest rate (%) Annual interest rate applied to the loan. 
Interest rate spread (%) Annual interest rate minus the corresponding one-year Shibor rate. 
Duration (months) Maturity of the loan, expressed in number of months. 
On-site verification (Y/N) Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if an officer from RenrenDai 
verified that the information provided by the borrower on the internet 
platform is true, by visiting the borrower at her stated address. 
Credit score Credit score assigned to the borrower by RenrenDai. 
Proportion of Months Delinquent (%) The proportion of months, over the loan’s life, during which the borrower is 
delinquent. A borrower is delinquent if she misses or delays the monthly 
payment of the interest and/or the monthly repayment of the principal. 
Default (0/1) Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a loan is declared in default and 
0 otherwise. 
B. Borrower characteristics 
Income (RMB) Borrower’s monthly income at the origination of the loan. RenrenDai 
provides this information in brackets: between 0 and 1,000, between 1,001 
and 2,000, between 2,001 and 5,000, between 5,001 and 10,000, between 
10,001 and 20,000, between 20,001 and 50,000, and above 50,000 RMB. 
Age Age of the borrower at the origination of the loan. 
College degree (0/1) Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower has a college 
degree or higher education level. 
Male (0/1) Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower is a male. 
Home Owner (0/1) Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower owns a house and 
0 otherwise. 
Number of applications since registration Number of loan applications, at the time of the loan origination, made by the 
borrower since her registration in RenrenDai. 
Total Amount Borrowed since registration  Total RMB borrowed by the borrower on Renredai at the time of the loan 
origination since her registration  
C. Lender characteristics 
Portfolio size (RMB) Size of lenders’s portfolio, measured in RMB. 
Portfolio size (nr. loans) Size of lender’s portfolio, measured in number of loans. 
Uplan lending (% of RMB) % of the lender’s portfolio (measured in RMB) invested via Uplan. 
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Uplan lending (% of loans made) % of the lender’s portfolio (measured in number of loans) invested via Uplan. 
Portfolio concentration (HHI) Concentration of the lenders’ portfolio. Concentration is measured with a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), based on the relative proportion of each 
loan with respect to the total size of the lender’s portfolio.   
Experience (months since first loan) Experience of the lender, measured as a the number of months between the 
origination of the loan and the first loan made by the lender on Renrendai. 
Number of Lenders per loan Number of lenders funding a particular loan issue on Renrendai 
D. Macroeconomic variables 
Province GDP per capita GDP per capita of the province where the borrower’s city is located, retrieved 
from the CSMAR database. 
Province population Population of the province where the borrower’s city is located, retrieved 
from the CSMAR database. 
Province annual GDP per capita growth Annual GDP per capita growth of the province where the borrower’s city is 
located, retrieved from the CSMAR database. 
Province annual population growth (%) Annual population growth of the province where the borrower’s city is 
located, retrieved from the CSMAR database. 
Monthly % change in house prices (past 18 
months) 
Average growth of house prices in the city during the past 18 months, 
retrieved from the China Index Academy databank. 
Household net debt to income Total city household debt minus total city households bank deposits divided 
by city GDP, retrieved from the CSMAR database. 
Real wage index Average wage per worker in the city divided by the city’s CPI (base, 
Shanghai in November 2013), retrieved from the CSMAR database. 
Annual nominal wage growth Average growth of nominal wages per workers in the city, retrieved from the 
CSMAR database. 
Unemployment rate Number of unemployed individuals in the city divided by the city labor force, 
retrieved from the CSMAR database. 
RenrenDai penetration Number of loan applications per city in a given year divided by city 
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